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FOREWORD
The following volume consists of research that the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)
commissioned and vetted throughout 2006. For at least half
of the chapters, authors presented versions of their work
as testimony before Congressional oversight committees.
Among them are some of the sharpest critics and staunchest
boosters of U.S.-Indian nuclear and strategic cooperation.
No matter what one’s point of view, though, these chapters
deserve close attention since all are focused on what is
needed to assure U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation succeeds.
The volume offers U.S. and Indian policy and law makers
a detailed checklist of things to watch, avoid, and try to
achieve.
Funding for this project came from the Catherine D.
MacArthur Foundation. Ashley Tellis and George Perkovich
of the Carnegie Endowment, Gary Schmitt of the American
Enterprise Institute, Gary Samore from the Council on
Foreign Relations, Robert Einhorn of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, a select number of officials within
the U.S. Executive Branch, and numerous aides serving on
Capitol Hill provided guidance and assistance.
Special thanks is due to Ali Naqvi, NPEC’s project
manager, who was saddled with the responsibility of
arranging the many dinner seminars at which each chapter
was shared with Capitol Hill and Executive Branch Staff,
embassy officials, policy analysts, and the press. Finally,
this is the eighth in a series of edited volumes NPEC has
produced with the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). To the
book’s authors, the SSI staff, and all those who made this
book possible, NPEC and SSI are indebted.
HENRY SOKOLSKI
Executive Director
Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center


CHAPTER 1
NEGOTIATING THE OBSTACLES
TO U.S.-INDIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION
Henry Sokolski
As this volume goes to press, the Henry J. Hyde U.S.India Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 became
the law of land. Passage of this legislation, which was
16 months in the making, was heralded by its backers
as the most significant U.S. strategic development
since the end of the Cold War. In at least three respects,
though, the law has yet to be implemented and its
strategic implications are still unclear.
First, U.S. nuclear cooperation—the lynch pin of
U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation, according to the
deal’s supporters—has to navigate several necessary
steps. India has not yet negotiated a nuclear cooperative
agreement with the United States. This will take several
months. The key issues here include nuclear testing
and the sharing of nuclear fuel technology. In the first
instance, India objects to congressional demands that
all nuclear cooperation be terminated if India tests; in
the second, Congress opposes such sharing unless the
transfers are part of a larger nonproliferation effort.
Also, because India has not signed the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and refuses to open all
of its nuclear facilities to international inspections, it
is not yet eligible to import controlled nuclear goods
from the United States or any other of the 44 members
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). To change this,
the NSG must agree by consensus to make an exception



for India. It is unclear how this might work. China (an
NSG member) has offered nuclear cooperation to India,
but has argued that any exception for India should be
framed in such a way also to allow nuclear transfers
to Pakistan as well. Several NSG members, including
Sweden, also seem uncomfortable approving civilian
nuclear cooperation unless India does more to restrain
its nuclear weapons program.
In any case, before the NSG is likely to approve any
exception for India, it must reach at least a tentative
agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) regarding the inspection of eight
additional civilian Indian reactors. India is insisting
that these plants only be inspected if and when they
contain foreign fuel. IAEA officials, meanwhile, are
resisting this proposal for fear that it will become a
new lower standard for IAEA inspections for other
countries. In addition, several NSG members are
anxious to do nothing that might let India believe
that it can test nuclear weapons and continue to
receive civilian nuclear assistance. Finally, under
the legislation President Bush recently signed, a U.S.
nuclear cooperative agreement must be completely
negotiated, an NSG waiver agreed to, and all of the
legal steps necessary to conclude an IAEA safeguards
agreement implemented before Congress can consider
approving U.S nuclear cooperation with India.
Assuming all of these conditions will be met, U.S.Indian strategic cooperation will proceed. A new raft of
questions, however, will then immediately arise. Will
nuclear cooperation expand or—as some Indian and
American critics have predicted—become effectively
dead due to a lack of mutual nuclear interest? To what
extent will Indian nuclear supporters who have pushed
nuclear power as an energy independence effort be



interested in buying foreign reactors? Will Congress
see the merit of guaranteeing Export-Import Bank
loans for major U.S. nuclear sales? Will U.S. nuclear
vendors demand that India establish a credible nuclear
insurance pool or provide them with immunity from
possible legal claims due to future accidents or acts
of nuclear terrorism? Shortly after the July 11, 2006,
Mumbai terror bombing, Indian officials announced
they were doing all they could to assure Indian nuclear
plants would be safe against terror attacks. Will the
Indian government be able to do enough?
Then there are the additional challenges the United
States and India face assuming nuclear cooperation
does proceed. Will U.S. and other foreign sales of
nuclear fuel and nuclear technology to India directly or
indirectly assist India’s nuclear weapons program and
so implicate the United States and others in violating
Article 1 of the NPT (which prohibits such assistance
to any state that did not have nuclear weapons before
1967)? The legislation President Bush recently signed
into law makes it clear that Congress is keen to avoid
such violations. The Hyde Act states that it should
be U.S. policy to strengthen the NPT, IAEA, and
NSG, and encourage India to limit the expansion of
its nuclear strategic forces. The act also makes clear
Congress’ desire for India to abide by the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and that satellite
launch assistance, which the United States also offered
to India, will only be used for peaceful purposes.
Critics of the deal worry that India will secure special
treatment by the IAEA and NSG that will lower
existing control standards. Key proponents of strategic
cooperation and the nuclear deal, meanwhile, insist
that India should be allowed—even encouraged—to
build up its strategic nuclear missile forces to serve as



a counterweight to China. Might New Delhi expand its
nuclear forces but choose not to cooperate closely with
the United States?
This immediately raises the question of Iran. The
Hyde Act requires the President to report whether
India, which struck a high-technology-diplomaticintelligence-military-training strategic cooperation
agreement with Iran in 2003, is working actively with
the United States to isolate and sanction Iran for its
nuclear misbehavior. The question is will India do so?
India has close ties to Iran to help it outflank Pakistan.
It also has clear cultural sympathies (India has 150
million Muslims, and Iran has recognized Kashmir as
a legitimate part of India), and even clearer economic
interests (India is a major refiner of Iranian oil and
views Iran’s oil and natural gas as an energy option to
service is own economy). India has allowed sensitive
nuclear and rocket technology transfers to be made
to Tehran and was reported to have discussed space
launch cooperation with Iran, which would have direct
application to Iran’s development of missiles capable of
hitting Europe and the United States. Can the interests
India might develop with the United States override its
attraction to improving its ties to Tehran?
This brings us to the last concern: How well will
India and the United States be able to balance their
differing strategic goals? In the near term, the United
States wants help from India in isolating and sanctioning
Iran. It is doubtful, however, if India will go very far
to achieve this aim. The United States would also like
India to help in the reconstruction of Iraq. But this too is
unlikely. Some Indian officials, meanwhile, are anxious
to block what they see as its increasing encirclement
by China. India not only has reached out to cooperate
and support Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore, but



Burma—a regime the United States opposes. Beyond
this, many Indian officials seem just as concerned about
being encircled by the United States in Central Asia, the
Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean as they are about
undue Chinese influence in these regions. For these
reasons, India recently announced that it and China
would engage in joint military, energy, economic,
and nuclear cooperation. The question is, will this
cooperation assure that the two nations achieve what
Indian Prime Minister Singh described as “reshaping
the world”? If so, how might key U.S. interests fair?
The Indians currently are demanding that the United
States provide them with some of the most advanced,
classified U.S. defense technologies. Will this and other
demands be the set “price” the United States must pay
to secure India’s strategic cooperation or will India
merely play the United States off against China and
visa versa indefinitely? China and India recently agreed
to increase their mutual trade to record levels over the
next decade. The United States and India, meanwhile,
have agreed to reduce barriers to increasing U.S.-Indian
trade. Will U.S. trade with India prosper in the next
decade and prove more important to India than trade
with China, or will India’s trade with China prove to
be more significant?
All of these questions are addressed in this book.
There is a detailed study of India’s electrical future
from two analysts working at one of America’s most
prominent economic developmental advisory groups;
a history of the Indian civilian nuclear program by a
leading Indian nuclear analyst and commentator; and
an analysis of the relationship between civilian and
military nuclear programs by an international panel
of nuclear scientists that includes leading Pakistani,
Indian, and American experts. Also, there is a detailed



nuclear terrorism risk assessment of India’s civilian
nuclear program by one of the leading American
nuclear terrorism experts; an arms control analysis
from the most authoritative historian of India’s nuclear
weapons program; and a missile technology analysis
of India’s missile programs by an original architect
of the MTCR. Finally, there is an assessment of what
we can expect of our strategic partnership with India
from the Bush administration’s key advisor on U.S.Indian affairs; a detailed analysis of India’s strategic
partnership with Iran by one of America’s leading IndoIranian observers; and a review of what the United
States might do to assure a stronger strategic friendship
with India than was secured with China by the former
China desk officer in the Rumsfeld Pentagon.
What are the bottom line recommendations of these
analysts and of experts who reviewed their work? If
the United States and India are serious about having
a positive and fruitful strategic relationship, a number
of minimal, specific, additional steps beyond merely
striking a nuclear cooperative agreement with the U.S.
government, will be necessary. Specifically:
1. The United States should begin negotiations
now to reach a free trade agreement in due course
with India. A potential problem with the United
States developing sounder relations with India is the
relatively lower level of trade that may be conducted
between India and the United States as compared to
trade between China and the United States. Indian
regulations, bureaucratic fiat, and protectionism have
played a heavy hand in reducing U.S. investment in
and trade with India. The United States should take
the lead to change this by beginning negotiations to
establish a free trade zone with India and promising to
conclude these talks when India removes its obstacles



to increased U.S. bilateral trade. Working toward this
end will do more to cement sound strategic economic
and political relations with India than any military
or nuclear cooperative venture could ever do alone.
Congress can support this course of action simply
by passing a sense of Congress resolution urging the
Executive Branch to begin such negotiations. The
Executive, meanwhile, can choose to begin talks on its
own without waiting upon Congress to pass such a
resolution.
2. The United States should do more to make it
easier for Indian citizens to visit and work in the
United States. At the end of the last Congress, House
Republicans attempted to increase the number of
business visas Indians might be able to secure to
come to the United States. This initiative failed. It is
worthy of resurrecting. The more Indians that can
visit and work in the United States, the better both
economically and politically for the United States
and for India. Again, the strategic value of freeing the
movement of peoples between India and the United
States far exceeds anything that might be secured
through any government-to-government space or
nuclear cooperative project. As already noted, the
House nearly passed a law expanding such visas. The
Executive Branch and the new Congress should work
together to make such an expansion occur.
3. Congress must enforce current law to assure
that U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation does not bring
down the very nonproliferation institutions—the
NPT, IAEA, an NSG—that the deal’s backers claim
it should fortify. India may not have signed the NPT,
but the United States and the world’s other key nuclear
suppliers have. Technically, NPT weapons states cannot
help any nation that did not have nuclear weapons



before 1967 (including India) directly or indirectly to
acquire nuclear weapons. That means that the United
States cannot help New Delhi meet its nuclear reactor
fuel requirements unless U.S. officials can be sure that
doing so will not indirectly help India increase its
nuclear weapons production. This will require a careful
annual monitoring of the Indian civilian and military
nuclear programs. It would help if a pledge could be
secured from India that it will not increase its nuclear
weapons production beyond current levels. Here, it
would also be useful if the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal is
implemented in a manner that will not undermine the
NSG. The NSG was created to restrict trade to countries
like India that refused to open all of their civilian nuclear
facilities to international inspections and proceeded to
make nuclear weapons and test them. Lest the NSG
establish a new lower standard for nuclear trade that
would encourage countries to think they could proceed
to divert nuclear materials and test them, several NSG
members have privately suggested that any Indian
resumption of nuclear testing should cause all of the
NSG membership to suspend nuclear cooperation until
the NSG has had a chance to confer and agree on some
other course of action. Finally, the IAEA should take
care not to let its own safeguard standards be reduced
any further. India wants safeguards only to apply if
foreign fuel is present in its civilian reactors. The IAEA,
so far, has been resisting accepting this looser standard.
Several members of the NSG are refusing to consider
opening nuclear trade with India until this matter is
resolved. Under current U.S. law, both the NSG and
the IAEA must complete their work in dealing with
India before the U.S. Congress acts. This part of the
law must be upheld to avoid any misunderstanding
of what U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation might entail



and to increase the prospects that the most worrisome
issues associated with civilian nuclear commerce with
India are resolved properly.
4. Insist that India establish a credible nuclear
accident insurance pool and cooperate to reduce
nuclear terrorism risks before providing it with
significant civilian nuclear exports. Most U.S. and foreign nuclear equipment vendors have to be concerned
that India’s current lack of a nuclear accident insurance
pool would put them at risk of being held liable in the
case of any nuclear accident involving their hardware.
Currently, the Indian government does not allow any
of its civilian nuclear facilities to be owned or managed
by private entities. It therefore sees no need to provide
for private insurance against nucelar accidents. If
the United States is serious about wanting India to
expand its use of nuclear power and to import the best
technology it can from abroad, it has a direct stake in
seeing India loosen the management and ownership
reigns over nuclear power plants. For this purpose,
going beyond the minimal protections that eventually
will be afforded by the Vienna Convention on Civil
Nuclear Liability Damage (which has not yet entered
into force) will be essential. At a minimum, the United
States should encourage India to develop an insurance
pool equivalent to that afforded by the Price Anderson
Act, which has been criticized in the United States for
being far less than what would be required to cover
a major nuclear accident. As for nuclear terrorism,
India has voiced concerns that its own civilian nuclear
facilities might be targeted by Muslim extremists
and has offered to work more closely with Pakistan
to reduce these risks. Many Indian nuclear officials,
however, have voiced concerns about cooperating with
the United States to reduce these threats for fear such



cooperation might reveal secrets about India’s nuclear
weapons program. These misplaced apprehensions
need to be overcome. Pushing India to provide for
adequate nuclear insurance should help.
5. Restrict satellite launch cooperation with India to
activities that avoid transferring even “safeguarded”
MTCR-controlled know-how until New Delhi clearly
ends its military and high-technology cooperation
with Iran. Iran and India previously have discussed
cooperation in space launch vehicle (SLV) technology.
SLV technology, however, is interchangeable with
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology. If
there should be any revelations that India has helped
Iran develop long-range missiles that could threaten
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies
and the United States, this news would seriously
undermine European and American public support for
high-technology and defense cooperation with India
generally. Meanwhile, the prospects that India will
cut off its military-to-military cooperation with Iran
in the near term is not very high. But, then, neither is
India’s need to develop its own satellite launch vehicle
or ICBM. The former is cost ineffective as compared
to launching satellites off other nations’ existing space
launch vehicles, and the latter is provocative militarily
and self-defeating regarding sound relations with
Pakistan and China. As long as the United States is
eager to uphold and strengthen the MTCR, it would
be wise do nothing to undermine its strictures against
member states sharing satellite integration and satellite
launch technology as it did in the commercial space
satellite launch cooperation with China in the l990s.
The latter was supposedly “safeguarded.” However,
the effectiveness of such safeguards is limited and
such protections are virtually useless if the recipient
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has a strong incentive to cheat. Here, careful, routine
congressional oversight of the U.S. export licensing
process regarding space-related transfers to India is
the first order of business. Under no circumstances
should the United States undermine existing MTCR
restrictions for India or tolerate others doing so as the
United States did in the case of China. On the other
hand, the United States and other satellite launching
nations can and should provide their launch services
to India without discrimination and cooperate in
space science ventures whenever possible. Until India
demonstrates tight missile technology controls over its
private and public entities (something it has so far failed
to do in the case of Iran) and clearly severs its military
and strategic cooperative ties with the Revolutionary
Iranian government, the United States should oppose
the sharing even of “safeguarded” space launch vehicle
technology with New Delhi.
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CHAPTER 2
WILL THE U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR
COOPERATION INITIATIVE LIGHT INDIA?
John Stephenson
Peter Tynan
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. and Indian governments recently
established an unprecedented strategic partnership
on nuclear energy through the U.S.-India Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, marking a significant
shift in U.S. nonproliferation policy. To many
observers, the choice before the U.S. Congress is now
between “approving the deal and damaging nuclear
nonproliferation, or rejecting the deal and thereby
setting back an important strategic relationship.”1 In
light of this important decision, it is vital to evaluate
objectively the arguments and evidence that underpin
the proposed change in policy. While many strategies
and geopolitical arguments have been discussed
throughout this book, it also is important to weigh
this decision on an economic scale to see whether it
is well-balanced. It is the aim of this chapter to test
the economic arguments for the agreement against a
rigorous fact base.
Proponents of the shift in U.S. foreign policy towards
a stronger strategic partnership through civil nuclear
cooperation with India put forth three main economic
and resource arguments. The first is that nuclear
energy will aid India in reducing its reliance on oil and
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gas. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asserted that
“civilian nuclear energy will make [India] less reliant
on unstable sources of oil and gas.”2 The second is that
nuclear energy is necessary to sustain India’s gross
domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 8-9 percent.
Without nuclear energy, it is argued, India may not be
able to sustain its GDP growth and achieve its targets
for economic development. The third argument is that
nuclear energy can reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and improve climate change by substituting for coalbased electricity generation.
The ultimate question given the debate around
U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation is whether
nuclear generation is needed to meet the electricity
needs of India in the medium and long-term and
whether it contributes meaningfully to environmental
improvements and energy independence to justify an
expansion of nuclear power in India. In evaluating
the validity and strength of the arguments for the
agreement, this chapter will: (1) assess the current and
future demand for electricity in India in the mediumterm to 2016 and the long-term to 2032 to determine the
gap between current supply and future demand; and,
(2) review energy supply options by evaluating total
potential capacity, relative costs, pace of development
and technical constraints, the location of supply and
demand, environmental issues, and the impact on
energy independence.
WHAT IS INDIA’S CURRENT AND FUTURE
DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY?
Numerous factors are involved in estimating
future energy requirements and it is important to
place electricity demand within the context of India’s
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total future energy needs. The Government of India’s
Planning Commission highlights in its August 2006
Integrated Energy Policy that:
long-term projections for energy requirements
are based on assumptions vis-à-vis the growth
of the economy, population growth, the pace at
which “non-commercial energy” is replaced by
“commercial energy,” the progress of energy
conservation, increase in energy efficiency as
well as societal and lifestyle changes.3

The demand for electricity in India undoubtedly will
increase significantly, but the country is still largely
reliant on traditional forms of energy, including
traditional biomass such as firewood and cow dung.
In 2000, firewood and chips constituted 59 percent
of total energy needs, dung cake another 22 percent,
and electricity only 6 percent.4 Long-term strategies
for India’s development need to focus on the entire
energy picture of which electricity production is but
a small part. In examining the economic arguments
for an expansion of nuclear generation, this chapter
focuses on electricity but recognizes the still marginal
contribution electricity plays toward fulfilling India’s
energy needs.
The major driver of electricity demand is the GDP
growth rate, with most estimates forecasting the
Indian growth rate between 5 to 9 percent.5 This wide
variation demonstrates the high level of uncertainty
inherent in projections about GDP growth. Historically,
India’s GDP has grown at 5.3 percent from 1978-2003,6
but most analysts forecast a higher rate of growth
due to improvements in the structure of the economy
and benefits derived from globalization. According
to David Victor of the Council on Foreign Relations,
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“India’s economy enjoyed an average annual growth
rate of around 7 percent from 1994-2004 . . . [and] most
analysts expect growth to be sustained at 8 percent
over the next few years, if not longer.”7 The Planning
Commission based its energy supply scenarios for
its Integrated Energy Policy on 8 percent and 9 percent
GDP growth rates, constituting a suitable upper bound
when estimating future energy requirements. If less
ambitious GDP growth is realized and less electricity is
needed, the conclusions drawn by this report, especially
with regards to the role of nuclear generation, should
continue to hold true.
Indian Sector Composition.
The sectoral composition of GDP growth has a
considerable effect on the demand for electricity both in
terms of absolute and total gigawatts required as well
as the composition of electricity supply sources, i.e.,
centralized versus decentralized generation. As seen
in Figure 1, while “agriculture, forestry, and fishing”
contribute the most to India’s GDP, currently at 20
percent, the growth rate is only 4 percent. By contrast,
“manufacturing,” historically a large consumer of
electricity, comprises another 16 percent of GDP and
is growing at 11 percent. Generally, “economic growth
is expected to cause a shift in the Indian economy
away from energy-intensive manufacturing and also
engender investments that make the economy more
efficient in its use of energy.”8 The Government of India
has focused on lowering the energy intensity of GDP
growth through greater efficiency with the result that
“the energy intensity of India’s growth has been falling
and is about half of what it used to be in the seventies.”9
But while a reduction in energy intensity could result
in as much as 25 percent less electricity needed per unit
18

of GDP than current levels,10 most analyses forecast
a growth in the overall demand for electricity and
required generation capacity at approximately the
same rate as the economy.11

Source: Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
Available at: www.mospi.nic.in/31jan06_s3_1.htm
** Compound Annual Growth Rate

Figure 1.
Changes in electricity demand across industrial,
domestic, and agricultural sectors also may have
implications for the appropriateness of supply
sources. The shift in the relative consumption of
electricity by sector has seen considerable growth in
the share of domestic and agricultural sectors along
with a significant drop in the share of industrial
consumption (see Figure 2). The industrial share of
electricity consumption has decreased over the last
half-century from a peak of 69 percent in the 1960s to
current levels of roughly 34 percent of total electricity
consumption. Agricultural consumption of electricity
steadily increased over the last half-century, from
19

roughly 4 percent in the 1950s to more than 24 percent
in 2003 and domestic consumption increased from
roughly 13 percent in 1950 to approximately 25 percent
during the same period. Agriculture increasingly is
being modernized, and the need for water pumping
is driving the demand for electricity in the sector. The
combined shift in relative electricity consumption
from industrial to domestic and agricultural suggests
an increased demand for decentralized, distributed
generation. While urbanization may counter the
decentralization of domestic consumption, with an
urban population rising from 28 percent in 2001 to 48
percent in 2020,12 electricity consumption in general
could be less decentralized than in India’s history due
to the share of agricultural consumption and the policy
goal of providing electricity to rural populations.

Figure 2.
Population Growth.
The growth in electricity demand also is due to
population growth and a policy of improving electricity
access to the entire population. Population growth
20

is approximately 1.7 percent per year with the total
population “expected to touch 1.9 billion by 2010 and
1.41 billion by 2020.”13 Concurrently, the government
has the goal of meeting “the lifeline energy needs of
all citizens” which necessitates increasing “electricity
generation capacity/supply by 5 to 6 times [that] of
their 2003-2004 levels.”14 As of 2000, approximately
57 percent of rural households and 12 percent of
urban households did not have access to electricity.15
The policy goal of reaching more of the population
with electricity will result in significant increases in
consumer demand for electricity and will also make
non-grid, decentralized approaches such as renewable
energy sources, more appropriate. With a large rural
population, even in light of urbanization trends, much
of India’s population does not live close to transmission
and distribution lines.
Geographic Distribution.
Geographically, electricity demand is concentrated
in the North, South, and Western regions of India (see
Figure 3). The Northeastern and East regions comprise
only approximately 11-12 percent of the electricity
demand of the country, whereas the other three
regions each comprise 27-33 percent of total demand.
As such, meeting GDP growth targets will require
meeting electricity demand primarily in these areas
and determining how best to share energy resources
from the Northeastern and Eastern regions which are
well-endowed with hydropower and coal resources
respectively.
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Source: Kakodkar, Dr. Anil. “Nuclear Power in India: An Inevitable Option for Sustainable Development
of a Sixth of Humanity,” World Nuclear Association Symposium, 4-6 September 2002, London.

Figure 3.
Electricity Demand Projections.
Given strong forecasted GDP growth, population
growth, and policy goals of improving access to
electricity for the entire population, India’s electricity
demand and corresponding electricity generation
capacity to meet that demand will grow significantly.
On the demand side, whereas India’s 2003-04 per capita
consumption of electricity was 553 kilowatt hours
(kWh), GDP growth of 8-9 percent would suggest per
capita consumption at 2,471 kWh in 2032, a five-fold
increase over 25 years. Placed in a global context, this
per capita consumption would be just over the world
average in 2003, at 2,429 kWh per capita; and India’s
2031-32 level would constitute only 19 percent of
the American 2003 per capita consumption of 13,006
kWh. On the supply side, to satisfy India’s forecasted
electricity consumption based on GDP growth rates
of 8-9 percent, the Government of India’s Planning
Commission projects a need of 306-337 gigawatts
of total generation capacity by 2016-17 and 778-960
gigawatts by 2031-32 (see Figure 4). With current
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generation of 127 gigawatts, this means closing a gap
of 180-211 gigawatts by 2016-17 and 652-834 gigawatts
by 2031-32. We use these GDP growth rate projections
of 8-9 percent as the basis for this chapter’s analysis
of electricity demand and supply to ensure that any
conclusions drawn will also remain valid at lower rates
of realized GDP growth.

Sources: U.S. Department of Energy. International Energy Outlook, 2006, Energy Information
Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, Washington, DC, June 2006; Government of
India, Planning Comission. Integrated Energy Policy: Report of the Expert Committee, New Delhi, August
2006.

Figure 4.
WHAT ELECTRICITY SUPPLY OPTIONS
ARE AVAILABLE TO INDIA?
Historically and currently, the majority of India’s
electricity has been supplied by domestic coal. In 2006,
coal constituted 54 percent of total installed capacity,
with hydro supplying 26 percent, gas 11 percent,
renewables 5 percent, nuclear 3 percent, and diesel
generation 1 percent.16 The fastest growing generation
source has been natural gas, which increased 16
percent from 1971-98, with coal and nuclear growing
at 8-9 percent, hydro growing at 4 percent, and oil
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growing at only 1 percent.17 Overall, the forecasts to
sustain an 8-9 percent GDP growth rate suggest 6-8
percent growth in total installed capacity from 200632. The total potential sources for additional electricity
generation in India are both vast and diverse. Coal
will most likely remain the primary source given its
availability and low cost, but India’s hydro potential is
significant, natural gas is sizable, and both renewables
and nuclear also are options.
In considering the different generation options
to meet the required growth rates for electricity
generation, a number of factors must be considered
by government officials and private investors. These
include:
1. the total potential capacity of a given supply
option;
2. the relative cost, including upfront investment
and ongoing operational costs;
3. the pace of development, technological
innovation, and technical constraints;
4. the location of supply and efficient distribution
to electricity demand centers;
5. environmental issues and costs associated with
the supply source; and,
6. national issues of energy independence.
Each of these factors is prioritized by different
stakeholder groups. Investors interested in deciding
between particular projects focus on the relative
costs to find the highest net present value (NPV)
projects for providing electric power to the most
stable demand centers. The pace of development,
technological innovations required for exploitation,
linkages of supply to electricity demand centers,
and energy independence typically are focused on
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by policymakers who have the national interest to
consider and must make political and economic tradeoffs. Environmental issues tend to be emphasized by
those populations disrupted by, or within proximity
to, supply sources such as hydro dams, coal plants, or
nuclear power plants, although climate change makes
carbon emissions a global concern. Proponents of
specific supply options often focus on a single criterion
to justify support for their preferred generation supply.
By looking at these multiple criteria across the range
of supply options, this chapter seeks to highlight the
relative benefits and the feasibility of developing these
generation sources.
In choosing an optimal mix of electricity generation
to meet forecasted demand, it also is important to
keep in mind the differences between peak and base
load capacity as well as centralized and decentralized
generation. Base-load generating capacity is operated
throughout a 24-hour period to meet minimum loads
using mechanically and thermally efficient equipment
to reduce operating costs and provide consistent, low
cost electricity. Other resources, like natural gas, are
reserved primarily for meeting peak loads. Peak and
base loads vary throughout a 24-hour period and can
fluctuate seasonally based on increases or decreases in
end user demand.18
Centralized versus decentralized generation also is
dependent on the characteristics of end user demand.
Centralized generation leverages large plants to
serve sizable and consistent demand centers, such as
cities. Electricity is delivered over transmission lines
and distributed to end users, whether industrial,
commercial, or domestic. Decentralized generation
links smaller demand centers with discrete generating
capacity that does not link up to a state, regional, or
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national grid. Renewables such as mini-hydros are
a good example of decentralized generation with
the ability to satisfy a cluster of villages’ electricity
demands or local commercial centers. With current
constraints to effective transmission and distribution
in India, decentralized generation often offers the only
option for certain populations.
With these issues in mind, we now examine the
supply options along the six criteria detailed above to
develop an understanding of the likely contribution of
each option towards meeting the electricity demand in
2016 and 2032.
Total Potential Capacity.
Given the forecasted requirements to meet
electricity demand in 2016 and 2032, India must build
installed capacity using a range of supply options. The
required total installed capacity by 2016 is 306-337 GW
(see Figure 5) and the range for 2032 is 778-960 GW (see
Figure 6). Various scenarios from the Government of
India’s Planning Commission and the U.S. Department
of Energy (DoE) employ ambitious or conservative
growth rate estimates for the supply options, both of
which are captured in Figures 5 and 6. To meet the
targets for 2016 and 2032, at least a few of the options
will likely have to meet their maximum potential.
Most likely, it is through a mix of coal, hydro,
natural gas, nuclear, renewables, diesel, and energy
efficiency improvements that sufficient generation
capacity can be developed to meet demand in both 2016
and 2032. While there are trade-offs in the sequence
of developing energy resources, nearly all options
need further development to meet demand and GDP

26

Sources: U.S. Department of Energy. International Energy Outlook, 2006, Energy Information
Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, Washington, DC, June 2006; Government
of India, Planning Comission. Integrated Energy Policy: Report of the Expert Committee, New Delhi,
August 2006.

Figure 5.

Sources: U.S. Department of Energy. International Energy Outlook, 2006, Energy Information
Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, Washington, DC, June 2006; Government
of India, Planning Comission. Integrated Energy Policy: Report of the Expert Committee, New Delhi,
August 2006.

Figure 6.
growth targets and “no single energy resource or
technology constitutes a panacea.”19 To extend coal
resources past 45 years and to offset carbon emissions,
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all other energy sources like hydro, natural gas, nuclear,
and renewables need development.20 However, if
exploitation and development of any of these supply
sources lags, coal-based generation will likely be the
backstop. Significantly, energy efficiency efforts offer an
opportunity to “virtually generate” gigawatts in excess
of what nuclear could provide in the same timeframe.
It is notable that nuclear energy will constitute a
marginal contribution through 2032 and is not critical
to meeting the GDP growth targets. If the development
of all other options were maximized, it could be
possible to meet the generation capacity required for 9
percent GDP growth with only minimal development
of nuclear power. Nuclear’s contribution will only
become sizable in 2050 and then only if significant
technological obstacles are overcome. Even though
nuclear is not itself critical to meet the electricity
demand projections for 8-9 percent GDP growth, full
development at a later stage would probably warrant
some level of development as would a prudent energy
supply strategy based on diversification to mitigate
risk.
The total potential capacity of each supply option is
discussed in detail.
Coal. No matter what other energy sources are
available, coal will continue to dominate electricity
generation due to its abundance, suitability for base
load needs, and relatively low cost. Coal has a variety
of energy uses, but in 2006 approximately 78 percent
of coal was used for power generation.21 The total
extractable coal reserves are roughly 22,540 million tons
of oil equivalent (Mtoe). The current utilization of coal
supply sources is approximately 184 Mtoe, and the range
of utilization of coal in 2032 is expected to between 573
and 1,082 Mtoe.22 Given current production rates and
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barring technological advancements, the extractable
reserves could last 80 years and if “all inferred reserves
also materialize then coal and lignite can last for over
140 years at the current rate of extraction.”23 Other
estimates suggest that at current consumption and
production rates India’s coal could last as many as 200
years.24 But with a moderate projected growth rate of 5
percent in domestic production, currently extractable
coal resources may be exhausted in approximately 45
years. The extent of extractable coal reserves may rise
in the future, however, since only about 45 percent
of the potential coal bearing area has been covered
by regional surveys.25 Given the abundance of Indian
coal, all estimates and projections for future installed
generation capacity suggest coal will remain the major
supply for electricity generation until 2032 and possibly
beyond.26
Hydro. India has a significant large-scale hydro
power potential of roughly 150 gigawatts.27 Only
about 33 gigawatts have been installed as of 2006,28
leaving 117 gigawatts available, of which roughly
5-8 percent is currently being developed.29 While
hydro comprises a significant percentage of current
generation capacity—approximately 26 percent of
127 total gigawatts generated—full exploitation of the
resource by 2032 would reduce the contribution of
hydro to the total installed capacity to 16-19 percent
of 776-960 total gigawatts. India could further expand
its hydropower generated electricity by importing
from neighboring Nepal or Bhutan, “whose combined
economically feasible potentials is estimated to be in
excess of 55,000 MW.”30 Given the absolute size of the
hydropower potential, and its benefits, it will remain a
significant contributor to India’s electricity generation
and is seen as particularly useful given its flexibility
and suitability to meet peak demand.31
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Natural gas. India has limited, but considerable,
natural gas reserves and currently generates 11
percent of total current electricity from gas. To date,
90 percent of natural gas demand has been met by
domestic sources32 and discoveries of 700 bcm over the
last decade “hold promise for gas reserves in India,”33
such as the discoveries in the Krishna-Godavari basin
which “have added to the gas reserves substantially.”34
Gas reserves have grown from 62 bcm to 1100 bcm
from 1970 to 2006 and production has risen from 1.4
bcm to 32.2 bcm in the same period. With a total need
of 100-197 Mtoe of natural gas for the various scenarios
laid out by the Planning Commission, India could
require imports ranging from 0-49 percent of its total
natural gas demand by 2032.35 But in all the scenarios
developed by the Planning Commission, even when
“pushed for power generation, only 16 percent of the
power generated comes from gas.”36 This is true even
when the scenario supplements natural gas with coalbed methane, in-situ gasification of coal, and natural
gas imports.
The potential natural gas resource available for
power generation is constrained by strong demand
from other sectors. Natural gas is used to produce
fertilizers and chemicals and cannot be economically
substituted for those uses.37 The Planning Commission
has emphasized that “gas should be used for power
generation only after it meets the above demand”38
and suggests that gas be made available “to those enduses that best extract its economic value . . . such as
fertilizer, petrochemicals, CNG vehicles, and power
in that order.”39 With such competition for end-uses,
natural gas power generation may be constrained
during the time period that coal is readily available, at
least through 2032.
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Nuclear. India has quite limited domestic uranium
resources but vast thorium resources for potential
nuclear power generation. The available uranium
resources of 61,000 tons can fuel only about 10 gigawatts
using Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors.40 The current
estimate of yearly demand for uranium is roughly 475
tons, while production has only reached 300 tons per
year.41 Imports of uranium potentially could come from
“stable countries such as Canada and Australia, so
interruptions to supplies are unlikely.”42 But with the
three stage process of nuclear development planned by
the Department of Atomic Energy in India, the hope
is to generate 500 GW capacity “based on plutonium
bred from indigenously available uranium.”43
A much greater potential exists if the domestic thorium
reserves of 225,000 tons can be used commercially to
generate extremely large amounts of electricity.44 This
could constitute a vast source for electricity generation,
but the technological advancements needed for this to
take place prevent nuclear generation from dominating
the electricity supply in the 2016 or 2032 timeframes.
Full exploitation of India’s domestic thorium resources
will likely not occur until after 2050. With only 3.9
gigawatts generated by nuclear power in 2006, or
approximately 3 percent of total generating capacity,45
the most optimistic scenarios for nuclear power
generation put its contribution at 20 gigawatts by 2016
and 68 gigawatts by 2032. As such, nuclear generation
likely will not exceed 9 percent of the total generation
in 2032. While the potential for nuclear generation
is large, tapping this potential is not likely for some
time.
Renewables. The potential for renewable energy
resources to generate electricity is not insignificant
in India, which already has proven itself committed
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to exploiting these resources. Currently, renewables
provide more electricity than nuclear, with 6.2
gigawatts and 5 percent of the total.46 While estimates
vary, it generally is believed that the total potential
includes 45 gigawatts of wind power, 15 gigawatts
from small hydro, 19.85 gigawatts from biomass
power/cogeneration, and 10 gigawatts from solar.47
As such, over 90 percent of the potential has yet to be
harnessed. The Planning Commission has recognized
the importance of renewable energy resources and
has emphasized the importance of building capacity.
However, even achieving ambitious targets for
renewables’ contribution to the electricity supply, they
will only account for only about 5-6 percent by 2032.48
ENERGY EFFICIENCY: VIRTUAL RESOURCES
OF “NEGAWATTS”
In addition to the potential of new installed capacity,
as discussed above, significant “virtual resources” also
exist to enhance the likelihood that India will meet its
ambitious targets for generation capacity to sustain 8-9
percent GDP growth. These include efforts to improve
industrial, end-user, and generation efficiencies as
well as reducing system losses. Currently India’s
Bureau of Energy Efficiency reports that potential
efficiency savings in the industrial sector alone amount
to 15 gigawatts and another 3-5 gigawatts are possible
by making households more efficient.49 Thermal
generation of electricity also is not as efficient as it
could be. With current generation efficiencies in India
of about 30.5 percent, experts believe that an increase
to 42 percent could produce significant savings.50 By
moving to 36.5 percent by 2016, 20-25 gigawatts may
be virtually generated and by moving to 42 percent by
2032, 40-65 gigawatts may be virtually generated.51 The
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Indian government understands the need to lower the
energy intensity of GDP growth and argues that:
Lowering energy intensity through higher
efficiency is equivalent to creating a virtual source
of untapped domestic energy. It may be noted that
a unit of energy saved by a user is greater than a
unit produced, as it saves on production losses as
well as transport, transmission and distribution
losses. Thus a “Megawatt,” produced by a
reduction of energy need has more value than a
Megawatt generated. . . . It is possible to reduce
India’s energy intensity by up to 25 percent from
current levels.52

Similarly, India’s transmission and distribution
system losses are quite high and could be improved.
Some experts put current system losses at 20-30 percent53
while others, including the Planning Commission,
highlight that “losses which include theft, nonbilling,
incorrect billing, inefficiency in collection, and
transmission and distribution losses, exceed 40 percent
for the country as a whole.”54 A 5 percent reduction in
such losses could offer 11-15 gigawatt savings by 2016,
with an additional 5 percent between 2016 and 2032
offering 25-39 gigawatts. A 10 percent reduction in each
time period could yield 22-30 gigawatts in 2016 and an
additional 50-78 gigawatts by 2032. In total, combining
energy efficiency efforts and reducing system losses,
49-58 gigawatts could be virtually generated by 2016
and an additional 67-106 gigawatts could be virtually
generated by 2032.
RELATIVE COSTS
The decision to develop certain energy supplies
most often will center on the issue of relative costs. Cost
estimates range widely but suggest that coal, nuclear,
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hydro, and natural gas generated electricity possibly
can be produced for roughly the same amount on a per
kWh basis, depending on discount rates and the cost of
fuel (see Figure 7, which includes both India and U.S.
cost benchmarks to show relative costs). Nuclear and
hydro options require large upfront investments, and
so their relative cost depends greatly on the financing
available. The International Energy Agency recently
calculated that “at current levels, . . . nuclear power
is cheaper than gas and almost as cheap as coal,” but
one concern is that “new reactors, based on unproven
technology, will cost more than expected to build and
run.”55 Coal and nuclear also need to take into account
environmental externalities, which do not often factor
into project cost estimates. For renewables, there are
no fuel costs and upfront costs are low in absolute
terms. High per kWh costs of renewable sources
should not preclude development, as demonstrated by
successful business models around the world that pair
micro-finance and renewable technologies to provide
self-financed, decentralized electricity generation for
remote populations. Ultimately, meeting India’s sizable
demand in 2016 and 2032 will require development
of almost all supply options, with very little room for
trading one supply alternative completely for another.
Even if one option were significantly and continuously
cheaper than all others, a risk mitigation strategy would
preclude over-reliance on one resource.
Coal.
The primary use of coal for generation can be
attributed partly to the fact that it is one of the cheapest
forms of generation. The estimates for the cost per kWh
range from 3.9 U.S. cents to 5.3 U.S. cents (see Figure
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Sources: Energy Information Administration. Annual Energy Outlook, 2006. DOE/EIA-0383(2006),
Washington DC, February 2006. Government of India Planning Commission. Integrated Energy Policy:
Report of the Expert Committee, New Delhi, August 2006. Victor, David G. “The India Nuclear Deal Implications
for Global Climate Change,” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
July 18, 2006. Available at: www.cfr.org/publication/11123/india_nuclear_deal.html.
Notes: For the levelized cost comparison of coal, natural gas (advanced combined cycle), the low estimate for
wind, and nuclear, the cost comparison is for U.S. plants that would come online in 2015. The high end nuclear
estimate includes the fact that “India is extractinf Uranium from extremely low grade ores . . . . This makes
Indian nuclear fuel 2-3 times costlier than international suppliers.” Planning Commission, Integrated Energy
Policy, page 35. For the nuclear generation estimates by David Victor, for Light Water Reactors: the lowest at
3.8 US cents comes from Bharadwaj, Anshu; Rahul Tongia, and V.S. Arunachalam (2006). “Whither Nuclear
Power?” Economic and Political Weekly 41(12): 1203-1212. The medium cost of 4.2 cents per kWh and 6.7
cents per kWh ceom from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2003). The Future of Nuclear Power: an
Interdisciplinary Study. Using the US DOE’s levelized costs and incorporating the fact that Indian fuel is 2-3
times costlier, a cost of 6.6 cents per kWh is estimated.

Figure 7.
7). India’s abundance of coal makes it particularly
inexpensive to exploit, even though the calorific
content is only about two-thirds that of imported coal.56
Coal plant capital costs typically are more expensive
than natural gas, but are significantly less expensive
than nuclear.57 Comparative fuel costs are just the
opposite, with coal being less expensive than natural
gas and more expensive than nuclear.58 Adding in
environmental externalities, or including research and
development costs for clean coal technologies, would
increase per kWh costs but would be unlikely to make
coal uncompetitive.
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Hydro.
Despite high upfront investment costs, hydropower
offers one of the least expensive sources of power
generation. The cost estimates for small hydropower
are roughly $0.055 per kWh, and large hydro is
considerably less. Estimates for the costs of large hydro
in the United States range from 0.55-0.85 U.S. cents per
kWh.59 Additionally, hydropower has one of the best
energy conversion efficiency rates, turning nearly 90
percent of the available energy into electricity.60 The
large upfront investment needed for developing hydro
resources often includes associated costs of relocating
populations and mitigating environmental damage.
Additionally, adequate planning to ensure access to
demand centers is needed to ensure cost recovery, which
often requires significant additional infrastructure
investments in transmission and distribution lines.
Natural Gas.
Natural gas plants have low upfront investment
costs, but large fluctuations in fuel prices can make
them uncompetitive. Natural gas plants generally are
used for peak load generation rather than base load
generation “in which case [they] will have to compete
against alternative sources of peaking power, . . . the
cheapest alternative most likely would be a coal-based
plant.”61 For the Government of India’s Planning
Commission scenarios, natural gas was found to not
be economically viable when prices were U.S.$4.5
per MMBtu or higher for peaking power when coal
remained at or below U.S.$2.27 per MMBtu, or $45
per ton of imported coal at 6,000 kcal/kg.62 Energy
analysts expect that delivered prices will remain high,
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probably in the range of $7-$8 per MMBtu.63 Rising
prices of natural gas would only make it increasingly
unattractive for use in the power sector.64 As India’s
Ministry of Finance commented, “it has not been
possible to harness the advantages of gas/LNG as a fuel
for power generation effectively, primarily because of
its limited availability and lack of price competitiveness
vis-à-vis coal. Fuel price, constituting about 60 percent
of the total cost of thermal power generation, is a critical
determinant of long-term sustainability of a thermal
plant.”65 With natural gas prices likely to remain high,
natural gas generation could remain uncompetitive for
large scale development.
Nuclear.
Nuclear has the potential to be relatively low
cost. The cost estimates for nuclear range from 3.8
to 6.7 U.S. cents per kWh. However, India’s limited
uranium resources come from particularly low grade
ore (as low as 0.1 percent compared to 12-14 percent),66
thereby making the cost of fuel for nuclear generation
2-3 times that of international nuclear fuel. Also, due
to its capital intensiveness, the cost of nuclear power
varies considerably with financing options. Analysis
of the levelized cost of electricity from different power
plants in India found that nuclear power was cheaper
than coal power at a 2 percent discount rate, roughly
equivalent at a 3-4 percent discount rate, and more
expensive at a 5-6 percent discount rate. At the lower
discount rates, nuclear power was no more than 18
percent less expensive, while at the higher discount
rates, it was more than 30 percent more expensive than
coal. Analysts have noted that with “multiple demands
on capital for infrastructural projects, including for
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electricity generation, such low discount rates are not
realistic.”67
Nuclear power is even less competitive if
externalities and additional costs are taken into
account. The methodology used did not include the
costs of managing radioactive waste68 or the cost of
reprocessing in India which “would increase the unit
cost by roughly one cent.”69 India also lacks “insurance
liability against accidents,”70 the provision of which
would increase the per kWh costs; and the high costs
of eventual decommissioning of nuclear reactors often
is ignored. Finally, India is pursuing unproven nuclear
technologies which could increase the cost to both
build and run nuclear power plants.71
Renewables.
On a per kWh basis, renewable energy remains
an expensive source for electricity. Solar power
can cost more than $0.30 per kWh and wind power
typically starts at the high end of the price range for
coal, gas, and nuclear. Some analysts argue and have
demonstrated, however, that “new nuclear plants
and central coal- or gas-fired power plants are all
uncompetitive with various decentralized renewables,
combined heat and power installations, and efficient
end use of electricity.”72 Whether renewables are
cheaper on a per kWh basis or not, the low upfront
investment costs make renewables an attractive option
for nongrid connected rural populations. Numerous
sustainable business models have been demonstrated
throughout the world that combine micro-finance
and renewable energy technologies, such as Grameen
Shakti in Bangladesh. Systems can begin meeting
local demand for electricity in a few months for a few
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thousand dollars, as opposed to the years and millions
(or billions) of dollars it requires for traditional plants.
PACE OF DEVELOPMENT AND
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
Nearly all of the electricity supply options face
challenges in the pace of development to 2016 and
2032 and require technological innovation for full
exploitation. Coal resources must be made cleaner
and more fully exploitable economically; hydropower
must avoid environmental and social disruptions;
full exploitation of nuclear must overcome significant
technological challenges; and renewable energy
technologies need improvement to increase adoption
rates. Historically, India’s generation capacity has
grown by 5.87 percent each year over the last 25 years.73
During the same period, improvements in efficiencies
have enabled the total supply of electricity to grow at 7.2
percent.74 As detailed above for the given scenarios of
8-9 percent GDP growth, total generation capacity will
need to increase 6-7 percent per annum from 2006-32,
which means the pace of development for most supply
options will have to be hastened through technological
innovations.
Thermal generation has grown the fastest,
historically at 10 percent compound annual growth
rate (CAGR) (see Figure 8), while nuclear generation
has grown the slowest at 6 percent. One determinant
of the pace of development is the extent to which the
private sector is involved. The private sector has been a
major factor in the development of natural gas capacity,
which has increased its contribution to electricity at a
16 percent growth rate from 1971-98.75 In those areas
where the private sector participates more, the pace
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of development can be faster. Where the public sector
retains a monopoly, the pace of development will not
likely be as fast.

Source: Government of India, Ministry of Power. Available at indiabudget.nic.in. “NCES”
indicates nonconventional energy sources other then wind. Projected CAGR reanges based
on analysis in Figures 7 & 8.

Figure 8.
Privatization offers considerable advantages over
public sector development of generation capacity.
Recognizing this, reform in the Indian energy sector
has been emphasized, including a need to bring prices
closer to global market levels; ensuring the sector
operates on a fiscally sound basis; and increasing
private sector participation.76 Privatization can only
help unlock development and also can enable India
to maximize its potential gains from efficiency and
system loss reduction. For example, the power sector
of Delhi was privatized and distribution companies
were expected to reduce Aggregate Technical and
Commercial (AT&C) losses by 17 percent over 5
years. With a sound financial incentive to do so, the
companies have exceeded their targets over a 3-year
period, with some having reduced losses to 33.79
percent.77 Additional improvements include higher
quality power with significant reductions in load
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shedding, and full payment being made to central
power sector utilities for the electricity purchased and
distributed.78 Of course, other factors influence the pace
of development for different resource options and the
technological innovations needed for full exploitation,
and these will be examined in greater detail for coal,
hydro, and nuclear.
Coal.
Given India’s abundance of coal, the pace of
development and contribution of coal to the electricity
supply has been strong, at approximately 9 percent.79
Relatively fewer constraints hinder the development
of coal generation, and it is acknowledged by the
government that to the extent other alternatives do not
develop “as projected . . . coal-based generation will
need to fill the gap.”80 In recent years, there has been
some concern about the production of domestic coal
“not keeping pace with the growing demand for coal
in the power sector.”81 These production concerns need
to be addressed to ensure that domestic coal-based
generation can fill the gap if the development of other
resources falters in order to meet future demand.82
Technological innovation could enhance and extend
significantly the timeframe for India’s coal resources
as well as make it cleaner. In-situ coal gasification
“can tap energy from coal reserves that cannot be
extracted economically based on available open
cast/underground extraction technologies.”83 While
commercial development has not yet occurred,84 the
technology has garnered greater attention worldwide
largely due to significant increases in natural gas
prices.85 Such technologies would increase India’s
extractable coal reserves considerably.
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Hydro.
Hydro power generation has grown at a rate of
4.2 percent per annum. Projections suggest that an
estimated 45 gigawatts will be added within the next
10 years,86 while more conservative estimates suggest
50 gigawatts will be added in the next 20 years.87
This pace is significantly below the historical growth
rate. To maximize the exploitation of the full 150
gigawatts by 2032, hydro power will have to grow
at approximately 6 percent per year. The pace of
developing hydropower often can slow due to social
and environmental considerations. As highlighted
by the Planning Commission, “the need to mitigate
environmental and social impact of storage schemes
often delays hydro development thereby causing huge
cost overruns.”88
The technologies involved in hydropower
generation are generally well-developed and new
technologies are not required for the full exploitation
of the 150 gigawatt potential. However, new “run of
the river” schemes are being developed to reduce the
impact of hydropower generation on the environment
and local populations. Of the 50 gigawatts planned
for the medium-term, nearly 62 percent are run of the
river schemes to mitigate potential environmental and
social risks.89
Nuclear.
The historical pace of development of nuclear
power in India has been marked by ambitious
projections and slow actual development. Twenty-five
to 30-year projections made in the 1960s suggested
that India would have an installed nuclear capacity of
20-25 gigawatts by 1987 and 43.5 gigawatts by 2000.90
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Instead of meeting these projections, India had only
600 megawatts by 1980, 950 megawatts in 1987, and
2.7 gigawatts in 2000,91 or roughly 5-8 percent of the
projected capacity. While current projections are
extremely ambitious, there is cause for concern that the
actual technological development going forward may
be more difficult than the development thus far, and
therefore fall even shorter than expected.
The current Planning Commission projections for
installed capacity of nuclear power, predicated on a
number of crucial assumptions about technological
innovation and development, are 15-20 gigawatts by
2016, 52-68 gigawatts by 2032, and 208-275 gigawatts by
2050 (see Figure 9). The assumptions are threefold. First,
Fast Breeder Reactor technology must be demonstrated
successfully by the 500 megawatt installation currently
being constructed. Second, new uranium mines must
be opened and provide fuel for additional Pressurized
Heavy Water Reactors. And third, India must import
and assimilate Light Water Reactor technology,
including nearly 8 gigawatts over the next 10 years (in
the optimistic scenario), as well as develop Advanced
Heavy Water Reactors to use thorium by 2020.92 The
full development of nuclear power in India requires
exploitation of its vast thorium resources and therefore
requires significant technological advancement to
commercialize thorium-based production. Nuclear
power in India requires “robust technologies . . . for both
the front end and back end of the fuel cycle” and until
thorium-based generation becomes commercialized
“the nuclear energy programme will be uranium
based”93 and significantly constrained.
This list of assumptions is considerable, and
analysts argue that chances of achieving the targets are
slim.94 One major criticism is the focus on Fast Breeder
technology which, some argue, has proven “unreliable
43

in most countries that have experimented with it.”95
Given the technological hurdles, the growth rate may
be slower, rather than faster, than historical trends.

Figure 9.
From 1950 to today, nuclear power capacity increased
at a rate of 6 percent,96 from 1980 to 2000 it increased at
8 percent per annum,97 and in recent years growth has
slowed considerably. Despite this, current projections
require a growth rate of 11-12 percent from 2006 to
2032. Although there have been some indications that
nuclear development has improved recently, such as
the 540 MW PHWR unit at Tarapur that went critical
8 months ahead of schedule,98 it remains unlikely that
development will outpace historical rates significantly
and achieve the targets. Furthermore, even if these
ambitious targets are met, nuclear power will still
provide only 6-7 percent of India’s capacity in 2016 and
8-9 percent in 2032. Only by 2052 will nuclear power
44

represent a significant portion of India’s total installed
capacity, at potentially 20 percent.99
LOCATION OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND
In addition to the issues previously highlighted, a
range of electricity supply options should be pursued
due to the locations of supply and demand. The largest
demand centers are in the North, South, and West (see
Figure 3). The Northeast and East have the potential to
be electricity exporters, if the Northeast fully exploits
its considerable remaining hydropower potential and
the East continues to supply coal throughout India (see
Appendix C). The demand in the North increasingly can
be supplied by its available hydropower, and the South
and West have the ability to import coal economically
after domestic reserves decline. Renewables and
nuclear can contribute throughout the country, with
renewables focused on decentralized demand centers
and rural areas.
Integral to matching supply with demand throughout the country is greater investment and attention to
improving and extending the transmission grid. Five
strong regional grids currently exist and an envisioned
“National Grid” seeks to increase interregional
transmission capacity “from its present 9.450 MW to
about 37.150 MW by 2012.”100 As in distribution and
generation, private sector participation increasingly
is being encouraged, with the Ministry of Power
finalizing policy guidelines for private investment.101
This will help enable the country to benefit uniformly
from the electricity supply options available. In the case
of coal, reserves are concentrated in certain areas of the
country,102 and while there are thermal power plants
throughout India (see Appendix B), the majority of the
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coal supplied originates in the East. India recognizes
the need to improve the interstate and intrastate
transmission system to ensure more equitable sharing
of resources like domestic coal, and to prevent high
transportation costs. Similarly, matching the supply
of hydropower to demand centers will require better
transmission to ensure economical development of the
potential. As seen with the case of the Northeast region,
significant remaining potential exists far in excess of
that regions future peak demands (see Figure 10).

Source: Government of India, Ministry of Power. Available at
powermin.nic.in/generation/accelerating_development.htm.

Figure 10.
Improving distribution also presents a key
challenge for meeting demand. Although 70 percent of
India’s population lives in rural areas, they use just 13
percent of power from the grid.103 Nation-wide, only 55
percent of Indian households have grid connections.
One solution to this issue is to approach the issue
through decentralized generation, which highlights the
46

importance of renewable energy resource generation.
The distributed nature of renewable energy technologies enables widespread electrification of even remote
and rural areas. While many of the technologies require
specific environmental and geographical conditions for
optimal efficiency, renewables generally can provide
supply closer to demand in areas far from the grid.
By producing electricity “by distributed generation
[it] flows shorter distances to consumers, . . . [and]
is cheaper than relying on a vast transmission and
distribution network.”104 Given the policy initiatives to
provide electricity to rural populations and the greater
relative consumption of electricity by decentralized
domestic and agricultural end-users (see Figure 2),
decentralized generation options are increasingly
important.
The supply of natural gas is of particular concern to
both India and to the United States. Although most of
India’s current gas needs have been met from domestic
sources, “India has . . . been energetic in seeking out
long-term gas deals”105 with countries including Iran,
Qatar, Australia, Malaysia, Oman, and Turkmenistan.
Cross-border gas pipelines originating from some of
these countries, such as Iran, would introduce political
obstacles and potential vulnerabilities as the pipe
would transit through Pakistan.106 Bangladesh also has
been a focus of Indian efforts to obtain gas supplies,
but these efforts have not “materialized, partly because
of political pressures in Bangladesh.”107 Some analysts
argue that the potential solution is liquefied natural
gas (LNG) in lieu of cross-border pipelines,108 but it
is acknowledged that “considerable technological
progress . . . has to be made in terms of extraction,
transportation, and delivery of LNG.”109 While vast
gas reserves exist in Iran, the best technology for LNG
remains in the United States and Great Britain.
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In terms of nuclear, power plants technically are not
constrained by the location of any fuel resource. Nuclear
power plants “can be built close to populations they
serve, without risk of interrupted supply of fuel.”110
However, they generally are better positioned to serve
higher population densities rather than decentralized
communities. As some experts argue,
Installing a centralized nuclear reactor or thermal
plant and extending the grid to cover distant
villages is an inefficient way of providing lighting
to the primarily rural societies that characterizes
India. . . . Such communities are better served by
distributed renewable energy systems based on a
number of different technologies and sources—
micro hydel plants, windmills, photovoltaics,
and biomass based power. 111

As such, efficient development of nuclear power
generating capacity may require alignment with
concentrated demand centers rather than rural
electrification and distributed demand like agriculture.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
With increasing concern about climate change,
environmental considerations have become integral
to discussions of energy and electricity generation in
India. As emphasized by William Rosenberg of Harvard
University, “an energy policy also is an environmental
policy also is an economic policy. They are not separate
policies.”112 As such, strategies to reduce carbon
emissions from fossil fuel generation, or replace fossil
fuel generation with zero-emission generation, have
been highlighted as desirable policy goals. To make
prudent tradeoffs, the scope and potential impact of
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the alternatives need to be examined. In light of the
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, the
focus of this analysis will be on coal and nuclear and
the likelihood that nuclear would substitute for coalbased generation.
Coal produces the majority of carbon dioxide
emissions in India, comprising 68 percent of the total in
1990 and 65 percent in 2003. With electricity generation
the major consumer of coal,113 the environmental
impact of coal-based electricity is a serious concern.
The dominant role that coal plays in all projections
of electricity generation at least until 2032 suggest
a strong need to mitigate the risks to climate change
by pursuing clean coal technologies. The Planning
Commission acknowledges this and highlights the need
for research and development of clean coal technologies
for “improving the efficiency of energy conversion and
limiting emissions.”114 In-situ gasification is especially
beneficial to the environment by eliminating the
issues of “overburden removal and ash disposal faced
by conventional coal mining” as well as enabling
sequestration in the mine or “pump[ing] back in oil
or gas fields to enhance oil or gas recovery.”115 These
techniques could enhance the clean exploitation of coal
resources and extend the exploitation of this domestic
resource.
Efforts to reduce coal-based carbon emissions are
exceedingly important, but contributions should be
put into global and historical perspective. India’s
coal-based carbon dioxide emissions were 22 percent
of U.S. coal-based carbon dioxide emissions in 1990
and 32 percent in 2003. Whereas the United States
produced 7.2 metric tons of coal-based carbon dioxide
emissions per capita, India produced 0.62. In absolute
terms, the United States produced 2,100 million metric
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tons of carbon dioxide emissions from coal in 2003,
compared to India’s 666 million metric tons. Using the
DoE reference case for projecting coal-based carbon
dioxide emissions, India could produce 1,372 million
metric tons of coal-based emissions in 2030, which is
approximately 65 percent of what the United States
produced in 2003. On a per capita basis, India’s 2030
projected coal-based carbon emissions are just 0.95
metric tons, or just 13 percent of what the United States
produced on a per capita basis in 2003.116 As Michael
Levi and Charles Ferguson of the Council on Foreign
Relations point out, “absent much broader efforts on
that front . . . modest reductions in Indian emissions
will have little effect.”117
Examining India’s options for carbon emission
reduction in relative terms helps to contextualize
the possible gains (see Figure 11). The estimates of
carbon off-set for nuclear’s substitution ranges from
145 million tons of carbon emissions by developing
20 GW118 of nuclear generation capacity to a more
conservative total of 175 million tons for 68 GW by
2032.119 The Planning Commission analyses suggest
nuclear alone would reduce emissions from a coaldominant scenario by only 6 percent. By comparison,
demand side management, maximizing hydro, and
natural gas generation would reduce emissions by as
much as 800 million tons,120 constituting an additional
28 percent reduction from a coal-dominant scenario
(see Figure 12). Given the technological limitations of
the development of nuclear and the dominance of coal
at least through 2032, “burning coal more cheaply and
more cleanly would do more for India’s economy and
the environment than would expanding the country’s
nuclear power capacity.”121
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Sources: “Government of India, Planning Commission. Integrated Energy Policy: Report of the
Expert Committee, New Delhi, August 2006. Dalberg analysis of incremental reductions across
2031/32 scenarios. @ Victor, David G. ”The India Nuclear Deal: Implications for Global Climate
Change,” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, July
18, 2006. Available at: www.cfr.org/publication/11123/india_nuclear_deal.html.
Notes: Emissions are visual approximations of the contributions from electricity as depicted
in the graph on page 50 og the Integrated Energy Policy report. India’s 297 approved CDM
projects from the Integrated Energy Policy, page xxix. India’s 20 GW nuclear generation
substitution effect on emissions based on David Victor’s data and compared to the optimistic
scenario of hitting 20 GW, which is 2016.

Figure 11.

Sources: Dalberg analysis; Government of India, Planning Commission, Integrated Energy
Policy: Report of the Expert Committee, New Delhi, August 2006.
Notes: Emissions are visual approximations of the contributions from electricity as depicted in
the graph on page 50 of the Integrated Energy Policy report.

Figure 12.
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Nuclear power’s substitution effect with carbon
emitting generation options can be minimal, and
nuclear is not without its own unique environmental
concerns. For some countries, an increase in nuclear
generation did not occur commensurate with a decrease
in carbon emissions. In the case of Japan, nuclear
generation capacity increased by 40 gigawatts from
1965 to 1995, and carbon emissions rose from 400 to
1,200 million tons at the same time.122 For a country like
India which ambitiously seeks an increase in electricity
consumption to 2,741 kWh per capita by 2032, it may
not be an “either-or” scenario. The coal resource offers
economical and technologically accessible electricity
generation that will not be substituted for directly.
And to the extent that any of the other options fail to
meet their growth targets, coal-based generation likely
will fill the gap. With regard to other environmental
considerations, nuclear reactors “produce a lot of
highly radioactive waste . . . for which safe storage for
the tens of thousands of years required for it to become
harmless is yet to be found.”123 While disposal can be
done in a safe and effective manner, the environmental
concerns are not insignificant.
ENERGY INDEPENDENCE
The issue of energy independence is particularly
important for the Government of India, which seeks to
limit international supply risks by leveraging domestic
resources to the greatest extent possible. Although
an understandable and a theoretically worthwhile
goal, some would argue that a strict focus on energy
independence is unattainable; would actually drive
prices up; and would disrupt market access needed
for meeting energy demands efficiently. Despite
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these arguments against a strict focus on energy
independence, it is interesting to evaluate the best
option for attaining this goal. Through 2016 and 2032,
energy independence is reinforced mostly through
coal-based generation and by exploiting fully the
hydropower potential. Only in the very long term does
nuclear energy hold the promise to provide energy
security and independence which,124 as described
above, requires significant technological advancements
in thorium-based production and will not occur before
2050.
Abundant coal resources provide a degree of energy
independence in the near- and medium-terms, but
exhaustion of these resources will require increasing
reliance on coal imports or other forms of energy.
The degree to which India will rely on coal imports
in the future will depend on the extent to which it
can develop hydropower, natural gas, nuclear, and
renewable alternatives as well as initiate demand side
management and energy efficiency efforts. The coaldominant energy scenario developed by the Planning
Commission suggests as much as 45 percent of the
coal required to be imported in 2032 with 8 percent
GDP growth, while the least coal dependent scenario
suggests 11 percent could come from imports.125 The
cost of imported coal remains economically competitive
for power generation in certain areas of India due to
the low calorific value of domestic coal. With domestic
coal having a calorific value of 3,500 kcal/kg versus
6,000 kcal/kg for imported coal, the cost of imported
coal transported under 500 km is cheaper than domestic
coal transported greater than 1,400 km.126 As such, the
exhaustion of coal resources could reduce the energy
independence of the country, but only in the long term
and only if technological innovations do not occur to
prolong the life of the resource.
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Full exploitation of domestic hydropower would
contribute meaningfully to a policy of energy
independence. When fully exploited, hydropower
could comprise 16-19 percent of total generation
capacity by 2032. Maximizing the hydro potential in
some regions well-endowed with the resource could
offset the use of other resources, like coal, and extend
its availability to areas less well-endowed with hydro.
Once domestic resources have been fully tapped,
potential also exists to import some of the 55 gigawatts
of hydropower from neighboring Nepal and Bhutan.127
While importing hydro could degrade the degree of
energy independence somewhat, India’s neighbors
offer less political instability than some of India’s
options for natural gas.
The contribution of natural gas to energy
independence will depend greatly on the extent and
continuation of domestic reserves. As the Planning
Commission’s scenarios project, imports of natural
gas could range from 0-49 percent of total demand for
the resource in 2016-32. Although many neighboring
countries, such as Iran, Turkmenistan, Bangladesh
and Myanmar, have large resources of natural gas,
the option to utilize cross-border pipelines creates
concerns about energy security128 where India “may
face potential supply disruption if political issues
emerge.”129
Finally, while nuclear has been emphasized as a
key to India’s energy independence, this is not likely
to happen before 2050. If thorium-based production
technologies are not found, India would become
dependent on uranium imports to fuel its nuclear
power plants. Increasing the installed nuclear capacity
under this scenario would impinge significantly on
India’s energy independence. The uranium shortage
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already has forced India “to operate even the small
nuclear generation capacity that we have at a load factor
below what is technically possible.”130 The promise of
energy independence based on nuclear power, then,
is predicated on successful development of thoriumbased production and will not take place until well
beyond 2050.
CONCLUSIONS
It has been argued that the recent U.S.-India Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Initiative makes considerable
sense from an economic and resource perspective.
Among these arguments are the assertions that: it will
make India less reliant on unstable sources of oil and
gas; that India requires nuclear energy to meet its GDP
growth targets; and that nuclear energy can improve
the environment significantly and enhance energy
independence. Strategic and geopolitical justifications
notwithstanding, the economic and resource arguments
are overstated. In this analysis, we have sought to
assess the central question of whether nuclear energy
will meet India’s future energy needs by analyzing
the demand for electricity and evaluating each supply
option: i) total potential capacity; ii) relative costs; iii)
the pace of development, technological innovations,
and technical constraints; iv) locations of supply and
efficient distribution to electricity demand centers;
v) environmental considerations; and vi) impacts on
energy independence.
In the final assessment, this report finds that nuclear
energy likely will not reduce India’s dependence on
oil and gas, will play a marginal role in sustaining
economic growth through 2032, and is either not the
most significant option for reducing greenhouse gas
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emissions or is unlikely to reduce such emissions. In
terms of lessening India’s dependence on imported
fossil fuels, nuclear energy does not fulfill the same
end uses as the majority of imports of foreign fossil
fuels and therefore will not substitute for them. As
Dr. Ashton Carter of Harvard University succinctly
underscored:
Nuclear power can play a part in helping India
address these problems, but it will not make
a critical difference. Electricity in India will be
mostly produced by coal-burning power plants
for the foreseeable future; even under the most
extravagant projections, nuclear plants will
provide less than ten percent of India’s electricity
. . . . [As such, nuclear power] can do little to slake
the thirst of the principal consuming sector in
India—transportation—because cars and trucks
do not run off the electrical grid and will not for
a long time.131

Michael Levi and Charles Ferguson of the Council on
Foreign Relations reinforce this point by highlighting
that “most Indian oil is used by cars and trucks, not by
power plants, so nuclear power will not significantly
change the demand for oil.”132
In terms of the electricity supply, estimates generally
agree that India will depend primarily on domestic
coal and hydropower, providing roughly 60-80 percent
of electricity through 2032. In the most optimistic
scenarios, natural gas generation could reach 16
percent, and nuclear energy could constitute 9 percent
of generation capacity by 2032. But if the development
of hydro, natural gas, or nuclear generation is delayed,
coal-based generation will fill the gap. In general,
India has considerable domestic resources—in the
form of coal, hydro, efficiency improvements, and
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renewables—to meet demand for the next 10-25 years
and most likely the next 45 years. The electricity
demands of economic growth can be met with India’s
diverse and vast resource base, of which nuclear will
remain a marginal contributor at least through 2050.
In terms of energy independence and environmental
improvements, coal also dominates the scenarios
through 2032. Although domestic coal could be
exhausted in 45 years if additional technologies or
reserves are not found, imported coal can be economical
for a significant portion of India, and technological
improvements could extend the coal resource base
and significantly enhance energy independence. Since
India lacks sufficient domestic sources of uranium,
an increase in nuclear generation would result in
greater dependence on imports of ore and technology
until India’s abundant domestic resources of thorium
can be commercialized for significant production of
electricity, which is not likely until after 2050. In terms
of environmental improvements, the development
of nuclear generation has not necessarily led to a
reduction in greenhouse gases, and the dominance of
coal in the energy mix well through 2050 means that
clean-coal technologies, hydro power, demand side
management, and renewables could do more to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions than nuclear generation.
In sum, the economic and resource arguments for the
U.S.-India Civil Cooperation Initiative are overstated.
Nuclear energy will not reduce India’s reliance on
foreign fossil fuels significantly, is not vital to sustain
India’s economic growth through 2032, and does not
necessarily provide the best option for environmental
improvements and energy independence.
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APPENDIX A
KEY FINDINGS BY CRITERION
Criterion

Key findings

Total potential capacity

• Coal will contribute the
majority of electricity for the
next 45+ years
• Hydropower remains
significant, at ~16-20 percent
of 2032 demand
• Nuclear potential
optimistically contributes
only 8-9 percent by 2032

Relative costs

• Relative costs may
impact the sequence of
development, but all supply
options are necessary to
some degree to meet future
demand
• Hydropower is currently
among the cheapest, coal
and nuclear are potentially
equivalent, depending on
discount rate, natural gas
is potentially expensive
if fuel prices remain high
and renewables remain
expensive per kWh but
small installation costs make
them accessible for rural
populations

Pace of development,
technological innovation, and
technical constraints
(continued)

• Nuclear has historically
fallen short of projections
and current estimates
employ many assumptions
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Criterion

Key findings

Pace of development,
technological innovation, and
technical constraints
(continued)

• Optimistic nuclear
projections require
overcoming significant
technological hurdles (e.g.,
commercializing thorium)

Pace of development,
technological innovation, and
technical constraints
(concluded)

• Hydropower is often
hindered by social pressures
and current plans are slower
than historical rates of
development through 2016
• Clean use of coal and
extending the life of coal
resources face significant
technological hurdles (e.g.,
in-situ gasification), but
exploitation for next 45
years does not
• Significant technological
hurdles are needed to make
renewables cheaper on a per
kWh basis

Locations of supply and
linkages to demand

• Hydropower potential
remains primarily in those
areas where importation
of coal would not be
economically competitive
• Transmission and
distribution network
improvements are vital
• Decentralized generation
can help meet the policy
goals of increasing
electricity access among
rural populations
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Criterion

Key findings

Environmental considerations

• Demand side management,
improving coal efficiency,
and full exploitation of
renewables contributes
more to CO2 reductions
than optimistic nuclear
projections
• Unlikely that nuclear would
substitute for coal-based
generation

Energy independence

• Extending coal resources
reinforces independence the
most
• Hydropower contributes
meaningfully to
independence until fully
exploited
• Uranium-based nuclear
power makes India
dependent due to limited
domestic resources
• Nuclear contributes
meaningfully to energy
independence only after
thorium generation is
realized and ramped up,
probably after 2050
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APPENDIX B
MAIN POWER PLANTS IN INDIA

Source: International Energy Agency. Electricity in India:
Providing Power for the Millions, OECD/IEA, Paris, 2002.
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APPENDIX C
COAL PRODUCTION, USE AND IMPORTS

Source: International Energy Agency. Electricity in India:
Providing Power for the Millions, OECD/IEA, Paris, 2002.
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CHAPTER 3
NUCLEAR POWER IN INDIA:
FAILED PAST, DUBIOUS FUTURE
M. V. Ramana
The general assumption underlying the July 2005
agreement signed by President George Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh seems to be that nuclear
power will be an important component of India’s
energy future. As we shall show both by examining the
history and performance of the Indian nuclear power
program so far and analyzing problems with some of
the plans for its growth, nuclear power in India has
not been and will not be a major source of power
for many decades at least, if even then. The negative
consequences far outweigh any energy benefits that
may accrue from a larger nuclear sector in India.
INITIATION
The Indian nuclear program was established in
1948, barely a few months after independence. The
main personalities involved in determining its contours
were Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of
India; and Homi Bhabha, a physicist who first made
his mark as a student at Cambridge University in the
United Kingdom (UK). Nehru was of the view that if
India had “to remain abreast of the world, [it] must
develop this atomic energy” and was therefore very
supportive of Bhabha’s plans for nuclear energy in
India.
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The legislative bill enabling the creation of the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the apex body in
charge of nuclear policy in India, made atomic energy
the exclusive responsibility of the state and allowed
for a thick layer of secrecy.1 Nehru gave two reasons,
both somewhat disingenuous, for the imposition of
secrecy. “The advantage of our research would go
to others before we even reaped it, and secondly, it
would become impossible for us to cooperate with any
country which is prepared to cooperate with us in this
matter, because it will not be prepared for the results of
researches to become public.”
There was some criticism of the secrecy provisions
in the assembly as Nehru introduced the bill. One
member, Krishnamurthy Rao, compared the bill
with the British and American acts and pointed out
that the bill did not have mechanisms for oversight,
checks, and balances as the U.S. Atomic Energy
Act. Further, in the bill passed in the UK, secrecy is
restricted only to defense purposes, and Rao asked if,
in India, secrecy would be extended also to research for
peaceful purposes. Though it may seem surprising for
someone who has spoken so eloquently against nuclear
weapons, Nehru had to confess: “I do not know how to
distinguish the two [peaceful and defense purposes].”
Nehru’s dilemma is clear from his statements while
introducing the bill. On the one hand, he said “I think
we must develop it for peaceful purposes.” But he
went on, “Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to
use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments
will stop the nation from using it that way.”
The connection between developing nuclear energy
and acquiring the capacity to build nuclear weapons
was clear to Nehru as it was to many of the scientists
and statesmen of that period. Indeed, it was perhaps
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more apparent then, in the immediate aftermath of the
U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, than today.
Those developing the Indian nuclear program were no
exception, and their plans accounted for the possibility
that the facilities constructed and expertise gained
could be used for military purposes.
ORGANIZATIONS AND STRUCTURE
The nuclear establishment in India enjoys unique
access to political authority and is protected from
external oversight. Unlike most policy matters where
the cabinet has the ultimate authority, the AEC is under
the direct charge of the Prime Minister. This structure
makes it difficult for most politicians or bureaucrats,
let alone the public, to challenge nuclear policies or
practices.
The role of the AEC is to formulate the policies
and programs. The actual execution of these policies
is carried out by the Department of Atomic Energy
(DAE), which was set up in 1954. The DAE has set up
a number of associated or subsidiary organizations.
These include five research centers, five governmentowned companies (“public sector enterprises”),
three industrial organizations, and three service
organizations.
Among government-owned companies, the Nuclear
Power Corporation is responsible for designing,
constructing, and operating the nuclear power plants
within the first stage nuclear power program (i.e., not
breeder reactors, which are the responsibility of another
government-owned company called BHAVINI),
and the Uranium Corporation of India Limited is in
charge of mining and milling of uranium. Industrial
organizations include the Heavy Water Board, in charge
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of the many plants that produce heavy water; and the
Nuclear Fuel Complex, which manufactures the fuel for
the nuclear reactors. The best known research centers
are the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the
most important facility involved in nuclear weapons
research; and the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic
Research, where the breeder program was cultivated.
For a long time, the DAE did not have a separate
safety division. It was only in 1972 that the DAE
constituted an internal Safety Review Committee. In
1983, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)
was set up to oversee and enforce safety in all nuclear
operations. This was modified in 2000 to exclude
nuclear weapons facilities.
The AERB reports to the AEC, which is headed by the
head of the DAE. The Chairman of the Nuclear Power
Corporation (NPC) is also a member of the AEC. Thus,
both the DAE and the NPC exercise administrative
powers over the AERB. This lack of independence is
in direct contravention of the international Convention
on Nuclear Safety, of which India is a signatory.
EXTERNAL INPUTS
Despite much rhetoric about self reliance and
indigenous development, the AEC sought and received
ample help from other countries. In June 1954, Bhabha
requested Sir John Cockroft, an important figure in the
British atomic program and a colleague of Bhabha’s
during his Cambridge days, to help India build a low
power research reactor. A few months later Cockroft
offered detailed engineering drawings, technical data,
and enriched uranium fuel rods for a “swimming
pool reactor.” The AEC accepted with alacrity and the
first “indigenous” reactor, Apsara, became critical in
August 1956.
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The second reactor to be set up was CIRUS—a 40
megawatt (MW) heavy water moderated, light water
cooled, natural uranium fueled reactor using the
same design as the Canadian NRX reactor. This deal
involved another former Cambridge contemporary of
Bhabha’s, W. Bennett Lewis, then a senior official with
Atomic Energy of Canada. It was supplied by Canada
as part of its Colombo plan—a plan that was, in the
words of Robert Bothwell, “premised on the relation
between misery and poverty and communism.” The
occasion for the announcement of the gift was the
1955 Geneva conference on the peaceful uses of atomic
energy. Based on the 1953 Atoms for Peace speech by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the conference was
the scene of much cold war-era maneuvering, as well
as an opportunity for countries to exhibit their nuclear
wares and woo potential customers.
A few Canadian diplomats realized that this could
lead to potential acquisition of weapons useable
plutonium by India. The NRX reactor was known to be
an efficient producer of plutonium because of its high
neutron economy. Nevertheless, the initiative went
through because it was assumed that India would
be able to acquire a reactor from some other source.
Despite consistent efforts on the part of the Canadians,
India, led by Bhabha, adamantly refused to accept any
kind of voluntary controls or safeguards on the spent
fuel produced.
When it suited his purposes, however, Bhabha did
accept safeguards. Examples of this are the reactors
at Tarapur (TAPS I and II) and Rawatbhata (RAPS I
and II). Bhabha’s speech in 1956 at a conference on the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) statute
makes clear the strategy he adopted. Bhabha said,
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[T]here are many states, technically advanced, which
may undertake with Agency aid, fulfilling all the present
safeguards, but in addition run their own parallel
programs independently of the Agency in which they
could use the experience and know-how obtained in
Agency-aided projects, without being subject in any way
to the system of safeguards.

The construction of CIRUS also required help from
the United States, which supplied the heavy water
needed for the reactor. Likewise, it was an American
firm, Vitro International, which was awarded the
contract to prepare blueprints for the first reprocessing
plant at Trombay. The plant was used to separate
plutonium from the spent fuel rods irradiated at the
CIRUS reactor; the plutonium was then used in India’s
first nuclear weapons test of 1974. Between 1955 and
1974, 1,104 Indian scientists were sent to various U.S.
facilities; 263 were trained at Canadian facilities prior
to 1971.2
Despite India terming the test a “Peaceful Nuclear
Explosion” and launching a diplomatic offensive
trying to prove that it was indeed peaceful, the 1974
test ended the period of extensive foreign support to
the nuclear program. The international community,
led by Canada and the United States, which were
incensed by India’s use of plutonium from CIRUS that
had been given to India for purely peaceful purposes,
cut off most material transfers relating to the nuclear
program. It also resulted in the setting up of nuclear
material multilateral control regimes. However, a
little advertised fact is that various nuclear facilities
still procured components from abroad, and foreign
consultants continued to be hired for Indian nuclear
projects, though only to a small extent. DAE personnel
still had access to nuclear literature and participated in
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international conferences where technical details were
discussed freely.
PROJECTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
From the very beginning, plans for the Indian
nuclear program were ambitious and envisaged
covering the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Over the years,
apart from nuclear reactors, India also developed
facilities for mining uranium, fabricating fuel,
manufacturing heavy water, reprocessing spent fuel to
extract plutonium and, on a somewhat limited scale,
enriching uranium. Investment in this wide range of
activities often was uneconomical. But it was justified
on the grounds of self-sufficiency, a theme popular in
India.
The other justification often offered was a grand
three-stage program, first announced in 1954, for the
development of nuclear energy in the country. The
three-stage program was, for example, the proffered
justification for the early acquisition of reprocessing
technology. The first stage of the three-phase strategy
involves the use of uranium fuel in heavy water reactors,
followed by reprocessing the irradiated spent fuel to
extract plutonium. In the second stage, the plutonium
from reprocessed spent fuel from pressurized heavy
water reactors (PHWR) is used in the nuclear cores
of fast breeder reactors. These nuclear cores could be
surrounded by a “blanket” of either depleted uranium
or thorium to produce more plutonium or uranium233 respectively. So to ensure that there is adequate
plutonium to fuel these second stage breeder reactors,
a sufficiently large fleet of such breeder reactors with
uranium blankets would have to be commissioned
before thorium blankets are introduced. The third
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stage involves breeder reactors using uranium-233 in
their cores and thorium in their blankets.
On the basis of this plan and assuming optimistic
development times, Bhabha announced that there
would be 8,000 MW of nuclear power in the country by
1980. As the years progressed, these predictions were
to increase. By 1962, the prediction was that nuclear
energy would generate 20-25,000 MW by 1987, and
by 1969, the AEC predicted that by 2000 there would
be 43,500 MW of nuclear generating capacity. All of
this was before a single unit of nuclear electricity was
produced in the country.
Reality was quite different. Installed capacity in
1979-80 was about 600 MW, about 950 MW in 1987,
and 2720 MW in 2000. The only explanation that the
AEC has offered for its failures has been to blame the
cessation of foreign cooperation following the 1974
nuclear weapons test. At the same time, these sanctions
also provided the DAE with an opportunity: Each
development, no matter how small or routine, could
be portrayed as a heroic success, achieved in the face of
staunch opposition by other countries and impossible
odds; while any failures could be passed off as a result
of the determination of other countries to block and
prevent India achieving technological advancement.
Such continued failures were not because of a
paucity of resources. Practically all governments have
favored nuclear energy, and the DAE’s budgets have
always been high. The only period when the DAE did
not get all that it asked for (and therefore considers the
dark years) were the early 1990s, a period marked by
cutbacks on government spending as part of an effort
at economic liberalization. But this trend was reversed
with the 1998 nuclear weapons tests; since then the
DAE’s budget has increased from Rs. 18.4 billions in
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1997-98 to Rs. 55 billions in 2006-07, i.e., more than
doubled even in real terms.3
The high allocations for the DAE have come at the
cost of promoting other, more sustainable, sources of
power. In 2002-03, for example, the DAE was allocated
Rs. 33.5 billions, dwarfing in comparison the Rs. 4.7
billions allocated to the Ministry of Non-conventional
Energy Sources (MNES), which is in charge of
developing solar, wind, small hydro, and biomassbased power. Despite the smaller allocations, installed
capacity of these sources was 4,800 MW (as compared to
3,310 MW of nuclear energy). While their contribution
to actual electricity generated would be smaller since
these are intermittent sources of power, they have
much lower operations and maintenance costs. Further,
most of these programs, like the wind energy program,
started in earnest only in the last decade or two, and
there is ample scope for improvement.
Today, notwithstanding over 5 decades of sustained
and lavish government support, nuclear power
amounts to just 3,310 MW, less than 3 percent of the
country’s total electricity generation capacity. Over
the next few years, this capacity is to increase, largely
because of the importation of two 1,000 MW reactors
from Russia. The DAE has only just started operating
a reactor not fully based on an imported design, a 540
MW heavy water reactor, which is scaled up from the
design of the 220 MW reactor that was imported from
Canada.
Despite this less than modest history and the hand
wringing about international sanctions, the DAE has
continued to make extravagant predictions. The current
projections are for 20,000 MW by the year 2020 and for
207,000 to 275,000 MW by the year 2052. The likelihood
of these goals being met is slim at best. But even if
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they are met, nuclear power would still contribute
only about 8-10 percent of the projected electricity
capacity in 2020, and about 20 percent in 2052. There
is thus little chance of nuclear electricity becoming a
significant source of power for India anytime over the
next several decades.
BREEDER REACTORS
One key element in the DAE’s plans for the future
of nuclear power in India is a large number of breeder
reactors. While country after country has abandoned
breeder reactors as unsafe and uneconomical, the DAE
stubbornly has been ploughing a lone furrow, heroically
in its own eyes as well as in the eyes of the handful of
breeder enthusiasts elsewhere, but needlessly by most
other counts. Reliance on an unproven technology, or
more precisely a technology shown to be unreliable
in most countries that have experimented with it,
is another strategy that makes it likely that nuclear
power will never become a major source of electricity
in India.
Despite grand pronouncements for 5 decades about
the three stage nuclear program where the second and
third stages involve breeder reactors, all that the DAE
has to show is a pilot scale Fast Breeder Test Reactor
(FBTR). The DAE has claimed that the “technology for
design, construction and operation of FBRs has been
demonstrated at Kalpakkam with the establishment of
the IGCAR, where over the past 25 years, a 40 megawatt
thermal (MWt)/13 megawatt electric (MWe) FBTR and
various research and development laboratories . . . have
been set up.” However, the FBTR has not been easy to
build or operate, and the experience with it has only
demonstrated how difficult breeder reactor technology
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is. Neither has it ever operated at the advertised 40
MWt; the best it has managed is 17.5 MWt (2.8 MWe),
and that well over a decade after criticality.
Work on the FBTR started in 1971, and it was
anticipated that the reactor would be commissioned in
1976. But the reactor attained criticality only in October
1985, at a fraction of the original design power. Since
it was commissioned, the FBTR suffered numerous
accidents and component failures. Some of the incidents
and accidents involving the FBTR during just the first 5
years include the following:
• In 1987, there was leakage of Nitrogen in the
flanges/valves of the preheating. Later that year
“a complex mechanical interaction due to fuel
handling error in the reactor damaged certain
‘in-vessel’ components.” This took 2 years to
rectify.
• In September 1988, problems of failure of
the cores of the trailing cables were noticed
during the process of retrieval of damaged subassemblies in the reactor.
• In February 1989, the load cell failed, and the
Capsule Transfer Gripper (CTG) got damaged.
This was rectified in April 1989.
• In July 1989, the reactor was shut down as the
desired availability factor could not be achieved
due to noise pick-up by the reactor protection
logic and unsatisfactory operation of speed
control system for primary sodium pumps.
• In November 1989, due to certain construction
deficiencies, interference of the hangers with
the complimentary shielding was observed in
the primary sodium system.
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The litany of accidents and incidents continued
through the 1990s. It was only in 2000 that the FBTR
even managed to operate continuously for 53 days.
On the basis of this experience, spotty at best, the
DAE has started to build a 1,250 MWt breeder, the
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), scaling up the
FBTR by a factor of about 70. Instead of the carbide
fuel used in the FBTR, the PFBR will use plutonium
and uranium oxide based fuel that the DAE has no
experience with. All of this adds up to a recipe for cost
and time overruns, as well as operational difficulties,
with the PFBR.
The PFBR has been talked about for a long time.
Plans have been made beginning over 2 decades ago.
The first expenditures on the PFBR were made in
1987-88. In 1990, it was reported that the government
had “recently approved the reactor’s preliminary
design and has awarded construction permits” and
that the reactor would be on line by 2000. In 2001, the
chairman of the AEC announced that the PFBR would
be commissioned by 2008. Construction of the reactor
finally was started in October 2004 and is now expected
to be commissioned in 2010. There already may have
been a further setback due to the disastrous tsunami
of December 2004. Given that even the second stage
of the three-stage nuclear program is yet to start, more
than 50 years after the initial announcement, the thirdstage—breeders involving thorium and uranium-233—
is unlikely to materialize anytime in the foreseeable
future.
Such delays may well be a blessing in disguise.
Both safety and economical arguments weigh against
breeder reactors. There are several reasons why
accidents involving fast breeders are both more likely
and could cause greater damage to public health than
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other power generation systems. One problem arises
from the use of liquid (molten) sodium to transport heat
from the reactor core. Sodium is highly reactive; it burns
when exposed to air and reacts violently with water.
Therefore there are risks associated with leaks, sodium
fires, and explosive steam-sodium interactions.
Unlike small test reactors (such as the FBTR), large
fast breeder reactors often have what is called a positive
sodium void coefficient. What this means is that if for
some reason the sodium were to heat up and vaporize,
then it would increase the reactivity of the core of the
reactor. If the operating system failed to insert control
rods fast enough, the increased reactivity would, in
turn, heat up the sodium further; this chain could
ultimately cause a fuel meltdown into a supercritical
configuration and a small nuclear explosion.
Another problem arises from the use of mixed oxide
fuel (MOX) in the PFBR. Because the fuel contains
plutonium that is about 30,000 times more radioactive
than uranium-235, there are more severe health effects
coming from exposure (especially through inhalation)
to this fuel. Further, the spent fuel from FBR typically
has a greater buildup of highly radioactive fission
products. Thus, the impacts of a full-scale (beyond
design basis) accident would be much more severe
than in a light water or heavy water reactor.
The plutonium or uranium-233 (derived from
thorium) that provides the basic fissile material
required to drive the reactor is extracted by chemically
treating highly radioactive spent fuel at reprocessing
plants, producing large quantities of radioactive wastes
during the process. Reprocessing is also prone to
accidents. Indeed, it was an accident at the Kalpakkam
Reprocessing Plant on January 21, 2003, when six
workers were exposed to dangerously high levels of
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radiation, that has been described by the director of the
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre as “the worst accident
in radiation exposure in the history of nuclear India.”
Reprocessing is also expensive. Based on the
budgets allotted to the most recently constructed
reprocessing plant at Kalpakkam, which is to serve as
a standard design for future plants, we estimate that
the cost of reprocessing each kilogram of spent fuel
would be approximately Rs. 26,000 (approx. $600) with
assumptions favourable to reprocessing, and close to Rs.
30,000 (approximately $675) under other assumptions.4
These costs are lower than the corresponding figures
for reprocessing plants in Europe, the United States,
and Japan. As in their case, however, it is unlikely to be
an economically viable method of waste disposal.
Since the fuel for breeder reactors is obtained
through reprocessing, it will increase the costs of
producing electricity at these reactors. There are
further reasons to expect that electricity from breeder
reactors will be very expensive. First, due to greater
safety requirements, breeder reactors tend to cost more
to construct than water moderated thermal reactors.
The same also goes for associated fuel fabrication
plants. Finally, as mentioned earlier, these reactors
use molten sodium as coolant. Sodium is opaque and
cannot be exposed to air or water. Hence, operating
such reactors requires extensive precautions and even
minor maintenance tasks become difficult. Thus, in
comprison with other reactors, breeders will be capitalintensive, be fuelled at greater expense, and will have
higher operations and maintenance costs, all of which
will make electricity from these reactors costly.

84

EXPENSIVE POWER
Though perhaps not as costly as electricity from
breeder reactors, electricity from the DAE’s existing
reactors has not been cheap either, especially in
comparison with the staple source of electricity in
India, namely coal-based thermal power. Since nuclear
reactors clearly were much more expensive than
thermal plants, the DAE’s strategy was to compare
nuclear power costs with thermal power plants that
were situated far away from coal mines, thereby
increasing the transport cost of coal and thus the
fuelling costs of thermal power.
In 1958, Bhabha projected “the contribution of
atomic energy to the power production in India during
the next 10 to 15 years” and concluded that “the costs of
[nuclear] power [would] compare very favourably with
the cost of power from conventional sources in many
areas” (emphases added). The “many areas” referred
to regions that were remote from coalfields, which
was estimated as 600 kilometers (km) in the early
days. By the 1980s the DAE had changed this distance
and stated that the cost of nuclear power “compares
quite favourably with coal-fired stations located 800
km away from the pithead and in the 1990s would be
even cheaper than coal fired stations at pithead.” This
projection was not fulfilled, and a 1999 NPC internal
study came to the less optimistic conclusion that the
“cost of nuclear electricity generation in India remains
competitive with thermal [electricity] for plants located
about 1,200 km away from coal pit head, when full
credit is given to long-term operating cost, especially
in respect of fuel prices.”
Even this claim does not stand up to analysis. The
costs of generating electricity at the Kaiga atomic
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power station and the Raichur Thermal Power Station
(RTPS) VII—both plants of similar size and vintage—
have been compared using the standard discounted
cash flow methodology.5 The coal for RTPS VII was
assumed to come from mines that were 1,400 km
away. The nuclear reactors were assumed to have
an economic lifetime of 40 years (as against a much
longer radioactive lifetime), but the coal plants were
assumed to have an economic lifetime of only 30 years.
The comparison showed that nuclear power would
be competitive only with unrealistic assumptions; for
a wide range of realistic parameters, nuclear power
is significantly more expensive. These results are
summarized in Figure 1, which shows levelized cost
(the bare generation cost which does not include other
components of electricity tariff like interest payments
and transmission and distribution charges) of Kaiga
I and II (operating nuclear reactors), Kaiga III and IV
(nuclear reactors under construction; projected costs),
and the Raichur VII (operating coal fueled thermal
plant) as a function of the real discount rate (a measure
of the value of capital after taking out the effects of
inflation) at 80 percent Capacity Factor.
Levelized Cost of Electricity from Different Power
Plants
Cost (US cents/kWh)

5.00
4.50
Kaiga I&II Nuclear Plants
Kaiga III&IV Nuclear Plants
Raichur VII Coal Plant

4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

Real Discount Rate

Figure 1. Levelized Cost of Electricity from Different
Power Plants.
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One particularly key variable is the discount rate,
a measure of the value of capital. Nuclear power,
because of its capital intensive nature, is competitive
only for low discount rates. In a country where there
are multiple demands on capital for infrastructural
projects, including for electricity generation, such low
discount rates are not realistic. The electricity sector
in India, as elsewhere, is being reorganized to make it
more economically viable. The 2003 national Electricity
Act emphasizes competition as the basis for energy
policy. The nuclear establishment has so far managed
not to be put to the economic test, but this state of
affairs could change.
This economic comparison is based largely on
assumptions favorable to nuclear power. In particular,
following the methodology adopted by the DAE, we
have not included the costs of dealing with radioactive
wastes from nuclear power. Since there is no credible
solution to the problem of radioactive waste, the best
that can be done is short-term management. The
DAE treats spent nuclear fuel by reprocessing it and
segregating the waste into different categories on
the basis of their radioactivity. As mentioned earlier,
reprocessing is expensive. If our estimate of the cost of
reprocessing in India is included in the tariff for nuclear
power, it would increase the unit cost by roughly 1
percent. This would make it even more expensive than
thermal power from coal.
Neither does the comparison include any provision
for insurance liability against accidents since the
government has not required that of nuclear power
plants. In the United States, private companies
considering the construction of nuclear reactors
were concerned that such an accident would likely
bankrupt them and tried to get insurance coverage. No
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insurance company was willing to take on the risk of
indemnifying against such a huge liability, nor could
they commit to pay beyond their own resources. The
U.S. Congress had to introduce the Price-Anderson
act that allowed the Government to act as the ultimate
insurer, offering in essence a subsidy to the nuclear
industry. Such subsidies are not included in the quoted
economic costs of nuclear power.
In India, the assumption seems to be that in the event
of an accident, the government would deal with the
consequences. There is not even the minimal insurance
requirement that the Price-Anderson act imposes upon
nuclear utilities. Including those requirements would
only make nuclear power even less economical in India.
However, this is, in part, the result of the NPC being a
government-owned company. It is by no means clear
what would happen if private companies were to start
building or operating nuclear reactors.
ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS
There is reason, though, to be concerned about the
safety of the DAE’s reactors. Practically all the nuclear
reactors and other facilities associated with the nuclear
fuel cycle operated by the DAE have had accidents
of varying severity. Other facilities associated with
the nuclear fuel cycle also have had accidents. These
are euphemistically described as incidents by nuclear
establishments around the world in order to mollify
justified public concerns. One can barely imagine the
consequences of a Chernobyl-like accident involving
the release of large quantities of radioactive materials
in a densely populated country like India.
The observed safety problems seem to be systemic.
In 1995 the AERB, which is supposed to oversee the
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safe operation of all civilian nuclear facilities, produced
a detailed report that identified 134 safety issues, of
which about 95 were considered “top priority.” It is of
greater concern that many of these problems had been
identified in earlier DAE evaluations in 1979 and 1987
as items requiring “urgent action” but had not been
addressed. Not surprisingly, the DAE has kept the
AERB report a secret. Even now, not all of these safety
issues have been addressed.
The most serious of the accidents at a nuclear reactor
in India occurred on March 31, 1993, when two blades
in the turbine generator of the first unit of the Narora
Atomic Power Station snapped under accumulated
stress and caused a major fire in the turbine room,
nullifying all electrical safety systems. What saved
the reactor from a potential meltdown was the timely
action of some technicians, who flooded the reactor
with a solution containing boron, a neutron absorber.
This was considered “a last-level protection in the
event of a prolonged station power blackout.”
What is really cause for concern in the case of the
Narora accident is that it came after the DAE had been
warned by the manufacturer of the turbine blades
that they were susceptible to fatigue failure. But the
DAE ignored the warning. Further, at least two of
the DAE’s reactors had experienced major fires in the
preceding decade: the Rajasthan 2 reactor in 1985 and
the Kakrapar 1 reactor in 1991. In the latter, the fire
led to a complete loss of emergency diesel power and
a partial loss of D.C. power supply. And, finally, the
DAE had ignored what reactor designers around the
world had learned from the 1975 fire at the Browns
Ferry nuclear plant in the United States: Always put
electric cabling to emergency shut down and cooling
systems in separate fire proof channels.
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A further source of concern is that, as mentioned
earlier, the AERB, which is supposed to oversee the
safe operation of all civilian nuclear facilities, is not
independent of the DAE. This is compounded by the
AERB’s lack of technical staff and testing facilities. As
A. Gopalakrishnan, a former chairman of the AERB,
has observed,
95 percent of the members of the AERB’s evaluation
committees are scientists and engineers on the payrolls
of the DAE. This dependency is deliberately exploited
by the DAE management to influence, directly and
indirectly, the AERB’s safety evaluations and decisions.
The interference has manifested itself in the AERB toning
down the seriousness of safety concerns, agreeing to
the postponement of essential repairs to suit the DAE’s
time schedules, and allowing continued operation of
installations when public safety considerations would
warrant their immediate shutdown and repair.

Elsewhere, Gopalakrishnan has pointed to an example
of direct interference from the AEC. This was in the
context of the collapse of the Kaiga containment dome
that was mentioned earlier.
When, as chairman, I appointed an independent expert
committee to investigate the containment collapse
at Kaiga, the AEC chairman wanted its withdrawal
and matters left to the committee formed by the NPC
[Managing Director]. DAE also complained to the [Prime
Minister’s Office] who tried to force me to back off.

All of this suggests that the DAE is not an
organization that can avoid accidents at its nuclear
facilities reliably. Since generating nuclear power
involves a complex technology where events can spin
out of control in a very short time, even seemingly
minor accidents should be cause for serious concern.
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In studying the safety of nuclear reactors and other
hazardous technologies, sociologists and organization
theorists have come to the pessimistic conclusion that
serious accidents are inevitable with such complex
high-technology systems.6 The character of these
systems makes accidents a “normal” part of their
operation, regardless of the intent of their operators
and other authorities. In such technologies, many
major accidents have seemingly insignificant origins.
Because of the complexities involved, all possible
accident modes cannot be predicted and operator
errors are comprehensible only in hindsight. Adding
redundant safety mechanisms only increases the
complexity of the system allowing for unexpected
interactions between subsystems and increasing new
accident modes. All of this means that there is no way
to ensure that reactors and other nuclear facilities will
not have major accidents.
NUCLEAR POWER, CLIMATE CHANGE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
A new argument in support of nuclear power that
has become common is in the context of increasing
global warming. Pro-nuclear advocates have offered
nuclear power as a solution to global warming, and,
given the gravity of the likely impacts of impending
climate change, it is not surprising that many have
started looking at it more favourably. Flailing nuclear
establishments around the world, including India’s,
have grabbed this second opportunity and made
claims for massive state investments in the hope of
resurrecting an industry that has largely collapsed due
to its inability to provide clean, safe, or cheap electricity.
Some in the United States and elsewhere also have
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argued that India should be helped with technology
and uranium to expand its nuclear sector so that it
could decrease its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Two implicit but flawed assumptions underlie
such claims about the significance of nuclear energy
in controlling climate change. The first is that climate
change can be tackled without confronting and
changing Western, especially American, patterns
of energy consumption—the primary causes and
continuing drivers for unsustainable increases in carbon
emissions and global warming. This is impossible;
global warming cannot be stopped without significant
reductions in the current energy consumption levels
of Western/developed countries. Efforts by various
developing countries, especially by elites within such
countries, to match these consumption levels only
intensify the problem.
The second flawed assumption is that the adoption
of nuclear power makes sense as a strategy to lower
aggregate carbon emissions. A good example is Japan,
a strongly pro-nuclear energy country. As Japanese
nuclear chemist and winner of the 1997 Right Livelihood
Award Jinzaburo Takagi showed, from 1965 to 1995
Japan’s nuclear plant capacity went from zero to over
40,000 MW. During the same period, carbon dioxide
emissions went up from about 400 million tons to
about 1200 million tons. In other words, increased use
of nuclear power did not really reduce Japan’s emission
levels. The massive expansion of nuclear energy, then,
was not motivated by a desire to reduce emissions. If
indeed Japan was sincere about doing that, it would
have adopted very different strategies.
There are two reasons why increased use of nuclear
power does not necessarily lower carbon emissions.
First, nuclear energy is best suited only to produce
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baseload electricity, which only constitutes a fraction
of all sources of carbon emissions. Other sectors of the
economy where carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases are emitted, such as transportation, cannot be
operated using electricity from nuclear reactors. This
situation is unlikely to change anytime soon.
A second and more fundamental reason is provided
by John Byrnes of the University of Delaware’s Center
for Energy and Environmental Policy, who observes
that nuclear technology is an expensive source of
energy and can be viable economically only in a
society that relies on increasing levels of energy use.
Nuclear power tends to require and promote a supplyoriented energy policy and an energy intensive pattern
of development, and thus, in fact, indirectly adds to
the problem of global warming.
As with Japan, nuclear power is unlikely to make
much difference to carbon emissions from India.
Just about every study on the subject has identified
a host of other measures that are far more viable
economically. These include running Indian coal
plants better, including the use of coal washing
and possibly more advanced combustion methods;
increased energy efficiency measures in the domestic
sector; and improving Indian energy intensity (energy
consumption per unit of gross domestic product [GDP]).
Increased investment on nuclear power only diverts
attention and finances away from these measures.
The other choice that the Indian government has
to make is whose electricity needs are met first. As
energy analysts like Jose Goldemberg have argued,
development and the mitigation of poverty require
that energy services be directed deliberately and
specifically toward the needs of the poor. Installing
a centralized nuclear reactor or thermal plant and
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extending the grid to cover distant villages is an
inefficient way of providing lighting to the primarily
rural societies that characterize India, as they do most
developing countries. Such communities are better
served by distributed renewable energy systems based
on a number of different technologies and sources such
as micro hydel plants, windmills, photovoltaics, and
biomass-based power.
Climate change may be a grave danger confronting
humanity, but it should not blind us to other
environmental hazards. Nuclear power is unique
in many ways. One environmental consequence
peculiar to nuclear power is that, among all electricity
generating technologies, it alone produces waste
that stays radioactive for tens of thousands of years,
posing a potential health and environmental hazard
to thousands of future generations. This is clearly
iniquitous, since these generations would bear the
consequences while we use the electricity generated by
these reactors. Ethical dilemmas aside, no technology
that generates such long lived radioactive wastes can
be considered environmentally sustainable.
Further, different stages of the nuclear fuel chain
release large quantities of radioactive and other toxic
materials into the biosphere. Thus, claims of nuclear
energy being environment friendly are absolutely
baseless, and it should be considered a polluting source
of electricity generation, albeit in a different way from
fossil fuels.
NUCLEAR POWER AND THE INDO-U.S.
NUCLEAR DEAL
The above history of unachieved promises explains
why the demands from the DAE and other nuclear
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advocates to gain access to international nuclear
markets have became louder and louder over the last
decade. It is only with external help that the DAE
can ever hope to grow rapidly. That is one primary
motivation for the Indian commitment in the July
2005 agreement to separate its nuclear program into
a civilian and a military one, which goes against its
historical policy: India so far has refused to allow
international inspections at any of its indigenously
constructed reactors.
The other pressure driving this deal has been the
DAE’s failure to plan for an adequate supply of fuel
for even the existing nuclear reactors. Apart from
two very old imported U.S. reactors, Tarapur I and
II, India relies on its domestic uranium reserves to
fuel its nuclear reactors. As of May 2006, the total
electric capacity of India’s power reactors that were
domestically fuelled was 2,990 MW—this includes the
Rajasthan 1 and 2 reactors which are under safeguards
but have to be fuelled by domestic uranium. At 80
percent capacity, all these reactors would require about
430 tons of natural uranium fuel per year. The weapons
plutonium production reactors, CIRUS and Dhruva,
consume about another 35 tons of uranium annually.
The uranium enrichment facility would require about
10 tons of natural uranium feed a year. Thus, the total
current requirements are about 475 tons of domestic
natural uranium per year.
We estimate India’s current domestic uranium
production to be less than 300 tons/year, well short
of its needs. It has had to rely on stocks of previously
mined and processed uranium to meet the shortfall.
But this might run out very soon. This was evident
in the statement from an unnamed official to British
Broadcasting Corporation soon after the U.S.-India deal
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was announced, when he said: “The truth is, we were
desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till the end
of 2006. If this agreement had not come through, we
might as well have closed down our nuclear reactors
and, by extension, our nuclear programme.”
The DAE has been trying desperately to open
new uranium mines in the country. But it has been
met with stiff public resistance everywhere. This
local resistance stems from the widely-documented
impacts of uranium mining and milling on public and
occupational health. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that
such public opposition will be steamrolled, and new
mines and mills opened. However, even this expansion
is unlikely to satisfy the uranium requirements of the
nuclear program in the short to medium term.
While it is undeniable that for the DAE to meet its
goals it will require external help, it is by no means
clear that access to international nuclear technology
will make a significant difference to nuclear power in
India. Though the DAE’s nuclear reactor construction
has been marked with time and cost overruns,
overnight construction costs still are comparable to,
if not cheaper than, reactors sold on the international
market, primarily because of lower labor costs but
also because licensing requirements are easier to deal
with. In the case of French reactors which are typical
of Western supplied power plants, M. R. Srinivasan,
former head of the DAE, has stated that, “Recent cost
projections show that if an LWR were to be imported
from France, the cost of electricity would be too high
for the Indian consumer. This is because of the high
capital cost of French supplied equipment.” Unless
foreign countries offer cheap loans to allow for the
purchase of imported reactors, India is unlikely to be
able to afford them. This is unlikely to be a viable way
for a large scale expansion of nuclear power.
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CONCLUSIONS
The experience of over 50 years of experimentation
with nuclear power in India and elsewhere
demonstrates that it cannot be considered a safe,
economical, or environmentally sustainable source of
electricity. Despite continued government patronage
and much media hype, atomic energy is unlikely to be
a major source of electricity for India. There are many
who believe India and other countries would be better
off giving up this costly and dangerous technology
and finding ways of generating electricity that do not
threaten their future or their environment.
It is testimony to the political power of the
Department of Atomic Energy that it has continued to
be the beneficiary of government largesse for decades,
while producing so little electricity and that, too, at
enormous cost. The only viable explanation for this
lies in the DAE’s role in designing nuclear weapons
and producing the fissile material (plutonium and
enriched uranium) to make them.7 The DAE has,
of course, realized that this—namely, the ability to
produce fissile material—is the real source of its
political power. This is why it has sought strenuously
over the course of the negotiations of the Indo-U.S.
nuclear deal to keep as large a part of its complex as
possible outside of safeguards. As we have elaborated
elsewhere, the deal will allow for the retention of a
substantial capacity for the production of nuclear
weapons useable material.8 Thus, if it comes through,
the nuclear deal will give a new lease on life to a flailing
atomic energy establishment that is involved both in
the production of an undesirable source of electricity
and in the production of even less desirable nuclear
weapons.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 18, 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint
statement in Washington, DC, laying the grounds for
the resumption of U.S. and international nuclear trade
with India.1 This trade has been restricted for about
3 decades because India is neither a signatory to the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty nor allows International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all its
nuclear facilities. The July agreement has generated
political debate in the United States and India, and
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concern on the part of a number of other countries.2
Among the issues is the fear that the agreement serves
to normalize India’s status as a nuclear weapons state
and so weakens the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and the larger nonproliferation regime. An
important concern is that it may serve to expand India’s
potential nuclear weapons production capabilities and
thus hinder international efforts to end the production
of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
The United States has started to amend its own laws
and policies on nuclear technology transfer and to seek
the necessary changes in the international controls on
the supply of nuclear fuel and technology managed by
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of states so as to
allow nuclear trade with India. In exchange for the lifting
of these restrictions, India’s government has identified
several nuclear facilities that it will designate as civilian
and will volunteer for IAEA safeguarding. Currently,
India has four power reactors under IAEA safeguards,
the U.S.-built Tarapur 1 and 2, and the Canadian-built
Rajasthan 1 and 2. The two Koodankulam reactors that
are under construction by Russia also will be subject to
safeguards.
India has proposed that it will place eight additional
reactors under safeguards between 2006 and 2014, each
with a capacity of 220 MWe (see Appendix I). These
reactors are:3
• Two Rajasthan reactors still under construction,
RAPS 5 and 6, which would be made available
for IAEA monitoring when they commence
operation in 2007 and 2008 respectively,
• RAPS 3 and 4, which are already operating but
would only be available for safeguards in 2010,
• The two Kakrapar reactors, which would be
made available for safeguards in 2012, and
100

• The two reactors at Narora which would become
available for safeguards in 2014.
Some of the facilities at the Nuclear Fuel Complex,
Hyderabad, also have been identified as civilian and
are to be offered for safeguards by 2008.4 Other facilities
to be declared civilian include three heavy water plants
(leaving at least two out of safeguards), and the two
Away-from-Reactor spent fuel storage facilities that
contain spent fuel from the safeguarded Tarapur and
Rajasthan reactors.
India would shut down the Canadian-build CIRUS
reactor permanently in 2010 and also would shift the
spent fuel from the APSARA reactor to a site outside
the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and make it
available for safeguarding in 2010.
A significant proportion of India’s nuclear complex
would remain outside IAEA safeguards and continue
to have a “strategic” function (see Appendix I). This
military nuclear complex would include the Tarapur 3
and 4 reactors, each of 540 MWe capacity, the Madras
1 and 2 reactors, and the four power reactors at Kaiga.5
Together, these unsafeguarded reactors have 2,350
MWe of electricity generation capacity. India also will
not accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder
Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor
(FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. Facilities associated
with the nuclear submarine propulsion program
would not be offered for safeguards. Reprocessing
and enrichment facilities also are to remain outside
safeguards.6 Finally, under the deal, India retains the
right to determine which future nuclear facilities it
builds would be civilian and open to safeguards and
which would not.
At the March 2006 summit in New Delhi between
President Bush and Prime Minister Singh, it was
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announced that the U.S. Government was satisfied
with this proposed Indian plan to separate its program
into a civilian and a military component.7 However, the
final shape and status of the deal still is unclear since
the U.S. Congress has not agreed on amendments to
existing laws and may attach conditions that India may
not accept. There also needs to be a consensus among
the NSG countries in support of making an exemption
to its rules for India.8
Technical issues related to fissile materials that
are involved in these concerns about the agreement
are discussed below.9 First India’s current plutonium
production and stockpiles are estimated. The
significance for India’s future weapons-useable
plutonium production capabilities of the line India has
drawn between its civilian and military facilities are
then assessed.
INDIA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Established in 1948, India’s Atomic Energy
Commission turned to the United Kingdom (UK)
for the design and enriched uranium fuel for its first
nuclear reactor, Apsara. Similarly, the CIRUS reactor
was supplied by Canada, while the heavy water used
in it came from the United States. India’s first power
reactors at Tarapur and Rawatbhata were supplied by
the United States and Canada respectively. A U.S. design
was used for its first reprocessing plant in Trombay.
Some of these technologies and materials contributed
to the production and separation of the plutonium
used in India’s 1974 nuclear weapons test. Due to this
test and the subsequent refusal to give up its nuclear
weapons and sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty
(NPT), India has been kept largely outside the system
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of trade of nuclear technology that has developed over
the past 3 decades.
India over the years has built a nuclear power
program, with 15 reactors [Appendix I] providing an
installed capacity of 3,310 megawatts electric (MWe),
which accounts for about 3 percent of India’s installed
electricity generation capacity. Thirteen of the reactors
are Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), the
first two of which were supplied by Canada. The other
PHWR reactors are based largely on the Canadian
design. The latest evolution of the design has increased
the capacity from 220 to 540 MWe. The other two
power reactors are Boiling Water Reactors supplied by
the United States.
Only the four foreign supplied reactors currently
are under IAEA safeguards. Two 1,000 MWe reactors
being built by Russia under a 1988 deal also will be
safeguarded. These two large reactors will increase
India’s nuclear capacity by over 50 percent in the next
few years. Figure 1 shows the development of India’s
safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear capacity and
how it will evolve in the coming years, including the
effects of the U.S.-India nuclear deal.

Figure 1. The Evolution of India’s Installed Nuclear
Electricity Generation Capacity.
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For decades, India’s Department of Atomic Energy
(DAE) has pursued an ambitious fast-breeder reactor
development program. This involves separating
plutonium from the spent fuel produced in natural uranium reactors and using it to fuel fast-neutron breeder
reactors, which in turn could be used to produce U-233
that eventually would serve to fuel breeder reactors
operating on a Th-U-233 closed fuel cycle.10 These
efforts have made halting progress: The first breeder
reactor to be built, the Fast Breeder Test Reactor, was
due to become operational in 1976 but started only in
1985 and has been plagued with problems.11 The 500
MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor is not expected to
be completed until 2010, if all goes according to plan.
India also has begun work on a prototype plutoniumthorium-uranium-233 fuelled Advanced Heavy Water
Reactor (AHWR) to gain experience with the thorium
and uranium-233 fuel cycle.12
India conducted its first nuclear weapons test in May
1974. There were another five tests in 1998, involving
fission weapons and a thermonuclear weapon. There
are reports that at least one test used plutonium that
was less than weapons grade.13 India is believed to
have a stockpile of perhaps 40-50 nuclear weapons,
and one report cites plans for 300-400 weapons within
a decade.14
FISSILE MATERIALS IN INDIA
India is producing plutonium for its nuclearweapons programs. Along with Israel, Pakistan, and
perhaps North Korea, it may be the only state currently
doing so. The five NPT nuclear weapons states,
United States, Russia, UK, France, and (informally)
China, have all announced an end to fissile material
production for weapons. India also is reprocessing the
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spent fuel from its nuclear power reactors, an option
pursued currently only by Russia, France, and the UK.
Japan is about to begin operating a large reprocessing
plant. Other countries simply store their spent nuclear
fuel.
Weapons Grade Plutonium.
India’s weapons grade plutonium comes from the
40 megawatt thermal (MWt) CIRUS and 100 MWt
Dhruva reactors. Assuming that the reactors operate
at full power when they are available allows an upperbound estimate of plutonium production. At full
power and an availability factor of 70 percent, each
year CIRUS would produce about 9.2 kg of weapons
grade plutonium, and Dhruva would produce about
23 kg of weapons grade plutonium.15 The estimated
cumulative weapons grade plutonium produced by
2006 CIRUS is 234 kg and by Dhruva about 414 kg.16
Spent fuel from CIRUS and Dhruva is reprocessed
at the Trombay reprocessing plant (with a capacity of
about 50 tons of spent fuel per year). It is hard to know
how much of the plutonium that has been recovered
from spent fuel has been incorporated into weapons.
It is estimated that over the years a total of 131
kg of India’s weapons grade plutonium has been
consumed in nuclear weapons tests, as reactor fuel
and in processing losses. This would leave India
with a current stockpile of about 500 kg of weapons
grade plutonium.17 It is typically assumed that 5 kg of
plutonium is sufficient for a simple nuclear weapon.
(More advanced designs could use as little as 3 kg).
Thus, India’s current stockpile of weapons grade
plutonium would be equivalent to about 100 nuclear
weapons. It is not known how much of this has been
fabricated into weapons components.
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Civil Plutonium.
Power reactors produce plutonium in their fuel as
a normal byproduct of energy generation. As of May
2006, India’s unsafeguarded reactors had produced
about 149 terrawatt hours (TWh) of electricity. Their
accumulated spent fuel produced so far would contain
about 11.5 tons of plutonium.18 They are now producing
about 1.45 tons of plutonium per year. The currently
safeguarded power reactors have produced a total of
108 TWh of electricity, and 1266 tons of spent fuel,
containing about 6.8 tons of plutonium.19
In India, the chosen way of dealing with the
spent nuclear fuel from power reactors is through
reprocessing. India has two large reprocessing plants at
Tarapur (about 100 tons/year) and Kalpakkam (about
100 tons/year) to recover plutonium from spent power
reactor fuel.20 It plans to increase its annual reprocessing
capacity to 850 tons by 2014 to meet the needs of its fast
breeder reactor program and AHWR.21
The “reactor-grade” plutonium in the high burnup
spent fuel being discharged by these reactors has
a different mix of isotopes from weapons grade
plutonium. However, reactor grade plutonium can be
used to make a nuclear explosive and, as mentioned
earlier, one of India’s May 1998 nuclear tests is reported
to have involved such material. In his history of the
Indian nuclear weapons program, George Perkovich
claims “knowledgeable Indian sources confirmed” use
of nonweapons grade plutonium in one of the 1998
tests, while Raj Chengappa in a semi-official history of
1998 tests claims “one of the devices . . . used reactor
grade or dirty plutonium.”22 An estimated 8 kg of such
reactor grade plutonium would be required to make a
simple nuclear weapon.23
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Figure 2 summarizes these estimates for the different stockpiles of plutonium that India has accumulated
so far. However, the exact amount of separated plutonium that India has produced so far is not known.

Figure 2. India’s Total Plutonium Production.
The Uranium Constraint.
One important reason for the DAE’s willingness to
agree to have more of its nuclear facilities placed under
safeguards is India’s severe and growing shortage of
domestic uranium. An Indian official told the BBC soon
after the U.S.-India deal was announced, “The truth is,
we were desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only
till the end of 2006. If this agreement had not come
through we might have as well closed down our nuclear
reactors and by extension our nuclear program.”24 The
former head of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
has reported that “uranium shortage” has been “a
major problem . . . for some time.”25
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited
(NPCIL) data shows that most of its reactors have had
lower capacity factors in the last few years.26 Figure 3
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shows the recent trend in operating capacity factors at
India’s nuclear power reactors as reported by NPCIL. It
does not include data for Narora-1 and Rajasthan-1, both
of which were shut-down for part of this period. The
Indian Planning Commission noted that these reduced
load factors were “primarily due to nonavailability
of nuclear fuel because the development of domestic
mines has not kept pace with addition of generating
capacity.”27

Figure 3. The Recent Decline in Indian Nuclear
Power Plant Capacity Factors.
As of May 2006, the total electric capacity of
India’s power reactors that were domestically fuelled
was 2,990 MWe—this includes the Rajasthan 1 and 2
reactors, which are under safeguards but have to be
fuelled by domestic uranium. At 80 percent capacity,
all these reactors would require about 430 tons of
natural uranium fuel per year. The weapons grade
plutonium production reactors, CIRUS and Dhruva,
consume about another 35 tons of uranium annually.
The uranium enrichment facility would require
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about 10 tons of natural uranium feed a year. Thus,
it is estimated that the total current requirements are
about 475 tons of domestic natural uranium per year.
Nuclear Fuel Complex Chairman R. Kalidas has said
that India’s current annual uranium requirement is on
the order of 400-500 tons of uranium oxide.28
Figure 4 shows the different demands for domestic
uranium in India. At various times, India has been
able to import limited amounts of low enriched fuel
for its Tarapur reactors, from the United States (which
provided the reactors), Russia, France, and China.

Figure 4. Annual Consumption of Domestic
Uranium in India.
In comparison, it is estimated that current uranium
production within India is less than 300 tons of
uranium a year, well short of these requirements. It
is assumed that India mines and mills 2000 tons of
uranium ore per day, 300 days per year, at an average
ore grade of 0.05 percent uranium. The actual ore
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grade being mined may be only 0.03 percent, since the
better quality ore already has been used. The Jaduguda
mill has a processing capacity of about 2,100 tons ore/
day and may only have been producing 230 tons per
year.29 But efforts are being made to expand uranium
production. An official report notes that one mill is
under construction at Banduhurang, Jharkhand, and
was expected to be completed in mid-2006, and that
work is underway on another at Turamdih, which will
have a capacity of 3,000 tons per day of ore (about 450
tons/year of uranium).30
DAE has been able to continue to operate its reactors
by using uranium stockpiled from the period when
India’s nuclear generating capacity was much smaller.
Estimates are that, in the absence of cut backs in India’s
nuclear power generation or uranium imports, this
stockpile will be exhausted by 2007.
India is estimated to have total conventional
uranium resources of about 95,500 tons of uranium,
sufficient to supply about 10 GWe installed capacity
of PHWRs for 40 years or so.31 However, the DAE’s
efforts to open new uranium mines in the country have
met with stiff resistance, primarily because of concerns
in the communities around existing mines about the
health impacts of uranium mining and milling.32 State
governments in Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya,
where DAE has found significant uranium deposits,
have yet to approve new licenses for uranium mining
and milling activities.33
It is possible, however, that DAE may be able to
overcome this resistance. The most likely new sites are
in the districts of Nalgonda and Kadapa, in Andhra
Pradesh, with respective potential capacities of about
150-200 tons and 250 tons of uranium a year.34 If these
mines are developed, then India could meet its current
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domestic uranium needs for both its nuclear power
reactors and weapons program. In the meantime, old
mines are being reopened and existing mines expanded,
including at Jaduguda.35
In the next few years, the domestic uranium demand
for India’s unsafeguarded reactors will increase further
by about 140 tons/year, to 575 tons per year, as the 540
MWe Tarapur-3 and the 220 MWe Kaiga-3 and Kaiga4 reactors are completed and begin operation in 2007.
However, the total domestic uranium requirement
will begin to decrease as some of the currently
unsafeguarded reactors are opened for inspection
in 2010, 2012, and 2014 and can thus be fueled with
imported uranium along with the Rajasthan-1 and 2
reactors (see Figure 5). Consequently, if India is able
to meet the additional demand for domestic uranium
until 2010, the availability of uranium imports allowed
by the U.S.-India deal thereafter will give it a growing
excess uranium production capacity that could be used
for weapons purpose.

Figure 5. Estimated Annual Domestic
Uranium Requirements for Unsafeguarded
Heavy Water Power Reactors.36
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India has offered to put 1,760 MWe of PHWRs
under safeguards (including two reactors under
construction) in addition to the two Rajasthan PHWRs
with a combined capacity of 300 MWe that are already
under safeguards. Without access to international
uranium, all these reactors would have to be fueled
using domestic uranium. At an 80 percent capacity
factor, they would require about 300 tons of uranium
annually.
If the deal goes through, the DAE will be able
to purchase these 300 tons of uranium from the
international market, in effect freeing up the equivalent
of India’s entire current uranium production for
possible use in military facilities. With Nalgonda on
line, the uranium available for the unsafeguarded
power and weapons grade plutonium production
reactors and the enrichment program increases to 450500 tons/year. This would yield a uranium surplus of
75-125 tons a year after 2014.
There are several ways in which India could use
its freed-up domestic uranium. In particular, concern
has been raised about the possibility that it might be
diverted to use in the weapons program. This option has
been suggested by, among others, K. Subrahmanyam,
former head of the National Security Advisory Board,
who has argued that:
Given India's uranium ore crunch and the need to build
up our minimum credible nuclear deterrent arsenal as
fast as possible, it is to India's advantage to categorize
as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to
be refueled by imported uranium and conserve our
native uranium fuel for weapons grade plutonium
production.37

There are different ways in which this could be
accomplished. One is that India could choose to build
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a third reactor dedicated to making plutonium for its
nuclear weapons. There have been proposals for many
years to build another large plutonium production
reactor at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in
Bombay.38 The proposed reactor would be similar to
the 100 MWt Dhruva that has been operating at BARC
since 1985. A decision on whether to go ahead is
expected early in 2007.39 If a reactor of the same power
rating as Dhruva is built, it could yield an additional
20-30 kg of plutonium, i.e., several bombs worth, each
year.
India also could choose to use some of its domestic
uranium to make weapons grade plutonium in one of
its unsafeguarded PHWRs. This can be done by running
the reactor in a “production” mode, i.e., by limiting the
time the fuel is irradiated, through faster refueling.40
This is beyond the normal design requirement of
PHWR refueling machines but might be possible.
Assuming such high refueling rates are sustainable,
then a typical 220 MWe pressurized heavy water
reactor could produce between 150-200 kg/year of
weapons grade plutonium when operated at 60-80
percent capacity.41 Even one such reactor, if run on
a production mode, could increase the existing rate
of plutonium production by a factor of six to eight.42
The net penalty for running one 220 MWe reactor in
production mode is 190 tons of natural uranium.43
To offset this additional requirement of 190 tons/
year of uranium if India were to operate a single 220
MWe PHWR in weapons grade plutonium production
mode, it could recycle some of the depleted uranium
recovered from the spent fuel from this reactor into
the other seven unsafeguarded power reactors. This
scheme involves fuelling 25 percent of the core with
depleted uranium (containing 0.61 percent U-235)
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and ends up saving 20 percent of the normal natural
uranium requirement, with the average burn up
reduced to 5400 MWd/tHM.44
The resulting 20 percent savings on the roughly
306 tons/year of natural uranium the seven power
reactors require is equivalent to 61 tons/year of natural
uranium. The net penalty of running one reactor in
production mode is reduced from 190 tons/year to
about 130/tons per year. This implies that India could
operate an unsafeguarded 220 MWe heavy water
reactor in production mode, provided the Nalgonda
and other mines can yield an additional 200 tons/year
of uranium, and that India has sufficient reprocessing
capacity to maintain the necessary flow of depleted
uranium.
India already has fuelled some PHWRs using
natural uranium and depleted uranium recovered as a
byproduct of weapons grade plutonium production—
including the Rajasthan-3 and 4, Kaiga-2 and Madras2 reactors.45 It has used depleted uranium recovered
from low burn-up fuel from CIRUS and Dhruva.46
These reactors generate only about 30 tons/year of
spent fuel. However, there is a stock of about 750 tons
of such spent fuel.47 This would suffice for roughly 4 to
5 years if all the power reactors ran on a mixed natural
and depleted uranium core.
Power Reactor Spent Fuel.
The nuclear deal does not constrain India’s use of the
11.5 tons of plutonium from the spent fuel discharged
by any of its currently unsafeguarded reactors. Each of
the six currently operating reactors to be placed under
safeguards, operating at 80 percent capacity, will add
about 120 kg/year of plutonium during its remaining
unsafeguarded operation. The total contribution from
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these six reactors will be about 4,300 kg before they are
all finally under safeguards
India’s total annual unsafeguarded plutonium
production will increase from the current 1,450 kg/
year as reactors under construction come into operation
next year. It will decline in coming years as reactors are
opened for inspection. Plutonium production will fall
from about 2,000 kg/year in 2007 to about 1,250kg/
year after 2014, when it will stabilize (see Figure 6)
unless additional unsafeguarded reactors are built.
Thus, the separation plan will serve to reduce India’s
annual production of unsafeguarded plutonium by
about one-third.

Figure 6. Annual Production of Unsafeguarded
Plutonium from All Indian Power Reactors from
2007 until 2016, as Reactors Are Progressively
Placed under Safeguards.
The Fast Breeder Reactor Program.
India’s first large breeder reactor, the 500 MWe,
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) is under
construction at Kalpakkam, near Madras. It is part
of a larger complex that includes the Madras PHWR
reactors and a reprocessing plant. This entire complex
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is being kept outside safeguards.48 DAE chairman Anil
Kakodkar has declared that “Both from the point of
view of maintaining long term energy security and for
maintaining the minimum credible deterrent the Fast
Breeder Programme just cannot be put on the civilian
list.”49 This suggests that the breeder may be used
to produce weapons grade plutonium. The PFBR is
expected to be completed in 2010.
Fueled initially by reactor grade plutonium
separated from PHWR spent fuel, the PFBR would
produce weapons grade plutonium in both its radial
and axial blankets of depleted uranium while the
plutonium recovered from the core could be recycled
for use again as fuel (Figure 7). To recover the weapons
grade plutonium, the core and blanket fuel assemblies
would have to be reprocessed separately. There will be
a dedicated reprocessing plant specially for the FBR.50

Figure 7. The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Burns ReactorGrade Plutonium in Its Core and Produces Weapons-grade
Plutonium in Its Radial and Axial Blankets.
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The PFBR is designed to have a thermal power
of 1,250 MW and an initial inventory of 1910 kg of
plutonium in its core.51 It is estimated that at 80 percent
capacity the PFBR could produce on the order of 135
kg of weapons grade plutonium every year in its
blanket.52 This would amount to about 25-30 weapons
worth of plutonium a year, a four- to five-fold increase
over India’s current weapons plutonium production
capacity.
India plans to build four additional breeder reactors
by 2020, and then move to larger 1,000 MWe breeders
and eventually install 500 GWe of breeder capacity.53
Each of the four planned 500 MWe breeder reactors
would need two initial cores before they would be
able to begin recycling their own plutonium, a total of
about 16 tons.54 India would appear to have more than
sufficient unsafeguarded plutonium for placing all four
of the planned breeders in the military sector. If these
five breeders are built and all are kept military, then in
about 15 years, India would be able to produce about
500-800 kg per year of weapons grade plutonium from
them.
CONCLUSIONS
We have assessed plutonium production capabilities in India and how they might change as a result of
the U.S.-India deal. India’s current stockpile of weapons
grade plutonium from its CIRUS and Dhruva reactors
is found it to be about 500 kg. Assuming a typical figure
of 5 kg of plutonium for each nuclear warhead, this
stockpile would be sufficient for roughly 100 weapons.
Under the deal, India will be able to produce another
45 kg of weapons grade plutonium from its CIRUS
reactor before it is shut down in 2010. The Dhruva
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reactor will continue to operate and add about 20-25
kg/year. A second Dhruva sized reactor that is being
considered would add a similar amount each year.
The most important potential increase in India’s
weapons grade plutonium production will come from
its unsafeguarded fast breeder reactor, the PFBR, to
be completed in 2010. We have estimated that it could
produce about 130 kg of weapons grade plutonium
each year, a four-fold increase in India’s current
production capability. However, the breeder would
have remained unsafeguarded and produced the same
amount of plutonium even in the absence of the U.S.India deal.
India has a stockpile of about 11 tons of
unsafeguarded reactor-grade plutonium. This stockpile
is currently increasing at about two tons/year. We
have estimated that the reactors India has offered to
be safeguarded by 2014, in a phased manner as part
of the deal, will contribute in total another four tons
of unsafeguarded plutonium before they are opened
for inspection. The eight reactors that are designated as
military and will remain unsafeguarded will contribute
1,250 kg of reactor grade plutonium per year. All this
reactor grade plutonium is also potentially weaponsuseable.
We find that India’s current domestic production of
natural uranium of about 300 tons/year is insufficient
to fuel its unsafeguarded reactors and sustain its current
weapons grade plutonium and enriched uranium
production, which altogether require about 475 tons a
year. India has been able to escape this constraint so
far by using stocks of previously mined and processed
uranium.
Because of access to Uranium imports allowed by
the deal, India may be able to produce 60-100 kg/year of
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weapons grade plutonium by partially running one of
its unsafeguarded power reactors at low burn up. This
will require operating the reactor refueling machines
at much higher rates than normal and may limit the
extent to which this is possible. A key constraint on
this is the recycling of low-burn-up depleted uranium
(containing about 0.6 percent Uranium-23 percent) as
fuel. This in turn will depend on the operating capacity
of India’s reprocessing plants.
India already has achieved the fissile material
requirements for a “minimal” arsenal, and it has been
argued for some time that it should end production
of fissile material for weapons.55 It has been shown
that half a dozen modest Hiroshima-yield weapons
if dropped on major cities in South Asia could kill
over a million people.56 This suggests that several
dozen weapons would more than suffice to meet any
reasonable criteria for “minimum deterrence.”57 This
number would permit a nuclear attack with a dozen
warheads and provide for sufficient redundancy to
deal with any concerns about survivability, reliability,
and interception.58
Rather than pursue the option of a large expansion
of its nuclear arsenal, India could choose to suspend
all further production of fissile materials for weapons
purposes pending the negotiation and entry into force of
a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. This also is a necessary
step in progress towards nuclear disarmament.
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APPENDIX I
POWER REACTORS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
India (note: military reactors will not be open for
safeguards)
Power reactor

Type

Power
Start-up date
(MWe)

Safeguards
(June 2006)

Open for
Safeguards

Kaiga-1

HWR

220

16-Nov-00

Unsafeguarded

Military

Kaiga-2

HWR

220

16-Mar-00

Unsafeguarded

Military

Kakrapar-1

HWR

220

6-May-93

Unsafeguarded

2012

Kakrapar-2

HWR

220

1-Sep-95

Unsafeguarded

2012

Madras-1

HWR

170

27-Jan-84

Unsafeguarded

Military

Madras-2

HWR

220

21-Mar-86

Unsafeguarded

Military

Narora-1

HWR

220

1-Jan-91

Unsafeguarded

2014

Narora-2

HWR

220

1-Jul-92

Unsafeguarded

2014

Rajasthan-1

HWR

100

16-Dec-73

Safeguarded

Safeguarded

Rajasthan-2

HWR

200

1-Apr-81

Safeguarded

Safeguarded

Rajasthan-3

HWR

220

1-Jun-00

Unsafeguarded

2010

Rajasthan-4

HWR

220

23-Dec-00

Unsafeguarded

2010

Tarapur-1

BWR

160

28-Oct-69

Safeguarded

Safeguarded

Tarapur-2

BWR

160

28-Oct-69

Safeguarded

Safeguarded

Tarapur-4

HWR

540

12-Sep-05

Unsafeguarded

Military

HWR

220

2007 (planned) Unsafeguarded

Military

2007 (planned) Unsafeguarded

Under
Construction
Kaiga-3
Kaiga-4

HWR

220

Kudankulam-1

VVER*

1000

2007 (planned)

Safeguarded

Safeguarded

Kudankulam-2

VVER

1000

2008 (planned)

Safeguarded

Safeguarded

Rajasthan-5

HWR

220

2007 (planned) Unsafeguarded

2007

Rajasthan-6

HWR

220

2008 (planned) Unsafeguarded

2008

Tarapur-3

HWR

540

2007 (planned) Unsafeguarded

Military

*Russian: Pressurized Water Reactor.
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CHAPTER 5
ASSESSING THE VULNERABILITY
OF THE INDIAN CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
TO MILITARY AND TERRORIST ATTACK
Charles D. Ferguson
GROWING DANGERS
While the controversial U.S.-India nuclear deal has
focused attention on the potential for sparking nuclear
war or an arms race in East or South Asia, little or no
attention has been paid to how the deal’s implementation might increase the threats of terrorism and military
attack against Indian nuclear facilities. These threats
could grow in three ways. First, the deal could facilitate
a substantial expansion of India’s plutonium stockpile
in the civilian and military sectors. Plutonium, a toxic
and fissile material, could, in the hands of skilled
terrorists, fuel improvised nuclear devices—crude but
devastating nuclear bombs—or radiological dispersal
devices—one type of which is popularly called a
“dirty bomb.”1 Second, the deal could spur expansion
of India’s civilian nuclear facilities, thereby increasing
the number of targets for terrorist or military attacks.
Third, the deal brings India into much closer alignment
with the United States. This alliance already has stirred
animosity toward India from Osama bin Laden, the
leader of al-Qa’ida. Moreover, closer Indo-American
relations could also breed resentment in Pakistan and
result in a more vulnerable India, especially in armed
conflict involving India and Pakistan.
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Al-Qa’ida-affiliated operatives may have launched
or helped perpetrate the July 11, 2006, terrorist
bombings in Mumbai. Soon after these attacks, the U.S.
Embassy in New Delhi issued a warning about possible
terrorist assaults against Indian government facilities,
including nuclear sites. In response, New Delhi boosted
security at its nuclear complex by early August.2
Perhaps security requires further strengthening. For
instance, in late August, villagers near the Kakrapar
nuclear facility reported seeing two men armed with
automatic weapons inside a prohibited area, but still
outside the most sensitive area of the facility.3
India’s extensive nuclear complex both in the
civilian and military sectors already presents a targetrich environment. Moreover, India has ambitious plans
for a major expansion of this complex. This expansion
could increase the risk of accidents, attacks, or sabotage.
Without adequate quality controls in training, the risk
of accidents increases and, even with high quality of
training, a rapid influx of workers into the nuclear
program increases the probability of saboteurs entering
the program.
Shaken by sectarian strife and terrorism for many
decades, India resides in one of the most violence-prone
regions of the world. Jihadist groups have caused
much of this violence. Some of these groups have ties
to al-Qa’ida, which has considered using nuclear and
radiological terrorism. Pakistan has sponsored terrorist
groups to further its aims in the separatist region of
Jammu and Kashmir, and could consider using such
groups as proxies in a military attack against other
regions of India, including those containing nuclear
facilities.
The focus here is on the military and terrorist threats
to India’s civilian nuclear facilities. But because Indian
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civilian and military nuclear programs are intertwined,
the analysis will consider significant areas of overlap,
notably the growing plutonium stockpiles that can
fuel both programs. First, this chapter examines
India’s civilian nuclear infrastructure, assessing
potential vulnerabilities to attack. Second, it discusses
terrorism and sectarian violence involving India and
whether this violence is likely to be directed against
nuclear facilities. Finally, after reviewing efforts India
has reportedly taken to protect these facilities, the
chapter recommends further urgently-needed security
measures.
In sum, the major recommendations are that India
should:
• Ensure that the different modes of a terrorist
or military attack are fully considered and
continually evaluated in assessing the safety
and security of its nuclear facilities;
• Separate more of its civilian nuclear facilities,
including breeder reactors, from connections to
the military program to reduce the target profile
of these facilities and to help remove them from
the shroud of secrecy surrounding the military
program;
• Work with China and Pakistan toward a fissile
material cap to limit the amount of plutonium
potentially available to terrorists;
• Develop cooperative nuclear security by sharing
and implementing best practices with the United
States, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), and other partners;
• Apply to new facilities and retrofit to the extent
possible in existing facilities sabotage-resistant
safety systems as well as additional safety and
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security measures such as extra diesel generators
and relatively low-cost fortifications around
spent fuel pools and vulnerable buildings, in
addition to active and passive air defenses for
critical nuclear sites; and,
• Create a more transparent and self-critical
civilian nuclear infrastructure that would
empower an independent regulatory agency
and would be continually vigilant about insider
threats.
INDIA’S CIVILIAN NUCLEAR
INFRASTRUCTURE
Understanding the potential vulnerabilities of
India’s civilian nuclear program to military or terrorist
attack first requires understanding the vision behind
the program. For decades, India has envisioned a
three-pronged approach to developing its civilian
nuclear infrastructure. First, it would exploit its limited
indigenous deposits of uranium to fuel thermal reactors.
These reactors are called “thermal” because they rely
on slowed down neutrons, or neutrons possessing
thermal or relatively low energies, to power the nuclear
reactions in these reactors’ cores. Second, India would
harvest the plutonium produced in the thermal reactors
to make fuel for fast breeder reactors. The “harvesting”
is called reprocessing, which uses chemical processes
to extract plutonium from highly radioactive spent
nuclear fuel. Fast reactors use high speed, or highenergy, neutrons to power the reactions. Breeder
reactors can produce, or breed, more plutonium fuel.
Third, India wants to create a fleet of thorium-reactors
that would use the fertile element thorium to produce
uranium-233, a fissile material that can power reactors.
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India is estimated to possess one-third of the world’s
deposits of thorium.
Many aspects of this three-pronged plan can increase
India’s risk of militaries or terrorists targeting civilian
nuclear assets. The sheer complexity of the enterprise
could complicate management of ensuring adequate
security throughout the program. The different reactor
designs, for instance, would require detailed attention
to differences in vulnerability to various modes of
attack. For instance, one type of reactor might have
adequate protection against attacks from the air because
the reactor design might have a strong containment
building around the reactor core. In contrast, a different
design might have a weaker containment structure, but
might present vulnerabilities to truck bombs. Protecting
against these differing vulnerabilities demands a highly
technically-trained guard force, as well as a regulatory
agency that is vigilantly and continually conducting
rigorous security tests, probing for and correcting any
weaknesses.
The second prong involving bulk processing and
handling of tons of separated plutonium can increase
the risk of diversion of this bomb-usable material.
In contrast, keeping plutonium embedded in spent
nuclear fuel provides a highly radioactive and lethal
barrier against theft. In the event of an accident or
an attack that results in radioactivity release to the
environment, reactors fueled with plutonium could
cause greater harm to health than reactors fueled with
uranium because plutonium is a much more toxic
material.4
The third prong, if not managed properly, could
raise the risk of uranium-233, a fissile material that
can power the easiest to make nuclear bomb, a guntype device, falling into the wrong hands. The thorium
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cycle produces uranium-232, which decays to highly
radioactive daughter products. Even relatively small
concentrations of uranium-232 and its daughters can
emit lethal doses of gamma radiation.
Because U-232 and U-233 have essentially the
same chemical properties, separating the one isotope
from the other is very difficult. One method involves
limiting the daughter products of U-232 by chemically
removing thorium and other daughter products
from the uranium mixture. However, within 2 years
after this chemical separation, the buildup of highly
radioactive daughter products can lead to a lethal dose
in 20 minutes to a person within one meter of a critical
mass of uranium-233. This assumes that uranium-232
is present at least to the level of 0.1 percent. Another
method is to remove U-232 by using laser isotope
separation (LIS) methods. Employing powerful lasers,
LIS selectively excites and ionizes uranium-233 to
separate it from uranium-232. India’s Department of
Atomic Energy (DAE) has stated that its long-term
ambition is to use LIS to remove enough U-232 to reach
a level of a few parts per million (ppm). At this level,
workers could handle a mixture of U-233 and U-232
for 10s to 100s of hours without exceeding their annual
occupational radiation exposure doses. But terrorists
also could handle safely such a mixture.
A uranium-233 mixture can be denatured to make
it less bomb-usable. To do that, sufficient U-238 can be
added into the mixture to increase greatly the critical
mass needed to make a bomb out of the mixture. This
isotopic denaturing depends on the reactor design
as well as the reprocessing method used with the U233 mixture. Nuclear physicists Jungmin Kang and
Frank von Hippel have concluded, “The proliferation
resistance of thorium fuel cycles depends very much
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upon how they are implemented.”5 For instance, they
found that pressurized light water reactors fueled with
a mix of low enriched uranium and thorium fuel at high
burnup produce high U-232 contamination levels. Thus,
this type of usage is commensurate with proliferation
resistance. In contrast, heavy water reactors operated
in a low burnup mode can produce low concentrations
of U-232.
India has plans to develop an advanced heavy
water reactor using the thorium/uranium-233 cycle.
Presently, India has been operating since 1996 the
Kamini research reactor on uranium-233 fuel. This
reactor has a modest power rating of 30 kilowatt
thermal (kWth). Notably, the Kamini reactor is located
at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), which
is part of the Indian nuclear weapons complex. Like
the plutonium program, the thorium program blends
into India’s weapons program.
By design, the Indian civilian and military nuclear
programs are intertwined. An attack on India’s military
program also would likely adversely affect India’s
civilian program and vice versa. The analysis turns to
an examination of the different components of India’s
civilian nuclear program and the different potential
modes of attack or sabotage against the program.
Indian Nuclear Facilities.
India has several types of nuclear facilities, including
nuclear power plants, plutonium production reactors,
research reactors, spent fuel storage areas, high-level
radioactive waste storage facilities, and reprocessing
plants.
Nuclear Power Plants. Despite the ambitious threepronged plan, India has struggled to build even a small
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fraction of the nuclear power plants envisioned.6 Once
the 540-megawatt electric (MWe) Tarapur-3 reactor
supplies power to the grid, expected to occur in mid2006, India will have about 3,900 MWe of installed
nuclear power capacity.7 Under the optimistic planning
scenario, New Delhi wants 11,000 MWe by 2010 and
29,000 MWe by 2020. Of the 29,000 MWe, 20,000 MWe
are intended to come from indigenous development.
It is uncertain whether India will follow through on
acquiring 9,000 MWe of power from foreign sources.
New Delhi apparently put forward that figure prior to
the March meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh and President George W. Bush to help sweeten
the U.S.-India nuclear deal.8 However, for many years,
India has announced plans for 20,000 MWe of nuclear
power by 2020, and with the soon-to-be-completed two
Russian VVER-1000 reactors, imported reactors will
produce at least 2,000 MWe of the planned increase
in nuclear power capacity. India’s Nuclear Power
Corporation has sent dozens of engineers to be trained
in Russia to operate the VVER-1000 reactors.9 New
Delhi has discussed buying additional reactors from
Moscow.
Past performance or shortfalls do not dictate future
success or failure. Still, India repeatedly has failed to
reach its nuclear power production goals by substantial
margins.10 Within the next few years, India plans to
complete construction of at least eight indigenously
built nuclear power plants, with a cumulative
capacity of 2,780 MWe. Adding this amount to the
2,000 MWe from the Russian reactors, India would
more than double its current nuclear power capacity.
Nonetheless, even if India does not increase its use of
nuclear energy by almost nine times by 2020, a growth
of one-half or even one-fourth would challenge
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significantly India’s ability to train enough competent
nuclear engineers, technicians, plant managers, and
security guards within the next 14 years. According
to India’s top civilian nuclear management, the DAE
has had a functioning nuclear engineering school since
the late 1950s and is taking steps to ensure that India
can train enough engineers adequately to meet the
projected growth in nuclear energy development.11
India’s Nuclear Power Corporation reported in 2003
that it has more than 11,000 employees working at
its nuclear power plants.12 That number was for a
total power capacity of about 3,000 MWe, implying
the need for three to four employees per MWe. If this
ratio holds roughly constant as the power increases,
India would need 60,000 to 80,000 employees in 2020
for a goal power capacity of 20,000 MWe. The actual
number of employees needed probably would be less
than that amount because the newer plants would tend
to have a higher power rating and, therefore, would
need fewer employees at fewer higher-power rating
plants. Still, the overall conclusion is that DAE will
need to train several thousand to tens of thousands of
new employees. Assuming DAE can train sufficient
competent engineers, it also needs to take into account
the increased risk of the insider threat if the nuclear
workforce expands exponentially.
The next generation of Indian nuclear engineers
and plant managers at least would have to receive
training on three types of thermal reactors or additional
reactor designs depending on what types of foreign
reactors India would import, if those import deals are
actualized. Presently, the predominant type of Indian
commercial reactor is the pressurized heavy water
reactor (PHWR), based on the Canadian Deuterium
Uranium (CANDU) design. Fourteen of India’s 16
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thermal reactors are PHWRs. These PHWRs provide
about 3,500 MWe, or more than 90 percent, of installed
capacity. Boiling water reactors (BWRs) provide the
remainder. The third type of thermal reactor that India
will have in the coming years is the Russian-designed
VVER-1000, which is a pressurized water reactor
(PWR) design.
Reactor designs determine much of the inherent
strengths and weaknesses of a reactor. Nonetheless,
reactors of the same design can differ in their
characteristics because of differences in construction.
Engineers can vary the construction among reactors
of the same design due to many considerations. One
of the foremost considerations is site selection. Every
reactor site is unique. Proximity to other reactors at
the site or location of cooling sources such as bodies of
water, for example, can affect the layout of a nuclear
power plant significantly and lead to deviations from
a standard design. Because detailed information on
particular Indian nuclear power plant sites is not
available openly, this chapter discusses the general
characteristics that can affect the safety and security of
India’s commercial reactors.
Designers of nuclear power plants rely on the
concept of defense-in-depth, which means using
redundant systems to provide increased protection
against accidents. Almost all systems inside a nuclear
power plant have one or more backup systems to
ensure that if the main system fails, a replacement or
emergency system will provide protection quickly.
For example, if the primary coolant system ruptures,
an emergency cooling system is available to prevent
the reactor core from melting and possibly leading to a
release of radiation to the environment.
In general, there are two exceptions to the defensein-depth practice. A reactor has only one pressure
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vessel surrounding the highly radioactive core. If the
pressure vessel would rupture, a backup pressure
vessel would not be available to contain the core.
Nonetheless, the radioactivity in the core would not
necessarily be released to the environment because
most commercial reactors have a strong containment
building surrounding the reactor. The containment
is the last line of defense for a nuclear power plant
preventing a release of radiation to the environment.
But here is the second exception to defense-in-depth.
A commercial reactor, if it has a containment structure,
usually has only one. (As discussed later, the newer
Indian PHWRs have a double-domed containment
structure.) Thus, in assessing whether a nuclear power
plant can withstand an attack, it is vitally important to
know how strong its containment building is.
CANDU-type reactors, such as the Indian PHWRs,
have certain safety features that make them more
resistant to surviving attack or sabotage. CANDU cores
typically are subdivided into two thermo-hydraulic
loops. Each loop has hundreds of individual pressure
tubes. This feature would help localize a loss-of-coolant
incident caused by accident, attack, or sabotage.
Moreover, the large-volume, low-pressure, and lowtemperature heavy water moderator surrounding the
coolant would provide a large heat sink to further
protect the reactor fuel from melting down in a lossof-coolant incident. Furthermore, because the steam
generators are located above the core, natural thermosiphoning would help carry away heat from the core
and mitigate the effects of a loss of coolant incident.13
Containment buildings using a minimum of fourfoot thick concrete walls typically enclose CANDU
reactors. India’s most recently built PHWRs have an
added safety feature: double-domed containment
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structures.14 These PHWRs are the Kaiga-1 and 2
reactors, the Rajasthan-3 and 4 reactors, and the
Tarapur-3 and 4 reactors. But developing the doubledomes did not occur without incident. In 1994, Kaiga-1
experienced a partial collapse of its inner dome during
construction. In response, Indian engineers revised
the design. These PHWRs use microsilica-based high
performance concrete.15 The newer PHWRs also have
other safety features, including an automatic, quick
acting poison injection system to shut down the reactor
in an emergency and microprocessor-based systems
for reactor protection and control.16
India’s oldest commercial reactors are located at
Tarapur, which is about 100 kilometers from Mumbai.
India bought these U.S.-designed reactors from General
Electric (GE), which manufactured boiling water
reactors. Tarapur-1 and 2 began operation in 1969.
After more than 30 years of operation, these reactors
normally would be nearing their end of life. But Indian
engineers have made more than 300 modifications to
the Tarapur BWR plant to improve its safety. The DAE
believes that these improvements will allow Tarapur1 and 2 to run for another 30 years. Safety problems
had plagued these plants in the past. In particular, the
tubes in the secondary steam generators had developed
cracks. Technicians could not plug the leaks without
running a significant risk of receiving large doses of
radiation. Consequently, these generators were shut off
from the plant, and in 1985, the reactors were derated
from 210 MWe each to 160 MWe.17 The containment
structures of these reactors are not as robust as more
modern BWRs. The earliest generation GE BWR used
the torus or inverted light-bulb-shaped containment
design, which relies on a pressure suppression system.
This system, in the event of a loss of coolant accident,
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is intended to absorb steam and prevent a buildup of
pressure that could rupture the containment building.
Thus, designers reasoned that the pressure suppression
system would allow for a weaker containment building,
saving on construction costs. As early as 1972, safety
officials were recommending that this containment
system be discontinued because of concerns about
the failure of the system during an accident.18 Even if
the system would function properly during a loss of
coolant accident, a weak containment building might
not withstand the crash of a large airplane.
India has purchased two Russian light water
reactors to supplement its indigenous reactor
production. The older indigenous reactors typically are
rated at about 220 MWe (with two notable exceptions,
mentioned above). The newer indigenous reactors,
such as Tarapur-3 and 4, that are coming online within
the past are rated around 500 MWe. In contrast, the
Russian PWRs being built at Kudankulam are 1,000
MWe each. Thus, the foreign supplied reactors would
offer a significant boost to India’s power capacity.
The Russian VVER-1000 reactor has a relatively large
coolant-to-power ratio; thus, like a CANDU reactor, it
has some inherent protection in the event of a loss of
coolant incident. However, the VVER-1000 has some
inherent weaknesses. Vulnerabilities include steam
lines and isolation valves too close together, which a
single blast could knock out; the control room located
at the lower level of the reactor building, potentially
prompting quick evacuation if the containment
is breached, thus minimizing the amount of time
operators have to control the reactor; and relatively
weak containment structures that an airplane might
penetrate.19 The VVER-1000s are being constructed in
Tamil Nadu, where a number of terrorist groups are
based.
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Research Reactors.
Compared to commercial
nuclear power plants, research reactors at first glance
do not appear to offer tempting targets. Research
reactors typically contain much less radioactivity than
commercial reactors. Also, the former facilities usually
do not have the high symbolic or economic value of
the latter facilities. However, an attacker might strike
a research reactor because it tends to be weaker than
a commercial reactor. While the vast majority of
commercial reactors, including all Indian commercial
power plants, employ strong containment structures,
many research reactors do not use containment
buildings, and if they do, the containments tend to be
not as strong as those surrounding commercial reactors.
Research reactors, especially those at universities,
also tend to have less security forces than commercial
power plants.
Indian research reactors, however, usually are
located within institutions that perform both civilian
and military work. If security at these dual-use
institutions remains strong because of their role in
India’s military program, attackers would likely decide
to target relatively weaker nuclear facilities unless they
had assistance from workers inside the institutions.
Conversely, because these institutions have a dualuse role, military or terrorist attackers might find
striking against these facilities attractive. A successful
attack would deal a blow against India’s civilian and
military nuclear infrastructure. At the Bhabha Atomic
Research Center at Trombay, there are two operating
research reactors (the Apsara LWR and the Purnima-3
LWR), three decommissioned reactors (the Purnima1 critical assembly, the Purnima-2 LWR, and the
Zerlina PHWR), and one planned to start operating
in 2010 (the compact high temperature reactor). The
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decommissioned reactors, while not operating, still
could present potential targets because of the possible
presence of radioactive materials on-site. At the Indira
Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) at
Kalpakkam, there is the Kamini test reactor, which, as
mentioned earlier, uses uranium-233.
Plutonium Production Reactors. Indian plutonium
production reactors employ the technology in certain
types of research reactors to make plutonium for
nuclear weapons. While plutonium production reactors
are part of the military program, these reactors are
considered here because they also are intertwined with
the civilian program. Currently, India uses the Cirus
and Dhruva research reactors to produce plutonium.
Both of these reactors are located at BARC in Trombay.
Also, BARC contains a plutonium separation plant that
can process 30 to 50 tons of spent fuel annually and
a plutonium weapons component facility.20 Even six
kilograms of plutonium would be sufficient to make a
nuclear bomb. This is a very small amount compared to
the bulk of plutonium that India processes. Terrorists
who have enlisted the help of insiders might be able to
sneak out enough plutonium to build an improvised
nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device.
Plutonium, however, poses significant technical
challenges for terrorists wanting to make a relatively
high-yield nuclear bomb with an explosive yield
of roughly one to 20 kilotons. An implosion nuclear
device, or the Nagasaki-type bomb, demands use of
high-speed electronic switches and precisely shaped
and specialized conventional explosives, for example.21
Nonetheless, Pakistani nuclear scientists who are
sympathetic to terrorist causes might help terrorists
construct a bomb from Indian plutonium. This scenario
is not farfetched. Osama bin Laden reportedly met with
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two Pakistani nuclear physicists in 2001 and asked
about nuclear bomb making.22
If terrorists could not enlist expert assistance
or would face insurmountable technical hurdles to
making an implosion bomb, they could decide to
build a much less powerful plutonium-fueled guntype nuclear bomb. By using highly enriched uranium,
the Hiroshima bomb, a gun-type device, achieved a
nuclear yield of about 13 kilotons. The gun-type device
is the easiest to build nuclear weapon. However, it
would still pose technical challenges to terrorists, but
technically skilled terrorists have a greater chance of
making this type of nuclear weapon than an implosiontype weapon.
Because plutonium emits more spontaneous
neutrons than highly enriched uranium, it cannot
power a high-yield gun-type bomb. Nonetheless, a
plutonium gun-type bomb can produce an explosive
yield of two to 10 tons.23 While such a bomb would
be about 1,000 times less explosive than a plutonium
implosion bomb, it would still be much more powerful
than a typical conventional bomb. Thus, an expanding
stockpile of bomb-usable plutonium can increase
the risk of terrorists building an improvised nuclear
explosive.
Breeder Reactors. Faced with limited supplies of
indigenous uranium, as noted earlier, India envisions
fueling a fleet of commercial reactors with plutonium.
Consequently, India has researched breeder reactors,
a technology that most of the world has abandoned.
Presently, a fast breeder test reactor is operating at
IGCAR in Kalpakkam and is helping India gain research
experience with this technology. A much larger 500
MW breeder reactor is slated to begin operation in 2010
at Kalpakkam. New Delhi pointedly left its breeder
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reactor program outside of its list of designated
civilian reactors to be under international safeguards.
Although the breeder program would likely produce
fuel for civilian reactors, the fact that this program
remains on the military side of India’s nuclear complex
has raised concern that it could increase the stockpile of
plutonium for nuclear weapons. As with the plutonium
production reactors, a major problem with the breeder
program is the possibility that terrorists could steal
plutonium to make nuclear bombs or dirty bombs.
Spent Fuel Pools. Spent fuel pools are tanks full of
water that store spent, or used, nuclear fuel that has
been discharged from a reactor. These pools typically
are located near the reactor at a power plant site.
While commercial reactors usually contain millions of
curies of highly radioactive materials that could cause
significant harm if released to the environment, spent
nuclear fuel pools can contain several times this amount
of radioactivity because a spent fuel pool can store
several reactor cores. The radioactivity build up can
climb even higher. If spent fuel is not moved from the
pool and transferred to dry storage casks, the pool can
fill up beyond its original design capacity. For example,
the pool at Tarapur-1 initially was designed to store at
most 72 metric tons of spent fuel. But according to the
International Nuclear Safety Center, this pool contains
more than twice that amount. Storing more than the
originally designed amount of spent fuel can increase
the risk of the spent fuel catching fire in the event of a
loss of coolant incident.
If an attack causes a propagating zirconium cladding
fire, large amounts of radioactivity could be released.
After assessing the two types of spent fuel pools at
U.S. nuclear power plants, the U.S. National Research
Council concluded, “successful terrorist attacks on
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spent fuel pools, though difficult, are possible.”24
That study recommended to reduce the risk of such
attacks, the pools should be properly secured; effective
means of cooling should be available under emergency
conditions; as soon as permissible, spent fuel should
be stored in dry storage casks; and the remaining spent
fuel should be reconfigured in the pools to minimize
the risk of a propagating fire.
India has the boiling water reactor type of U.S.
power plant. The General Electric Mark I BWR
plants, related to the Indian Tarapur BWR plant, were
designed to have their spent fuel pools located inside
of the containment structure. This configuration would
provide a hardened protective layer for the pool. But
the countervailing factor is that BWR spent fuel pools
generally are well above ground level, and thus in the
event of a rupture, a BWR pool could drain more easily
than a pool that is partially or fully below ground
level.25
The majority of Indian spent fuel pools at PHWRs
most likely follow the CANDU design. The typical
CANDU plant has its spent fuel pool outside of the
containment building; thus it is more exposed to attack
than a BWR pool. But the CANDU pools are generally
partially or fully below ground level, making them
harder to drain.26
Reprocessing Plants. Reprocessing plants extract
plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Presently, India uses
the PUREX reprocessing method, which is considered
by nonproliferation experts to be proliferation-prone
because it completely separates plutonium from the
self-protecting highly radioactive materials in spent
fuel. Thieves or terrorists can carry separated plutonium
without suffering near-term harm to health.
India presently has two bulk, or industrialscale, reprocessing plants: the Power Reactor Fuel
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Reprocessing Plant at Tarapur and the Kalpakkam
Reprocessing Plant. Each plant can reprocess about
100 tons of spent fuel annually, which translates into
nearly one ton of plutonium, assuming that about 1
percent of the spent fuel is plutonium.27 This estimate
also assumes that the reprocessing is very efficient.
In reality, there will be some losses, but because
India has had decades of experience in reprocessing,
it likely can operate the reprocessing plants at high
efficiency. But in any plant, there will be losses and
material unaccounted for (MUF). MUF can add up to
many kilograms of plutonium not properly tracked
especially in a bulk handling facility. As India’s rate of
reprocessing and production of plutonium-based fuel
increase, the likelihood for large amounts of MUF will
increase. This situation will increase the potential for
plutonium diversion. Even under strict International
Atomic Energy Agency accounting, a 1 percent MUF
could easily occur. This relatively rigorous accounting
probably still would result in up to 20 kilograms of
plutonium unaccounted for in India’s two existing
industrial-scale plants. This amount of plutonium
could conceivably power two to three first-generation
implosion nuclear explosives. Reducing the MUF to
below bomb-usable amounts is next to impossible at
bulk reprocessing facilities. Increasing the amount of
reprocessed plutonium can also increase the chance
of hazardous release of radioactivity and plutonium
dispersal.
High-level Radioactive Waste Storage Areas.
Reprocessing plants also pose another danger to an
attack that can release massive amounts of radioactivity
to the environment. The highly radioactive fission
products removed from spent nuclear fuel during
reprocessing are stored in large high-level liquid waste
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tanks. Rupturing these tanks could result in millions
of curies of radioactivity released. In comparison, the
Chernobyl accident released more than two million curies of radioactive cesium. Thus, a worst-case attack on
a high-level waste storage facility could be comparable
to the contamination from the Chernobyl accident.
India has developed the capability to immobilize this
liquid waste in glass. Such immobilization would
create hard to disperse radioactive materials and would
provide significant protection against radioactivity
release from an attack on a high-level waste storage
facility. To make effective use of this protection, India
would have to operate the immobilization at a rate
commensurate with the production of liquid waste.
Uranium Enrichment Facilities. Usually uranium
enrichment facilities would not pose significant threats
for attack because uranium, unlike plutonium, is not
very radioactive and would not result in significant
harm to public health if it were dispersed. Also, low
enriched uranium used in commercial light water
reactors and certain other types of reactors cannot fuel
nuclear weapons. Although little is known openly
about India’s secretive uranium enrichment program,
the Rare Materials Project (RMP) at Mysore has a gas
centrifuge plant that apparently is devoted to enriching
uranium for nuclear submarine fuel. India’s nuclear
submarine program has been stuck in low gear for
decades and might not require weapons-grade uranium
for fuel. However, some analysts have suggested that
India might employ the RMP to make weapons-grade
uranium for its weapons program.28 The amount of
highly enriched uranium, if any, produced at the
RMP is unknown, but even as little as 40 kilograms in
terrorists’ hands could fuel a gun-type nuclear bomb.
Electricity Distribution Grid. A terrorist or military
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attack that disabled a nuclear power plant could have
far-reaching effects on India’s electrical power system.
Although New Delhi has been striving to improve the
stability and reliability of the national electrical grid,
this distribution system has suffered from frequency
and voltage fluctuations.29 On an unstable grid, loss of
a major generator such as a nuclear power plant could
bring down much of the electrical distribution system.
In addition to causing a major blackout, this event
could jeopardize the safety of the affected nuclear
plant because external sources of power typically
provide reliable means of running safety equipment
such as reactor coolant pumps. Knocking out the grid
connected to the plant would decouple the plant from
external sources of power.
Under that scenario, on-site diesel generators
would have to provide backup power to operate safety
equipment. According to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), “The reliability of the diesel
generator is strongly dependent on the interaction of
the following factors: design, testing and operational
requirements, operational history, inspections,
maintenance, and the personnel qualifications of
operators.”30 In 1977, the NRC cautioned, “The
demonstrated reliability of standby diesel generator
(DG) units in operating nuclear power plants has
been less than anticipated.”31 Although in recent
years, the NRC has cited a 97.5 percent reliability rate,
independent analysts have estimated that the actual
reliability rate is about 90 to 95 percent. While there are
no openly available estimates of India’s diesel generator
reliability, even a 95 percent reliability rate means
that a major grid failure that knocked out 10 or more
reactors would translate into a more than 40 percent
chance that one diesel generator would not operate at
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a nuclear reactor. A 90 percent reliability rate would
translate into a 65 percent failure chance under that
scenario. To provide additional reliability, a nuclear
power plant could have additional diesel generators.
However, even this added backup does not provide
absolute protection because the diesel generators at a
plant could experience common-mode failure.
Modes of Attack or Sabotage.
A military or terrorist strike against an Indian
nuclear facility could make use of a variety of attack
modes or sabotage, including airplane crashes or
bombings, truck bombs, commando-type attacks,
insider collusion, and cyber-terrorism.
Airplane Crashes or Bombings. In the immediate
wake of September 11, 2001 (9/11), nuclear regulatory
officials admitted that containment structures were not
designed to withstand the impact of large commercial
aircraft. But nuclear industry representatives have
emphasized the strength of containment structures
and have expressed confidence in the capability of
containments to protect against airplane crashes. The
nuclear industry in the United States has sponsored
studies to assess whether containments would remain
intact after an airplane crash. In perhaps the most
prominent and widely reported of these studies, which
was commissioned by the Nuclear Energy Institute,
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in June
2002 determined that containment buildings “can
safely protect the reactor against most commercial
aircraft,” including 757s (the type used in the 9/11
attack) and 777s.32 Then in December 2002, EPRI
reported the results of a related study in which it
simulated the impact of a Boeing 767-400 into four
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types of structures: containment buildings, spent fuel
storage pools, spent fuel dry cask storage facilities,
and spent fuel transportation containers. Although
the containment building experienced “some crushing
and spalling (chipping of material at the impact point)
of the concrete” and the spent fuel pools suffered
“localized crushing and cracking of the concrete wall,”
all simulations showed that the aircraft was not able
to breach the protection structures.33 Industry officials
also have scoffed at the notion that hijackers could
direct large airplanes traveling at fast speeds into a
containment structure, which is a relatively low profile
target.
Outside the nuclear industry, critics made their
own calculations of the effects of airplane crashes on
nuclear facilities. Among the independent analysts,
Edwin Lyman, a nuclear physicist, has assessed that
the engines of large aircraft traveling at high speeds
“would penetrate the containment, leading to a fuel
spill within the building and most likely a severe jet
fuel fire and/or explosion.”34 These fires or explosions
could cause multiple system or common mode failures.
Even if containment structures are strong enough to
withstand the direct impact of a large aircraft, many
other buildings at nuclear facilities are much softer
targets. For example, auxiliary buildings at nuclear
power plants are typically not hardened. Smashing
airplanes into these targets could result in many lives
killed and substantial property and financial damage.
Perhaps terrorists will never use airplanes to attack
nuclear facilities. In contrast, some militaries have
already crossed this threshold and attacked nuclear
reactors. In 1981, for example, Israel launched a
preemptive attack by bombing and destroying Iraq’s
Osirak research reactor, which was believed to become
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a plutonium production reactor. Later in the 1980s,
Iraq bombed Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant site
during the Iran-Iraq War. Also, in the 1980s, Bennett
Ramberg drew attention to nuclear power plants as
Achilles heels, offering relatively weak structures, but
valuable symbols, for an enemy to attack.35
Truck bombs. Over the past 3 decades, terrorists
increasingly have used trucks to deliver devastating
explosives to targets. Trucks are advantageous because
they are hard to slow down once they gain momentum,
allowing them to crash through unreinforced barriers,
and can carry large amounts of explosives. India has
suffered from many truck bomb attacks. Such attacks
carried out by Islamic extremists in Kashmir have
killed scores of people and damaged some hardened
structures. Although terrorists probably would prefer
trucks because of the large hauling capacity, they
also have used car bombs on several occasions. For
example, on August 25, 2003, Mumbai was rocked by
two powerful car bombs. Also, many car bombs have
detonated in Kashmir.
Commando-type Attacks. Most militaries, including
the Pakistani military, have highly skilled special
fighters or commandos who are trained to attack and
penetrate well-protected facilities. One of the most
daring and famous military commando attacks was the
Allied effort during World War II to destroy the Norsk
Hydro plant that was producing heavy water for the
Nazis’ nuclear program. British commandos at first
tried to hang-glide to the Norwegian plant, but they
failed because of the difficulties of landing on the rocky
terrain. Finally, Norwegian commandos parachuted to
a spot near the plant and then scaled steep, ice-covered
cliff faces to place explosives at the plant.36
Commandos usually are trained in multiple means
of attack. For instance, they could barrage nuclear
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facilities with rocket propelled grenades, mortars, or
artillery. Also, they could conduct attacks by air, land,
or water routes. In addition, highly skilled commandos
could disable external power supplies to a nuclear
plant just prior to launching a coordinated, multiple
onslaught. Knocking out external power would reduce
the capability of a nuclear plant to provide for adequate
cooling to the reactor core.
While there have not been any reported commando
attacks against Indian nuclear facilities, terrorists
trained in commando techniques broke through tight
security to attack the Indian parliament in New Delhi
on December 13, 2001. Parliament was in session at
that time. This attack brought India and Pakistan to the
brink of war. A similar type of attack against a nuclear
facility might spark an armed conflict between the two
nuclear-armed countries.
Cyber-attacks. Nuclear power plants and other
nuclear facilities rely on computer systems to operate.
Consequently, military or terrorist attackers can attempt
to use cyber-methods, such as hacking into computer
systems or unleashing computer worms or viruses, to
strike at India’s nuclear infrastructure. According to a
2002 report in the Indian Express, major Indian nuclear
research institutions such as the Indira Gandhi Centre
for Atomic Research and BARC have experienced
repeated attempts at cyber-attack. Notably, in 1988,
cyber-attackers stole critical data from BARC.37 Many
Indian computer experts point to Pakistan as a sponsor
of cyber-attackers. Al-Qai’da also is believed to support
and encourage cyber-terrorism. Some of the cybergroups that have targeted India include Anti India
Crew, G-Force, World’s Fantabulas Defacers, Pakistan
Hackerz Club, Kill India, and Death to India.
Cyber-attacks can provide many advantages to
an attacker. A cyber-attack is cheap compared to
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traditional methods. Tracking the attack can be very
difficult. Attackers can mask their identities and
locations and can launch an attack off-site. Cyberattacks can cross borders easily because of the global
nature of the Internet. For militaries, the Internet offers
a virtual battlefield.38 Increased frequency of computer
attacks between India and Pakistan often has coincided
with times when the two countries have prepared for
possible physical attacks. The rapid growth of software
engineering and other computer specialties has spurred
an exponential growth in the number of Indians who
have advanced computer skills. Even if only a tiny
fraction of these specialists turns to cyber-terrorism,
New Delhi would face an increased internal security
threat. Even though the Indian Parliament passed the
Information Technology Act of 2000, in part to address
cyber-threats, Praveen Dalal, an Indian legal and
computer expert, has called for the Indian legislature
to amend this law because it does not protect against
cyber-attacks adequately.39
Insider Collusion. Workers at nuclear facilities
have knowledge about the detailed operations and
vulnerabilities at these places that outsiders usually
would not possess. Thus, insider collusion would
serve as a multiplier effect for outside attackers. To
boost the chances of causing devastating damage,
terrorist or military attackers would devote significant
effort to recruit insiders. Skilled and highly trained
insiders, such as nuclear engineers, likely would
know how to disable emergency cooling systems and
emergency sources of power such as diesel generators.
Such disablement would increase the likelihood of
a reactor meltdown and radiation release. Insiders
could sabotage other vital plant systems while outside
attackers are placing guard forces under siege.
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India has experienced the betrayal of insiders.
One of the most high profile insider attacks was the
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her
own guards. A major theme of Indian legends and
literature is the fear of betrayal. For example, the Artha
Shastra, a classic Indian Machiavellian text which
predated Machiavelli’s The Prince by about 1,500 years,
advises its prince to use an army of spies to keep
watchful eyes on the loyalty of wives and officials.
Also, according to Stanley Wolpert, a leading scholar
of India, Chanakya’s Artha Shastra,
remained the standard text for several Indian Empires . . .
almost a timeless tribute to human treachery, banality,
and the corrosive pettiness of power. There was even
an elaborate “Circle” (Mandala) theory of foreign
policy that Chanakya developed, teaching every Indian
monarch that the king ruling the circle of his immediate
neighbor was his “Enemy,” while just beyond lived his
“Friend.”40

To cite another prominent example from literature, the
famous epic Ramayana pitted the virtuous Prince Rama
against the villainous Ravana. Rama feared betrayal
and forced his bride Sita, who had been abducted by
Ravana, to prove her chastity in a trial by fire. After
Rama became king, he continued to believe gossip that
Sita was disloyal.
Even if a devastating event is not a clear act of
insider sabotage, the public can be primed to view such
events in that light, searching for scapegoats. Many
have viewed the Bhopal chemical catastrophe, one of
the worst industrial accidents in history, as an act of
sabotage. On December 3, 1984, hazardous chemicals
spilled out of the Union Carbide plant at Bhopal,
killing thousands of mostly poor Indians. This event
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underscored the potential for complex technology to
wreak havoc. These technological tragedies can lead
to loss of faith in humanity’s ability to control its
inventions and can have profound socially disruptive
effects as Paul Slovic observed in the journal, Science:
An accident that takes many lives may produce relatively
little social disturbance (beyond that experienced by
the victims’ families and friends) if it occurs as part of
a familiar and well-understood system (such as a train
wreck). However, a small accident in an unfamiliar
system (or one perceived as poorly understood), such
as a nuclear reactor or a recombinant DNA laboratory,
may have immense social consequences if it is perceived
as a harbinger of further and possibly catastrophic
mishaps.41

Managerial and operator errors contributed to the
Bhopal disaster and further eroded public confidence
in corporate competence.42 An accident at or sabotage
of an Indian nuclear power plant could be perceived
as a nuclear Bhopal, potentially damaging public
acceptance of nuclear energy in India. The public or
the government also might try to pin the blame of a
nuclear Bhopal on Pakistan, possibly stimulating a war
between India and Pakistan.
Indian officials have taken measures to guard
against the insider threat at nuclear power plants.
In particular, India’s Nuclear Power Corporation
has instituted a Vigilance Directorate to, in part,
“strive towards achieving zero degree tolerance to
corruption” and also “encouraging whistle blowing
arrangements.”43 According to the corporation, it has
maintained surveillance on employees who have access
to sensitive parts of the plants and has done regular
and surprise inspections to try to detect possible
misconduct.
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Although vitally important and necessary,
personnel reliability programs such as the Vigilance
Directorate are not foolproof. In the United States
where the military has had decades-long practice with
a personnel reliability program (PRP), between 2.5 and
5 percent of the PRP certified personnel are decertified
and shut out from nuclear related duties.44
Regulation, Safety, Secrecy, and Security.
A safe nuclear facility is not necessarily a secure
facility and vice versa. Nonetheless, common nodes for
both safety and security are the regulatory agency and
the culture of operations at the facilities. Concerning
the culture of operations, key factors are whether
management instills a safety and security culture and
fosters trust among employees so that they feel that
they can raise safety and security concerns without fear
of reprimand or reprisal. An assessment of how safety
incidents are handled by the regulator can indicate
how security incidents are addressed.
The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is the
regulatory agency for India’s civilian nuclear facilities.
But because many of the civilian facilities are embedded
in the weapons program, BARC reviews the functioning
of the military-related facilities. From the beginning of
India’s nuclear program, the Official Secrets Act has
shrouded the program and blocked needed safety
improvements, according to safety advocates. In 1999,
T. S. Gopi Rethinaraj, a safety advocate, wrote, “India’s
nuclear establishment has grown into a monolithic and
autocratic entity that sets the nuclear agenda of the
country and yet remains virtually unaccountable for
its actions.”45
During the 1990s, then-AERB chairman Dr. A.
Gopalakrishnan led the charge that safety had fallen
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short. Soon after raising questions about safety
problems, the Indian government decided to not renew
his contract.46 In 1996, he cited, “there were 130 safetyrelated issues in various nuclear facilities, of which 95
belonged to the NPC [Nuclear Power Corporation]
alone.”47 The Official Secrets Act prevented him from
being fully open about the specific issues. The Chief
Engineer of the NPC responded that Gopalakrishnan
was an alarmist, and that his accusations have played
into the hands “of vested interests internationally who
are running down India’s self-reliant achievements in
nuclear energy and have been periodically using the
international media to create fear psychosis.”48 But the
Indian nuclear establishment was not carrying out an
open investigation of Gopalkrishnan’s safety concerns.
A conflict of interest, for example, arose when Raja
Ramanna was appointed to an inquiry committee
even though he was chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission when many of the safety incidents took
place.
In the 1990s, headlines about India’s nuclear
safety or lack thereof blazoned “Doomsday averted,”
“Headed for a meltdown,” and “Sugarcoating nuclear
power.”49 Some of the known incidents are: In 1991,
the switch gear room in the first unit of the Kakrapar
Atomic Power Station caught fire and caused a
complete loss of the emergency power system and
partial loss of the electrical power supply; also in 1991,
for almost a month, the Dhruva plutonium production
reactor operated without a functioning emergency
core cooling system; on March 31, 1993, a major fire
happened in the turbine room of the Narora Atomic
Power Station; in September 1997, the workers union
charged that there were high radiation levels at the
Madras Atomic Power Station; and on March 26, 1999,
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large quantities of radioactive heavy water leaked out
of the Madras Atomic Power Station. By the late 1990s,
India had sunk to the lowest bracket of efficiency and
performance in a Nuclear Engineering International
survey of the world’s nuclear programs.
A plethora of safety incidents can point to
shortcomings in the defense-in-depth protective
functions of nuclear plants. Weaker defense-in-depth
safety systems would make these plants less able to
withstand damage from a military or terrorist attack.
Safety failures could be blamed on saboteurs supported
by terrorists or by Pakistan.
Since the 1990s, there have been few reported
safety incidents. The lack of reported incidents could
either point to a secrecy clampdown or improvement
in safety. A combination of the two factors might be
the correct explanation. The Indian nuclear program,
according to outside safety and regulatory experts,
still is burdened with a regulatory agency that is not
fully independent. Moreover, the Official Secrets Act
probably still exerts a chilling effect. These barriers to
self-critical appraisal of safety shortcomings also could
lead officials to not take a hard examination of security
culture.
However, safety appears to have improved in
India’s nuclear program in recent years. For instance,
since the late 1990s, a number of India’s nuclear power
plants have received peer reviews by the World
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). WANO
grew out of the industry’s goal of striving to prevent
a repeat of the 1986 Chernobyl accident. In addition
to peer reviews of particular plant operations, WANO
also has conducted technical exchanges involving India
to help instill better safety practices.50
In May 2005, Gopalakrishnan addressed safety
concerns and responded to his past critics who had
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raised the issue of alleged undue influence of foreigners
in India’s nuclear activities:
In fact, without any foreign technical assistance, the
DAE engineers have rectified almost all the safety
deficiencies which I had documented and submitted to
the government . . . in 1995. Therefore, invoking the need
for safety assistance from the U.S. is merely a ploy to
indirectly plant doubts in the minds of the Indian public
that DAE’s capability to maintain safety in our reactors
is inadequate in comparison to U.S. expertise.51

His article was published in the lead up to the unveiling
of the controversial U.S.-India nuclear deal in July 2005.
Gopalakrishnan believes firmly in India maintaining
its self-reliance, especially in a world dominated by the
United States. Other former and current Indian nuclear
officials have expressed similar resistance to outside
nuclear safety assistance. Such resistance also would
tend to block India from receiving nuclear security
assistance from outsiders.
Still, in the same article, Gopalakrishnan underscored some current safety issues. In particular, he
warned against DAE’s consideration of operating
Tarapur reactors “with plutonium-based indigenous
fuel” because this “is impractical and dangerous” and
“world-wide studies have established that introducing
more than 30-35 percent plutonium into boiling water
reactors could bring adverse changes in their safetyrelated physics and kinetics parameters.” Despite
his reservations about relying on foreign assistance,
he encouraged DAE “to initiate detailed technical
discussions and consultations” with France and Russia
“to further ensure public safety” about the breeder
reactor program.52 While those countries have breeder
reactor programs, the French Superphenix breeder
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reactor had to be shut down soon after completion
because of sodium coolant leaks. There has been an
extensive history of safety problems in breeder reactor
programs. Without rigorous attention to safety, India
could experience numerous safety issues if it moves
ambitiously with its breeder program as it has planned
to do.
TERRORISM AND SECTARIAN VIOLENCE
Since independence in 1947, India repeatedly
has suffered from terrorism and sectarian violence.
While New Delhi has made great strides in creating
the world’s largest democracy and in officially ending
the caste system, centuries of religious strife and caste
discrimination lie just below the surface, ready to
boil over.53 In the past few decades, tens of thousands
have died in India because of sectarian and terrorist
violence.54 Even though South Asia has experienced
several wars in the past sixty years, terrorism has killed
more people than all the wars in South Asia during
that time period.55 In recent years, the cycle of terror
among disaffected groups continues and arguably has
increased in its fury. Although the West has recently
experienced high profile terrorist events, including
the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the March 11,
2004 (3/11) attacks in Spain, and the July 7, 2005 (7/7),
attacks in Britain, there have not been continual attacks
in these countries. In contrast, as terrorism analyst
Swati Parashar has underscored, “India on the other
hand barely recovers from one attack when another
is successfully launched. It is a never ending saga of
terror that needs to be examined.”56
Religious terrorism has caused the largest number
of terrorist incidents and killings. Much of this terrorism
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has arisen from the Sikh separatist movement wanting
to create an independent Khalistan, and from the strife
in Jammu and Kashmir. While the former movement
raged prior to 1995, the latter conflict continues to
flourish. Pakistani-linked pan-Islamic groups operate
in Jammu and Kashmir.
Four Pakistani pan-Islamic organizations, the
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkut-ul-Mujahideen
(HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), and the
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), which are active in India,
have joined Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic
Front (IIF), which formed in 1998. Osama bin Laden also
is the leader of al-Qai’da. All of these terrorist groups
have safe havens in Pakistan, and two of them, LET
and HUJI, also have found shelter in Bangladesh. While
these groups had at first recruited their members from
Pakistan, since 2003 they have drawn recruits from the
Indian Muslim diaspora community in the Gulf region
and from the Indian Muslim community within India.
Muslims in India generally are opposed to al-Qai’da
and the pan-Islamic terrorist groups.57 However, with
more than 140 million Muslims in India, which has
the second largest Muslim community in the world,
al-Qai’da affiliated groups need only recruit a tiny
fraction to create a formidable force operating inside
India.
The connection of these Pakistani pan-Islamic
groups to al-Qai’da increases India’s risk of nuclear
and radiological terrorism. Bin Laden has proclaimed
that al-Qai’da has a religious duty to acquire weapons
of mass destruction (WMD).58 He also has cited the
American bombing of Hiroshima to rationalize alQai’da’s drive for nuclear weapons.59 Lending support
to bin Laden’s call to nuclear arms, in May 2003,
Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd, a young Saudi

164

cleric, wrote the religious paper “A Treatise on the
Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction”
to try to justify Muslims’ use of such weapons in the
defense of the Umma, the Islamic community.60 This
rhetoric mirrors bin Laden’s modus operandi. Like the
Prophet Mohammed, bin Laden purposefully warns
foes before they are subjected to attack. This behavior
also tracks the Prophet Mohammed’s conviction of
trying to convince the enemy of the error of his ways
and giving him an opportunity to surrender or make
restitution. For example, bin Laden warned Spain and
Britain before the 3/11 and 7/7 attacks. Both countries
apparently were primary targets of al-Qai’da-affiliated
groups because they were closely aligned with the
United States, especially in the war in Iraq.
Until April 23, 2006, neither bin Laden nor his
deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had criticized India
directly. On that date, bin Laden, in a video aired
by the Al Jazeera TV channel, spoke about India’s
involvement in Kashmir and referred to an alleged
Crusader-Zionist-Hindu war against the Muslims.
A prominent South Asian terrorism analyst believes
that the bin Laden message was provoked in part by
President Bush’s visits to India and Pakistan in early
March 2006.61
Other Islamic extremists have warned Muslims
about Hindus allegedly colluding with the United
States and Israel. Notably, Professor Khurshid
Ahmad, a leading ideologue for the Jamaat-e-Islami,
has written about the Islamist “axis of evil,” revolving
around Christians, Jews, and Hindus.62 Such rhetoric
may have inspired al-Qai’da or an al-Qai’da-affiliated
group to bomb commuter trains on July 11, 2006. These
bombings killed about 200 people in Mumbai. Soon
after the attack, a self-described al-Qai’da represent-
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ative said that al-Qai’da had established a cell in
Kashmir and that the bombings were “a reaction to
what is happening to the minorities, especially Muslims
in India.”63
Early backlash against India allying with the United
States occurred on October 29, 2005, when three precisely coordinated bombs detonated in Delhi, killing
about 50 people. These bombings had the mark of alQai’da and the IIF because of the well-synchronized
nature of the multiple attacks and the occurrence close to
Al Quds Day, which is on the last Friday of the Ramadan
fasting period. Many Muslims commemorate Al Quds
Day by protesting against the Israeli occupation of East
Jerusalem where the Al Quds mosque is located. The
bombings also happened 2 days before Diwali, a major
Hindu festival. Moreover, the blasts follow on the heels
of a propaganda campaign against India launched by
al-Qai’da, the Taliban, and the IIF. For example, on
August 9, 2005, the Al Arabiya TV channel broadcast
an alleged al-Qai’da video that showed interviews with
jihadists in Afghanistan saying that they are avenging
the killing of Muslims by the United States, Britain,
Israel, and India.64 The propaganda campaign ramped
up soon after Prime Minister Singh’s high profile visit
to the United States in July 2005.65 During that visit,
Singh and Bush unveiled the U.S.-India nuclear deal.
So far, religious terrorists in India have not attacked
nuclear facilities or used nuclear or radiological
materials in their attacks. However, on September 12,
2001, Sheikh Jamil-ur-Rehman, the leader of the Tehrikul-Mujahideen, a terrorist group in Kashmir, promised
to attack nuclear facilities in India.66 Although some
religious terrorist organizations, such as al-Qai’da,
have expressed strong interest in nuclear terrorism,
all of the religious terrorist groups have favored well-
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proven techniques of improvised explosive devices,
suicide bombings and hostage taking, as well as
hijacking and blowing up aircraft. South Asian
terrorist groups which are influenced mainly by
nonreligious motivations also have employed these
non-nuclear methods and notably have introduced
to the subcontinent one of the more radical methods:
suicidal terrorism. In May 1991, suicidal terrorism
first appeared in India with the assassination of Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a national-separatist group in
Sri Lanka. However, after the Pakistani pan-Islamic
groups of LET, HUM, HUJI, and JEM teamed up with
bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (ISF) in 1998,
they have embraced and expanded the use of this
method. Terrorists’ willingness to covet martyrdom
may be required for them to penetrate a nuclear
facility. Certainly, an airplane crash into a nuclear plant
would call for suicidal terrorists. Also, a truck bomb
would likely require a terrorist martyr to drive to the
designated target at the nuclear facility and ensure the
detonation of the explosive.
At least one terrorist who wanted to crash airplanes
into nuclear power plants had lived in neighboring
Pakistan. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a Pakistani and
one of the chief planners of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
told interrogators that his ambitious original plan for
9/11 involved 10 airplanes instead of the four that were
used. In addition to smashing airplanes into the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, he wanted to crash
planes into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) headquarters,
as well as nuclear power plants.67 He was captured
in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003 and had
connections to al-Qai’da-affiliated groups throughout
South and Southeast Asia. Mohamed Atta, the leader
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of the 9/11 hijackers, also reportedly “considered
targeting a nuclear facility he had seen during
familiarization flights near New York . . . referred to as
‘electrical engineering’.”68 But the 9/11 report notes:
According to Binalshibh [one of the 9/11 planners],
the other pilots did not like the idea. They thought a
nuclear target would be difficult because the airspace
around it was restricted, making reconnaissance flights
impossible and increasing the likelihood that any plane
would be shot down before impact. Moreover, unlike the
approved targets, this alternative had not been discussed
with senior al-Qai’da leaders and therefore did not have
the requisite blessing.69

Some terrorist attacks in India have brought it close
to war with Pakistan. In particular, the December 13,
2001, attack on the Indian parliament and the following
January 2002 attack on the Kaluchak army camp
spurred New Delhi to mobilize its military along the
India-Pakistan border. Many Indian leaders believed
that Islamabad was responsible for allowing the
perpetrators of these attacks to operate within Pakistan.
The military mobilization spurred U.S. intervention
with Islamabad. In response, Pakistan temporarily
stemmed the flow of militants into India. According
to V. R. Raghavan, a retired general in the Indian
army, this experience in part shifted Indian strategy
“from defensive to proactive, offensive responses to
terrorism.”70 As a consequence, in the future, India
may use “punitive military actions such as air strikes
against terrorist infrastructure and military forays to
take out terrorist bases in Pakistani territory.”71 In light
of this new more aggressive strategy, a terrorist attack
on or sabotage of an Indian nuclear facility could
spark a war between India and Pakistan, particularly
if New Delhi suspects Islamabad’s involvement in the
initiating event.
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Concerns about Pakistan attacking nuclear facilities
have influenced decisions on where to build Indian
nuclear power plants. For example, on June 23, 2006,
the Indo-Asian News Service reported that New Delhi
was forced to rethink its original plans to locate a new
nuclear plant in Punjab after concerns were raised
about the proposed site’s close proximity to Pakistan.
Instead, the new plant will be built in Haryana.72
Al-Qai’da or al-Qai’da-affiliated groups in South
Asia could try to blackmail India to “liberate” Kashmir
from India. Blackmail is most effective when it targets
what someone cherishes. It would not have been lost on
jihadi terrorists in South Asia that India believes dearly
in its nuclear program. Moreover, a blow delivered to
this program also would strike at the United States,
which has invested much of its foreign policy clout
in promoting India’s civilian nuclear development.
Jihadis seeking the liberation of Kashmir would not
want to commit nuclear terrorism inside that region
because of fear of harming their constituents. Instead,
they would target Indian nuclear facilities outside that
region of which there are many. The blackmail scenario
could play out in a number of ways. Conceivably, a
terrorist group could forewarn Indian authorities
before the attack demanding surrender of Kashmir.
Alternatively, the group might believe that a more
effective method would be to prove its capability by
launching an attack on a nuclear facility and then
make its demand. The blackmail would take the form
of threats against other facilities. New Delhi probably
would suspect Islamabad’s involvement, especially
because Indian leaders likely would reason that
successful terrorist strikes against nuclear facilities
would require financial and technical assistance from
a state sponsor. This scenario could then spiral into a
war between India and Pakistan.
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While nonreligious terrorist groups in India
apparently are not motivated to acquire and use WMD,
possible exceptions are Marxist and Maoist groups.
These groups intend to right the wrongs of economic
and social injustice experienced by hundreds of millions
of India’s poor people. Marxist groups in India have
linked up with Maoist groups in Nepal, Sri Lanka,
and Bangladesh.73 This network could lend means of
financial and technical support among these groups.
Although Marxist and Maoist terrorist organizations
in South Asia have not expressed interest openly in
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorism,
one group has drawn attention recently to its targeting
of India’s economic infrastructure. During the past 4
years, the Naxalites, a Maoist-inspired group, have
spread throughout parts of eastern and southern India.
Their numbers have increased recently, and they are
held responsible for attacks that killed about 900
people in 2005. The Naxalites and some Marxist groups
recently have threatened to attack mining operations.74
A major uranium mining and milling site in Jaduguda is
located in the Indian region of Jharkhand, a stronghold
of the Naxalites. The Naxalites already have attacked
railways and could turn their sights on nuclear power
plants because of these facilities’ high-profile economic
significance.
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
The Ministry of Home Affairs is the lead agency
in managing internal Indian security. A major part
of the Home Ministry, the Central Industrial Security
Force (CISF) is responsible for defending nuclear
installations and is independent of the DAE. But
the CISF, a paramilitary force, has many additional

170

responsibilities. It protects oil refineries, ports,
airports, steel plants, and many other places that are
vital for India’s economy. The CISF currently consists
of more than 95,000 personnel guarding more than 250
industrial locations. It has a specially trained fire wing
that provides fire-fighting services to the government.
With all of these duties, there are concerns that CISF
is stretched too thin.75 Even the Indian government’s
official Web site for the CISF acknowledges, “CISF is
increasingly being called upon to perform important
duties beyond its charter such as internal security,
airport security, security of highway, election duties,
etc.” While not discussing the details of its training
methods, the CISF Web site mentions that its seven
training institutions are trying “to keep the force
abreast of the latest trends in threat perception and its
management vis-à-vis the technological advancements
in the field.”76 It is not reported openly as to what types
and frequency of testing the CISF undergo at nuclear
facilities.
In 2004, India’s Border Security Force (BSF)
announced that it is forming a battalion with special
skills in countering nuclear, biological, and chemical
threats. The special battalion will receive training from
nuclear experts at BARC. At that time, the BSF also
pointed to increased concerns about militant camps
in Bangladesh. While the battalion has established its
main base of operations near Bangladesh, BSF reported
that the battalion could deploy in any part of India if
and when needed.77
In April 2002, the Chairman of India’s Nuclear Power
Corporation announced that he was cognizant of the
terrorist threat and mentioned that the DAE and CISF
have performed security drills at nuclear facilities.78
Within a month after 9/11, New Delhi promulgated
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no-fly zones around nuclear power plants.79 However,
it is uncertain whether these facilities are adequately
protected by anti-aircraft defenses.
The Indo-U.S. Working Group on Counterterrorism
has discussed a variety of issues including nuclear
terrorism. The United States reportedly has brought
up the issue of assistance to secure Indian nuclear
facilities.80 But such assistance faces the hurdle of
appearing to place India in a subservient position.
Indian officials pride themselves on trying to become
self-reliant. To have a greater chance of being accepted,
U.S. help with nuclear plant security at least would
have to be perceived as a cooperative venture.
Crises often have spurred India and Pakistan
to enhance cooperative efforts to address mutual
security concerns. In the 1980s, for instance, Indian
fears about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program were
rising. During the early 1980s, New Delhi considered
preemptive strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities,
especially the Kahuta plant. Rumors were circulating
that Israel would carry out the attack if India so
requested.81 As noted earlier, Israel had bombed the
Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981. During this time period,
New Delhi had yet to recognize Israel diplomatically
because of not wanting to rile India’s large Muslim
population. A possible buildup to a preemptive
attack heightened already growing tensions on the
Subcontinent.
A partial defusing of the crisis atmosphere came
about with the 1988 agreement between the two adversaries to refrain from attacking each other’s nuclear
facilities in the event of war. The agreement entered
into force in 1991. Since January 1, 1992, the two sides
annually have exchanged a list of their nuclear facilities.
Although this agreement has served as a confidence-
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building measure, it has its shortcomings. It does not
define “nuclear facility,” and it does not specify when
a facility should be included on the list, that is, when
construction has started or been completed. The lists
have never been published openly. Outside observers
suspect that the lists are incomplete and most likely
do not include many military facilities. If possible, it
would be interesting to compare the list India has sent
Pakistan to the list of civilian facilities India has sent to
its parliament and the United States with respect to the
U.S.-India nuclear deal.82
Although India is not a signatory of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is a member of the IAEA.
The IAEA has provided some security training using
seminars for Indian officials. Also, both Indian and
Pakistani experts have participated in the IAEAsponsored International Training Course on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials
operated by the Sandia National Laboratories.83 But
India and Pakistan could make more effective use of the
IAEA by requesting International Physical Protection
Advisory Service missions in which an international
team makes confidential vulnerability assessments that
result in specific recommendations to improve physical
security. But Indian and Pakistani concerns about the
leakage of sensitive information from civilian facilities
embedded in the military complex are likely creating
resistance to fully opening up to the IAEA.84
The two countries are also parties to the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(CPPNM). A major shortcoming of the CPPNM was
that for many years, it only applied to protection of
nuclear material during international transit. But
amendments to the CPPNM in 2005, once ratified,
would require parties to protect nuclear material at
their domestic facilities. Still, independent security
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experts have expressed concern that security
requirements, associated with the CPPNM and related
IAEA guidance, are not rigorous enough.85
Guarding against Unintended Consequences.
While increasing the number of guards might appear
always to increase security, certain countervailing
human behaviors actually might weaken security if
guard forces are increased. Scott Sagan, a Stanford
University professor, has challenged the conventional
thinking on guard forces. In a 2003 paper that won
Columbia University’s Institute for War and Peace
Studies best paper award, he identified three ways
in which more security forces could result in less
security.
First, more guards could increase the threat from
insiders. If recently hired guards are not screened
thoroughly, saboteurs could infiltrate the nuclear
facility. Even if the new guards are well-screened,
screening procedures are not foolproof, and a rapid
increase in new hires increases the probability of some
malicious people being admitted. India’s ambitious
plan to increase rapidly the number of its nuclear plants
could allow penetration by saboteurs unintentionally.
While India likely would insist that it is only recruiting
loyal employees for its nuclear facilities, Sagan cautions,
“Unfortunately, organizations that pride themselves
on high degrees of personnel loyalty can be biased
against accurately assessing and even discussing the
risk of insider threats and unauthorized acts.” After an
employee clears a background check, he could become
the target of coercion by terrorists.
Second, Sagan observes that guard redundancy
can diffuse responsibility through the phenomenon
of social shirking. Citing examples from even elite
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military units, he points out that it is a common human
tendency to assume that others will “take up the
slack.” Third, Sagan cautions that increasing security
forces at a nuclear plant could lead to overconfidence
that the security system is stronger that it really is. This
unintended consequence can lead to the risky behavior
of building and running more nuclear facilities than
the security system can manage. Sagan concludes,
“Predicted increases in nuclear security forces should
not be used as a justification of maintaining inherently
insecure facilities or increasing the number of nuclear
power plants, storage sites, or weapons facilities.”
Still, he does not mean that “redundancy never works
in efforts to improve reliability and security.” He
advises that greater awareness of the potential pitfalls
in simply adding more security forces would likely
increase vigilance. 86
RECOMMENDATIONS
Over many decades, India has developed a
widespread and multifaceted nuclear infrastructure.
While New Delhi has instituted security practices,
including a paramilitary guard force and a personnel
reliability program, it continually must reevaluate the
rigorousness of its security system as it forges ahead
with an ambitious expansion of its nuclear enterprise.
It is not clear whether India has reexamined its design
basis threat (DBT) in light of al-Qai’da’s growing
influence on terrorist activity in India. The DBT is the
particular level of threat from outside attackers and
inside saboteurs.
Another complicating factor for Indian nuclear
security is the tight interconnection between India’s
civilian and military nuclear programs. A commercial
reactor would likely pose more of a target for military
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attack if it were associated with the military nuclear
sector. Moreover, this blurring between the programs
shrouds the civilian nuclear activities in more secrecy
than a purely civilian program would experience.
Although secrecy can keep sensitive information from
the enemy, too much secrecy can silence questioning
that leads to improvements in security.
Separate Civilian and Military Nuclear Programs.
India should move more of its civilian nuclear
facilities into a separate civilian program. While New
Delhi, under the U.S.-India nuclear deal, has designated
an additional handful of its commercial reactors as
subject to IAEA safeguards, many more of its reactors
remain in the military sector. The United States should
use what influence it has to urge India to place more of
its commercial reactors, as well as its breeder reactors,
under the civilian program. Other nuclear-armed
countries such as France and Russia have designated
their breeder programs as civilian. New Delhi has
objected to designating its breeder program as purely
civilian because it foresees this program as potentially
providing a huge source of plutonium for weapons.
Such potential plans should provide further incentive
for the United States and other nuclear-armed countries
to bring India and Pakistan into serious negotiations
for a fissile material cutoff. Such negotiations also
would have to involve China, which is believed to have
stopped making fissile material for nuclear weapons
but has never formally announced it has.
Develop Cooperative Nuclear Security.
India prides itself on having developed a largely
indigenous nuclear program. Many Indian leaders
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bristle at the suggestion that their country needs
security assistance. The United States, the IAEA, and
other relevant entities should work cooperatively
with India to improve its nuclear security. Perhaps the
United States could leverage the U.S.-India nuclear
deal to encourage New Delhi to engage in this issue.87
U.S. security experts could brief Indian officials about
security practices in the United States. In the spirit
of true cooperation, India would be encouraged to
discuss its practices. While the non-nuclear part of
the U.S.-India deal mentions greater cooperation on
fighting terrorism in South Asia, the United States and
India should strive to ensure that more work is done
in this area as the region confronts severe threats from
numerous terrorist groups.
New Delhi likely would have to be convinced to
accept a cooperative security program. A relevant
precedent is the opening up of India’s civilian nuclear
program to outside peer review of the safety systems
and operational practices at its nuclear power plants.
WANO has conducted several such confidential
reviews in India. A WANO-like security peer review
could identify shortcomings in India’s security system
confidentially. The peer reviewers could involve
IAEA security experts, as well as experts from other
countries’ nuclear programs. Indian experts could
take part in serving as peer reviewers of other nuclear
programs. Thus, the peer review program would not
single out a particular country but would serve as a
global network to exchange best security practices.88
At a minimum, India should request more security
reviews and seminars from the IAEA, especially
through the IAEA’s International Physical Protection
Advisory Service (IPPAS) program.
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Implement Best Safety and Security Practices.
While IAEA and WANO-type peer reviews
are important in identifying safety and security
shortcomings, safety and security will not improve
without implementation of the recommended
enhancements. Indian nuclear power plants should
incorporate safety systems resistant to insider
sabotage.89 India should apply this sabotage-resistance
to future plants and, to the extent possible, retrofit
current plants. In general, vital safety equipment could
require a two-person rule in order to allow access to the
equipment. For example, make sure that emergency
core cooling systems cannot be turned off unless at
least two nuclear operators agree.
Inherent safety systems can be expensive. But
there are inexpensive measures that can improve
safety and security. For instance, passive air defenses
such as barrage balloons or steel beams secured in
concrete foundations could provide cost effective
protection against airplane crashes.90 Placing a berm
around vulnerable nuclear plant structures, fortifying
spent nuclear fuel pools, transferring spent fuel to dry
storage casks, and supplying extra diesel generators for
reliable emergency power can be other relatively easy
ways to improve security. The extra diesel generators
should be configured and maintained in a manner that
minimizes the probability of common mode failure.
Create a More Open Civilian Nuclear Infrastructure.
While cooperative ventures can help enhance
security, for this cooperation to be effective, openness
to change is essential. In addition, openness to selfcriticism is equally as important. A self-critical nuclear
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system requires a truly independent regulator.
Although India’s AERB appears independent on
paper, New Delhi should ensure that the AERB is
independent in practice. New Delhi also should
make sure, by amendment as appropriate, that the
Official Secrets Act does not have the chilling effect
of silencing concerns about safety and security. As
India continues to build up its nuclear program, it
should continually assess whether its DBT is adequate
to counter military and terrorist threats. Also as the
Indian nuclear complex scales up, New Delhi should
prepare to counter potentially hazardous unintended
consequences, including increases in the insider threat
and the dangers of a growing stockpile of weaponsusable plutonium.
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CHAPTER 6
U.S. SATELLITE SPACE LAUNCH
COOPERATION AND INDIA’S
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC
MISSILE PROGRAM
Richard Speier
The U.S. nonproliferation community currently is
preoccupied with the George W. Bush administration’s
proposal for U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation. But
another element of the administration’s plans for
cooperation with India deserves scrutiny—the plans
for space cooperation. These plans could lead to a
replay of the regrets for the damaging U.S. space
technology transfers to China. And they could lead to
a direct threat against the U.S. homeland. The plans are
an integral part of the administration’s “glide path” for
cooperation with India.
The “Glide Path.”
A glide path is the gentle course that an airplane
follows as it descends to a safe landing. If the plane
encounters an unexpected development, it can divert,
regain altitude, and change its course.
Because India has been developing nuclear weapons
and missiles to deliver them, U.S.-Indian technology
relations for many years have remained up in the air,
not heading for a safe landing. After 4 years of Bush
administration negotiations, the United States now
describes its technology relations with India as being
on a “glide path.”
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This chapter addresses the question of whether, in
view of India’s abundantly-reported intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) development, we should
divert from our present “glide path” approach to space
cooperation. On October 3, 2003, the Washington Post
questioned then Secretary of State Colin Powell about
the latest diplomatic developments with India.
QUESTION: . . . last week, President Bush presented
[Prime Minister Atal Bihari] Vajpayee with what was
called, like, a “glide path” toward better relations. . . .
SECRETARY POWELL: . . . there was a basket of issues
that they were always asking us about called, well, we
called it—we nicknamed it, “The Trinity.” How could
you help us? How can we expand our trade in high tech
areas, in areas having to do with space launch activities,
and with our nuclear industry? . . . we also have to
protect certain red lines that we have with respect to
proliferation, because it’s sometimes hard to separate
within space launch activities and industries and nuclear
programs, that which could go to weapons, and that
which could be solely for peaceful purposes. . . . And
the “glide path” was a way of bringing closure to this
debate.1 (Emphasis added.)

Nearly 2 years later, President Bush and Vajpayee
confirmed this cooperation in a joint statement, “. . .
the two leaders resolve [to] . . . Build closer ties in space
exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the
commercial space arena. . . .”2 (Emphasis added.)
As this cooperation was being negotiated and
agreed upon, reports persisted that India was
preparing to produce an ICBM. These reports had been
accumulating for over 2 decades.3 The latest public
report appeared less than 6 weeks after the Presidents’
joint statement.4
Over the last decade, the reports have been
consistent in avering that the ICBM will be called Surya,
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and that key elements of hardware and technology for
the ICBM will come from India’s gigantic Polar Space
Launch Vehicle (PSLV). What are the capabilities of
the ICBM, and why does India want it? How did India
acquire the space launch vehicle technology for the
weapon? And how did the United States come to ride
a “glide path” to space launch cooperation with India?
These topics will be covered in turn.
India’s ICBM—What and Why.
In the 1980s, India adapted a space launch vehicle,
the SLV-3, to become the Agni medium-range ballistic
missile. In keeping with India’s practice of describing
nuclear and missile programs as civilian until their
military character could not be denied, India originally
claimed that the Agni was a “technology demonstrator.”
The Agni program now consists of three missiles with
ranges, respectively, of upwards of 700, 2,000, and
3,000 kilometers.
India may have begun the Surya project (also
sometimes known as Agni IV) officially in 1994.5
Reports cite various dates, perhaps because the project
has several decision points. Reports generally agree
that the Surya program, like the Agni program, will
result in missiles with various ranges.
• Surya-1 will have a range of about 5,000
kilometers.6
• Surya-2 will range from 8,000 to 12,000
kilometers.
• Surya-3 will range up to 20,000 kilometers.
Table 1 compares the Agni and Surya families of
missiles.
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Missile

Size
lxd (m)

Agni-1
Agni-2
Agni-3
		
Surya-1
Surya-2
Surya-3

15x1
20x1
20x1 or
13x1.8
~35x2.8
~40x2.8
40+x2.8

Range (km)

Mobile?

Probable Target

700-1,000+
2,000-3,000+
3,000-or 5,000+

yes
yes
yes

Pakistan
China
China

~5,000
8,000-12,000
20,000

no
no
no

China
United States
Global

Table 1. The Agni and Surya Missile Families.7
Reports agree that the Surya will have the option of a
nuclear payload—and sometimes the claim is made that
the payload will consist of multiple nuclear warheads.
Reports generally agree that the Surya will be a
three-stage missile with the first two Surya stages
derived from PSLV’s solid-fuel rockets. India obtained
the solid-fuel technology for the SLV-3 and the PSLV
from the United States in the 1960s.8 The third Surya
stage is to use liquid fuel and will be derived either
from the Viking rocket technology supplied by France
in the 1980s (called Vikas when India manufactured
PSLV stages with the technology) or from a more
powerful Russian-supplied cryogenic upper stage for
the Geosynchronous Space Launch Vehicle (GSLV),
which is an adaptation of the PSLV.
If—as is most frequently reported—the Surya uses
PSLV rocket motors, it will be an enormous rocket with
solid-fuel stages 2.8 meters (about nine feet) in diameter
and a total weight of up to 275 metric tons. This will
make it by far the largest ICBM in the world—with a
launch weight about three times that of the largest U.S.
or Russian ICBMs.
There appears to be no literature on Indian plans to
harden or conceal the Surya launch site, which would
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be difficult to do because of the missile’s size and
weight. If a cryogenic third stage is used, the launch
process will be lengthy. This means that the Surya is
likely to be vulnerable to attack before launch, making
it a “first-strike” weapon that could not survive in a
conflict. Indeed, the Surya’s threatening nature and
its prelaunch vulnerability would make it a classic
candidate for preemptive attack in a crisis. In strategic
theory this leads to “crisis instability,” the increased
incentive for a crisis to lead to strategic attacks because
of each side’s premium on striking first.
The one report of a mobile ICBM based on a
combination of PSLV and Agni technology makes more
sense militarily.9 But, as described below, it entails
other serious concerns. Why would India want such
a weapon? The reported ranges of the Surya variants
suggest the answer.
• A 5,000-kilometer Surya-1 might overlap the
range of a reported 5,000-kilometer upgrade of
the Agni missile.10 Surya-1 would have only one
advantage over such an upgraded Agni. That
advantage would be a far larger payload—to
carry a large (perhaps thermonuclear) warhead
or multiple nuclear warheads. India has no
reason to need a missile of “ICBM” range for use
against Pakistan. 5,000 kilometers is arguably an
appropriate missile range for military operations
against distant targets in China. As illustrations
of the relevant distances, the range from New
Delhi to Beijing is 3,900 kilometers; from New
Delhi to Shanghai, 4,400 kilometers; and from
Mumbai to Shanghai, 5,100 kilometers.
• An 8,000-to-12,000-kilometer Surya-2 would be
excessive for use against China. However, the
distance from New Delhi to London is 6,800
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kilometers; to Madrid, 7,400 kilometers; to
Seattle, 11,500 kilometers; and to Washington,
DC, 12,000 kilometers. In 1997 an article based
on information from officials in India’s Defence
Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) or higher levels of India’s defence
establishment stated flatly, “Surya’s targets will
be Europe and the United States.”11
• A 20,000-kilometer range, Surya-3 could strike
any point on the surface of the Earth.
Indian commentators generally cite two reasons
for acquiring an ICBM: To establish India as a global
power, and to enable India to deal with “high-tech
aggression” of the type demonstrated in the wars with
Iraq.12 Because there is no obvious reason for India
to want a military capability against Europe, there is
only one target that stands out as the bullseye for an
Indian ICBM—the United States. The reported 12,000kilometer Surya-2 range is tailor-made to target the
United States.
How India Got Here.
The established path to a space launch capability
for the United States, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom, France, and China was to adapt a ballistic
missile as a space launch vehicle. India turned the
process around, adapting a space launch vehicle as a
ballistic missile. If Brazil, Japan, or South Korea were
to develop long-range ballistic missiles, they would
probably follow India’s example.
President John Kennedy was once asked the
difference between the Atlas space launch vehicle that
put John Glenn into orbit and an Atlas missile aimed at
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the Soviet Union. He answered with a one-word pun,
“Attitude.” Paul Wolfowitz is said to have compared
space launch vehicles to “peaceful nuclear explosives”
(PNEs); both have civilian uses but embody hardware
and technology that are interchangeable with
military applications. India has demonstrated this
interchangeability with both space launch vehicles and
PNEs.
The path to India’s ICBM capability took more than
4 decades. The common threads in the history of Indian
rocketry are that space launch vehicle technology is the
basis for the Indian ICBM, and that India obtained the
technology with foreign help.
• Early 1960s: NASA trains Indian scientists at
Wallops Island, Virginia, in sounding rockets
and provides Nike-Apache sounding rockets to
India.13 France, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union also supply sounding rockets.14
• 1963-64: A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, an Indian engineer,
works at Wallops Island where the Scout space
launch vehicle (an adaptation of Minuteman
ICBM solid-fuel rocket technology) is flown.15
• 1965: Upon Kalam’s return to India the Indian
Atomic Energy Commission requests U.S.
assistance with the Scout, and NASA provides
unclassified reports.16
• 1969-70: U.S. firms supply equipment for
the Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant at
Sriharokota.17
• 1973: India tests a “peaceful nuclear explosion.”
• 1970s: A. P. J. Abdul Kalam becomes head of the
Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), in
charge of developing space launch vehicles.
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• 1980: India launches its first satellite with the
SLV-3 rocket, a close copy of the NASA Scout.18
• February 1982: Kalam becomes head of DRDO,
in charge of adapting space launch vehicle
technology to ballistic missiles.
• 1989: India launches its first Agni “technology
demonstrator” surface-to-surface missile. The
Agni’s first stage is essentially the first stage
of the SLV-3. Later, the Agni becomes a family
of three short-to-intermediate-range ballistic
missiles.19
• 1990: Russia agrees to supply India with
cryogenic upper stage rockets and technology.
The United States imposes sanctions on Russia
until, in 1993, Russia agrees to limit the transfer
to hardware and not technology. However,
India claims it has acquired the technology to
produce the rockets on its own.
• 1994: India launches the PSLV. Stages 1 and 3
are 2.8 meter-diameter solid-fuel rockets. Stages
2 and 4 are liquid-fuel Vikas engines derived
from French technology transfers in the 1980s.
• 1994: This is the earliest date for which the
Surya ICBM program, using PSLV technology,
is reported to have been officially authorized.
However, India’s space and missile engineers—
if not the “official” Indian government—had
opened the option much earlier.
• 1998: India tests nuclear weapons after decades
of protesting that its nuclear program was
exclusively peaceful.
• 1999: India launches the Agni II, an extended
range missile that tests reentry vehicle
“technology [that] can be integrated with the
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PSLV programme to creat an ICBM,” according
to a defense ministry official.20
• 1999: Defense News cites Indian Defence
Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) officials as stating that the Surya is
under development.21
• November 6, 1999: Indian Minister of State for
Defence (and former head of DRDO) Bachi
Singh Rawat says India is developing an ICBM
known as Surya that would “have a range of up
to 5,000 km.”22
• November 23, 1999: Rawat is reported to have
been stripped of his portfolio after his ICBM
disclosure.23
• 2001: Khrunichev State Space Science and
Production Center announces that it will supply
five more cryogenic upper stages to India within
the next 3 years.24
• 2001: The cryogenic engine is reported to be
“the Surya’s test-bed.”25
• 2001: A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate
states, “India could convert its polar space
launch vehicle into an ICBM within a year or
two of a decision to do so.”26
• 2004: A Russian Academy of Sciences Deputy
Director states that India is planning to increase
the range of the Agni missile to 5,000 kilometers
and to design the Surya ICBM with a range of
8,000 to 12,000 kilometers.27
• 2005: According to Indian Ministry of Defence
sources, there are plans to use the noncryogenic
Vikas stage for the Surya and to have the missile
deliver a 2-1/2 to 3-1/2 metric ton payload with
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two or three warheads with explosive yields of
15 to 20 kilotons.28
How the United States Got Here.
The United States has a policy against missile
proliferation, but the policy has not been in place
as long as the Indian missile program. Nor has the
policy been applied consistently. The common thread
in these developments is that the U.S. clarity about
the relationship between space launch vehicles and
missile proliferation appears close to being obscured
in the case of India. India’s agreement to adhere to the
Missile Technology Control Regime’s (MTCR) export
control guidelines is a welcome development but does
not entitle India to missile (or space launch vehicle)
technology. Without India’s adherence, if India were
to export missile technology restricted by the MTCR,
it would be a candidate for the imposition of sanctions
under U.S. law. In fact, India’s exports already have
triggered U.S. sanctions. For the timeline of U.S. missile
nonproliferation policy and India, see below:
• 1970s: The United States begins to consider a
broad policy against missile proliferation.29
• 1980s: The United States and its six economic
summit partners secretly negotiate the MTCR.
After 1 1/2 years of difficult negotiations
on the question of space launch vehicles, all
partners agree that they must be treated as
restrictively as ballistic missiles because their
hardware, technology, and production facilities
are interchangeable. The MTCR is informally
implemented in 1985 and is publicly announced
in 1987.30
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• 1990: Two weeks after the United States enacts
a sanctions law against missile proliferation, the
Soviet Union announces its cryogenic rocket
deal with India. The two parties are the first to
have sanctions imposed on them under the new
law.31
• 1993: The United States and Russia agree
that Russia may transfer a limited number of
cryogenic rocket engines to India, but not their
production technology.32
• 1998: India tests nuclear weapons. The United
States imposes broad sanctions on nuclear and
missile/space-related transfers.
• 1999: Kalam says he wants to “neutralise”
the “stranglehold” some nations have over
the MTCR, which had tried—but failed—to
“throttle” India’s missile program. “I would like
to devalue missiles by selling the technology to
many nations and break their stranglehold.”33
• September 22, 2001: The United States lifts many
of the technology sanctions imposed in 1998.
Subsequently, India’s Prime Minister visits the
United States amid agreements to broaden the
technology dialogue.34
• 2002: Kalam becomes President of India.
• 2002: The United States tells India it will not object
to India launching foreign satellites, as long as
they do not contain U.S.-origin components.35
• April 2003: The last mention of India is made
in the Director of Central Intelligence’s
unclassified semi-annual report to Congress on
the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Future reports delete descriptions of
India’s activities.36
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• October 2003: Secretary of State Powell speaks
to the Washington Post about the “Trinity” and
the “glide path.”37
• January 2004: President Bush agrees to expand
cooperation with India in “civilian space
programs” but not explicitly to cooperate
with space launches. This measure is part of
a bilateral initiative dubbed “Next Steps in
Strategic Partnership.”38
• July 2005: President Bush agrees to cooperate
with India on “satellite navigation and launch.”
The Prime Minister of India agrees to “adherence
to Missile Technology Control Regime . . .
guidelines.”39
India’s Exports.
India has a close historical relationship with Iran.40
The United States and Israel have urged India to cool
this relationship—specifically in areas of military
and energy cooperation and with respect to IAEA
deliberations on Iran’s nuclear program.41
But the relationship is strong. In January 2003
Iranian President Khatami joined Indian President
Kalam to watch Agni missiles roll by in the Indian
Republic Day parade; and the two presidents signed a
strategic accord providing India with access to Iranian
bases in an emergency in return for Indian transfers of
defense products, training, maintenance, and military
modernization support.42 This relationship is strongly
supported by India’s left-wing, and India cannot seem
to extricate itself.43 Even if the current ruling party
could disentangle itself from Iran, the underlying
political support for Iranian ties might lead a future
Indian government to resume the relationship.
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Indian entities have supplied sensitive military
technology and WMD-related items to Iran, triggering
U.S. sanctions. The United States has imposed sanctions
on Bharat Electronics Ltd, Dr. C. Surendar, Dr. Y. S. R.
Prasad, NEC Engineers, the Nuclear Power Corporation
of India, Projects and Development India Ltd, Rallis
India, and Transpek Industry Ltd.44 Moreover, Indian
entities have engaged in WMD-related transfers to
Libya and Iraq.45
India’s potential customers do not stop there. India’s
DRDO has aspirations to export missiles—below the
MTCR threshold at present—to “many African, Gulf
and Southeast Asian countries,” subject to government
approval.46
Analysis.
The story of India’s ICBM illustrates shortsightedness on the parts of both India and the United
States. If India completes the development of an ICBM,
the following consequences can be expected:
• An incentive to preempt against India in
times of crisis (especially if the ICBM is of
PSLV dimensions and, consequently, is easily
targeted),
• A diversion of India’s military funds away from
applications that would complement more
readily “strategic partnership” with the United
States,
• Increased tensions and dangers with China,
• Confusion and anger on the part of India’s
friends in Europe and the United States,
• A backlash against India that will hinder further
cooperation in a number of areas, and
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• A goad to other potential missile proliferators
and their potential suppliers to become more
unrestrained.
The governments of India and the United States
have nothing to be proud of in this business. In
seeking to become a global power by acquiring a firststrike WMD, the Indian government is succumbing
to its most immature and irresponsible instincts. The
U.S. Government, by offering India the “Trinity”
of cooperation, is flirting with counterproductive
activities that could lead to more proliferation.
There are, of course, arguments in favor of such
cooperation:
• Strategic cooperation with India is of greater
value than theological concerns about
proliferation.
• India already has developed nuclear weapons
and long-range missiles, so resistance to such
proliferation is futile.
• India has not necessarily made the final decision
to develop an ICBM.
• And, India is our friend, so we need not worry
about its strategic programs.
It is true that there is considerable value to strategic
cooperation with India. But nuclear and space launch
cooperation are not the only kinds of assistance that
India can use. It has a greater use for conventional
military assistance, development aid, and access to
economic markets. Moreover, nonproliferation has
a strategic value at least as great as that of an Indian
partnership. A little proliferation goes a long way. It
encourages other nations (such as Pakistan, Brazil,
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Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) to consider similar
programs. And the example of U.S. cooperation
encourages other suppliers to relax their restraint.
It is true that India already has developed nuclear
weapons and long-range missiles. But India has a long
way to go to improve their performance, and it has a
history of using nuclear and space launch assistance to
do just that. Some areas in which India can still improve
its missiles are:
• Accuracy. For a ballistic missile, accuracy
deteriorates with range. India’s ICBM could
make use of better guidance technology, and it
might obtain such technology with “high-tech”
cooperation with the United States.
• Weight. Unnecessary weight in a missile
reduces payload and range. Or it forces the
development of gigantic missiles such as India’s
PSLV-derived ICBM. India is striving to obtain
better materials and master their use to reduce
unnecessary missile weight.47
• Reliability. India’s space launch vehicles and
medium-range missiles have suffered their
share of flight failures. Engineering assistance
in space launches could improve India’s
missile reliability—as was demonstrated with
unapproved technology transfers incident to
launches of U.S. satellites by China.48
• Multiple warheads. India’s reported interest
in missile payloads with multiple nuclear
warheads means that certain elements of
satellite technology may get diverted to military
use. Deliberate or inadvertant transfers of
technology associated with dispensing and
orienting satellites could, as in the Chinese
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case, make it easier to develop multiple reentry
vehicles.
• Countermeasures against missile defenses.
Assistance to India in certain types of
satellite technology, such as the automated
deployment of structures in space, could aid
the development of penetration aids for India’s
long-range missiles. Given that the United
States is the obvious target for an Indian ICBM,
such countermeasures could stress U.S. missile
defenses.
Supplier restraint can slow down India’s missile
progress and make such missiles more expensive
and unreliable—perhaps delaying programs until a
new regime takes a fresh look at them and considers
deemphasizing them. Apart from the technical
assistance that the United States is considering
supplying, the relaxation of U.S. objections to foreign
use of Indian launch services will augment the ISRO
budget for rocket development.49 Even if India were
not aided materially by U.S. space launch cooperation,
the example is certain to kindle hopes in such nations
as Brazil that they can get away with the same tactics.
And France and Russia, India’s traditional and lessrestrained rocket technology suppliers, are certain to
want a piece of the action.
It is true that India has not necessarily made the
final commitment to develop an ICBM. But many,
many steps have been taken to this end. And, even if
India has no current intention to develop the Surya,
intentions (and ruling parties) can change. Unwise U.S.
space cooperation would facilitate India’s final steps
toward an ICBM.
It is true that India is our friend and “strategic
partner”, at least at the present time. History raises
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questions whether such friendship would continue
through an adverse change in India’s ruling party or
through a conflict with Pakistan. And India’s interest
in an ICBM, which only makes sense as a weapon
against the United States, raises questions whether
the friendship is mutual. Moreover, nonproliferation
policy often is directed against programs in friendly
nations. Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Pakistan, South
Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Ukraine are all
friendly nations for which the United States has
attempted to hinder WMD and missile programs
without undermining broader relations. An exception
for India is certain to be followed by more strident
demands for exceptions elsewhere. Is the space-launch
component of “friendship” worth a world filled with
nations with nuclear-armed missiles?
India’s missile program has evolved over more than
4 decades. The history of proliferation demonstrates
the difficulty of holding to a strong nonproliferation
policy over years, let alone decades.50 There will
always be temptations to trade nonproliferation for
some bilateral or strategic advantage of the moment.
In the current situation, India may have out-negotiated
the United States. After India’s 1998 nuclear weapon
tests, the United States imposed sanctions and then
gradually lifted them. In nuclear and rocket matters,
this was not enough for India. And once the United
States began easing up on India, the United States kept
easing up.
The United States professes to be holding to its
“red lines”—in Secretary of State Powell’s words—in
whatever kind of cooperation it is considering. But the
world needs to know where these lines are when it
comes to “space launch” cooperation. It is one thing for
the United States to provide launch services for Indian
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satellites. It is another thing for the United States to
use or help improve India’s ICBM-capable rockets. Are
the “red lines” firm or flexible? Is the “glide path” a
slippery slope? These questions bring us to a number
of recommendations.
Recommendations.
Under the July 18, 2005 joint statement, the United
States and India committed themselves to “build
closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and
launch, and in the commercial space arena.” This does
not require, nor should it encourage, U.S. cooperation
on India’s ICBM program directly or indirectly. In fact,
the United States already has taken a step in the right
direction by offering to launch Indian astronauts in
upcoming space shuttle missions and to involve them
to the fullest extent in the International Space Station.
The United States should do more to encourage
India to launch its satellites and science packages on
U.S. and foreign launchers by making these launches
more affordable. The United States also should be
forthcoming in offering India access, as appropriate,
to the benefits of U.S. satellite programs—including
communications, earth resource observation, and
exploration of the cosmos.
India, in fact, has some of the world’s best
astrophysicists and cosmologists. It is in our interest,
as well as the world’s, that we welcome these Indian
experts into the search for basic answers about the
universe. We should make the data from the Hubble
telescope and similar systems available to Indian
scientists and encourage them to become full partners
in its analysis.
On the other hand, there are some critical cautions
to be observed.
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1. Do not be naive about the nature of India’s
program. After more than 2 decades of reports about
India’s interest in an ICBM—including reports from
Russia, statements on India’s ICBM capability by the
U.S. intelligence community, and the firing of an Indian
official after he publicly described the Surya program—
there should be no illusions. The reports consistently
state that India’s ICBM will be derived from its space
launch vehicle technology.
• The United States should not believe that it is
possible to separate India’s “civilian” space
launch program—the incubator of its longrange missiles—from India’s military program.
• There should be no illusions about the target
of the ICBM. It is the United States—to protect
India from the theoretical possibility of “hightech aggression.”
• The U.S. intelligence community’s semi-annual
unclassified reporting to Congress on India’s
nuclear and missile programs was discontinued
after April 2003. This reporting should be
resumed.
2. Do not assist India’s space launch programs. The
United States should not cooperate either with India’s
space launches or with satellites that India will launch.
India hopes that satellite launches will earn revenues
that will accelerate its space program—including rocket
development. U.S. payloads for Indian launches—
such as the envisioned cooperative lunar project—risk
technology transfer (see recommendation #3) and
invite other nations to be less restrained in their use of
Indian launches.
• The United States should resume discouraging
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other nations from using Indian launches,
while encouraging India to resume the practice
of launching satellites on other nations’ space
launch vehicles.
• Given the frequent reports of Russian cryogenic
rockets being used in the Surya, the United
States should work with Russia to ensure that
Russian space cooperation with India does not
undercut U.S. restraint.
• Because there is no meaningful distinction
between India’s civilian and military rocket
programs, the United States should explicitly or
de facto place ISRO back on the “entities” list of
destinations that require export licenses.51
• Congress should insist that the United
States explain its “red lines” regarding space
cooperation with India. If these lines are
not drawn tightly enough, Congress should
intervene.
3. Review carefully any cooperation with India’s
satellite programs. India reportedly is developing
multiple nuclear warheads for its long-range missiles.
If India develops an ICBM, the next step will be to
develop countermeasures to penetrate U.S. missile
defenses. Certain satellite technologies can help India
with both of these developments.
• The United States should review its satellite
cooperation to ensure that it does not aid
India inappropriately in the technologies of
dispensing or orienting spacecraft, of automated
deployment of structures in space, or of other
operations that would materially contribute to
multiple warheads or countermeasures against
missile defenses.
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4. Stop using cooperation in dangerous technologies
as diplomatic baubles. India is the current example of
a broader, disfunctional tendency in bilateral relations
to display trust and friendship by opening up the most
dangerous forms of cooperation. The United States
should not fall further into this trap with India—or
with any other nation.
• India needs many other forms of economic
and military cooperation more than it needs
nuclear and space technology. If India insists on
focusing technology cooperation in these areas,
the United States should take it as a red flag.
• The U.S. removal of technology sanctions
imposed after India’s 1998 nuclear tests was
an adequate—and perhaps excessive—display
of friendship. Further technology cooperation
should be limited to areas that do not contribute
to nuclear weapons or their means of delivery.
Conclusion.
The target of an Indian ICBM would be the United
States. The technology of an Indian ICBM would be
that of a space launch vehicle—either directly via the
PSLV or indirectly via the Agni, which is based on
India’s SLV-3. The United States should not facilitate
the acquisition or improvement of that technology
directly or indirectly. In this matter, U.S. clarity and
restraint are what the world—and India—need.
The United States needs to divert from the present
“glide path” and reorient itself and India onto a more
productive course of cooperation. It would be a cruel
irony if, in the hope of becoming strategic partners, we
became each other’s strategic targets.
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CHAPTER 7
A REALIST’S CASE FOR CONDITIONING
U.S NUCLEAR COOPERATION
George Perkovich
The debate over the nuclear deal negotiated by
the Bush administration and the government of India
is too narrow. This is ironic inasmuch as the best
argument for the deal is that it advances big strategic
goals. Some administration officials admit privately
that the purported nonproliferation benefits of the deal
are thinner than the paper it is not yet written on, and
they hope to convince Congress that, even if there are
no nonproliferation gains, the grand strategic benefits
still make the deal worth supporting. Strangely, nevertheless, the debate focuses on the nonproliferation
aspects of the deal and leaves larger strategic questions
relatively unexamined.
I will not rehearse the various arguments made by
nonproliferation specialists who criticize the deal. By
and large, these criticisms are correct. If the proposed
deal would not undermine other countries’ continued
willingness to strengthen and enforce nonproliferation
rules, the administration could prove this by allowing
the 45 countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to
debate the deal fully and offer ways of improving it
before urging Congress to vote on the administration’s
proposal. If the U.S.-India deal is so harmless, then
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should not have
major problems with it. If NSG members have major
problems with it, the deal is not so harmless.
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To put it another way, proponents of the deal say it
will achieve nonproliferation benefits or, at least, will
not cause a weakening of the rules and enforcement
of the nonproliferation regime. Rather than accept
this claim on faith, is it not prudent to test it in the
marketplace of states that are vital to the regime’s
maintenance and enforcement, the NSG? What sound
argument can be made to proceed without such a test?
Concern that the NSG could adopt new rules ahead
of U.S. congressional action and thereby give French,
Russian, or other actors a commercial advantage,
overlooks the fact that the NSG acts by consensus, and
the United States can block proposed changes that
disadvantage it, or delay the proposed changes until
U.S. legislation can be adapted to conform with them.
Instead of dealing seriously with concerns raised
by nonproliferation specialists within and outside
the U.S. Government—and many other countries—
the President’s key advisors tend to dismiss them as
pedantic and small-minded. Nonproliferation details
are seen as getting in the way of grand historical
change, or of a long-delayed honeymoon in relations
between the United States and India.
Rather than argue that the nonproliferationists are
right (or wrong), I want to question whether the story
being created by the grand history makers is such a
good one after all. I believe that the authors—current
and former advisors to Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice and President George W. Bush—are careless in
their assumptions about the virtues of nuclear power
in both its forms, civilian and military.
In Realist terms, champions of the deal are inflating
the value of nuclear weapons at a time when U.S.
interests are best served by deflating it. By doing
nothing to constrain India’s capacity and will to
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expand its nuclear arsenal and by hinting that a more
robust Indian arsenal can help balance China’s power,
the United States sends an inflationary signal to the
global marketplace. Indeed, the signal is stronger to
the degree that Washington is rewarding India by
removing all long-standing policies that penalize states
acquiring nuclear weapons. These penalties were meant
precisely to devalue this currency. A strong case can be
made that rules need to be changed to bring India (and
Pakistan and Israel) into the broad nonproliferation
regime, recognizing that these states possess nuclear
weapons and have not violated the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). But changing the rules is not the same
as abolishing them. Hasty, wholesale abandonment of
rules that distinguish between the benefits that nonnuclear weapon states under the NPT enjoy, and those
that nuclear India (Pakistan and Israel) might gain,
devalues the restraint that countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, Germany, Japan, South Africa, South Korea,
Sweden, and others have exercised in forsaking nuclear
weapons. More graduated benefits should have been
considered.
As a consequence of the intervention in the Indian
nuclear currency market, many Iranians speculate
that, in short order, the United States will subordinate
nonproliferation objectives vis-à-vis Iran, as it has with
India. American officials (and analysts like me) can list
correctly the vital differences between Iran and India,
and insist that what is being done for India would not
be done for Iran or any other non-nuclear weapons
state under the NPT. Still, Iranians and many other
observers calculate that Iran is greater civilizationally
than Pakistan and on par with India. Iran has greater
energy resources than both and occupies a vital
geostrategic position. Therefore, some Iranians assume,
the Indian model can be adapted to their country.
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We should imagine that if Iran succeeds, Turks and
Egyptians, and perhaps South Koreans and Japanese,
may revise their own calculations. To the extent that
these countries are friendly toward the United States,
they will believe, with some reason, that Realist
interests in America ultimately would accommodate
their acquisition of nuclear weapons.
This currency intervention, as it were, contravenes
Realist interests whether one favors an international
model with the United States as an unrivaled, unipolar
power, or a model with the United States as a liberal
institution-builder. Either way, the United States is best
served by diminishing the attractiveness of nuclear
weapons both as military instruments and as symbols
of power. In military terms, the spread of nuclear
weapons to additional actors—states or terrorists—
reduces the freedom with which the United States can
project its military power or exercise its will in crises.
Nuclear weapons can be equalizers; the United States
is likely to be the equalizee, as former chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin once put
it.
Certainly the United States will try to deprive Iran
and other hostile countries from acquiring this technology precisely to prevent limitations on American
power projection. Yet Washington’s capacity to rally
the international coalition necessary to achieve this
objective is vitiated by the specific strategy and tactics
it is employing against Iran and the broader climate
created by the India deal.
To the extent that states capable of producing
nuclear weapons conclude from the India deal that
they can begin to develop hedging capabilities, and
bet that the United States or others gradually will
accommodate them as it is accommodating India,
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it is prudent to anticipate that Japan, South Korea,
Indonesia, and perhaps Turkey and Egypt might move
to achieve nascent fissile material production facilities.
Other factors more immediate than the U.S.-India deal
would be more important in driving such decisions,
particularly the future of the North Korean and Iranian
nuclear programs. Still, the accommodation being
offered to India will increase, rather than decrease,
the probabilities of such hedging by governments that
know the United States will not see them as enemies.
If states in Northeast, Southeast, and Southwest
Asia move to acquire overt or recessed nuclear weapons
capabilities, the United States, as the world’s greatest
power, will face an overwhelming challenge. As Henry
Kissinger recently wrote,
The management of a nuclear-armed world would be
infinitely more complex than maintaining the deterrent
balance of two Cold War superpowers. The various
nuclear countries would not only have to maintain
deterrent balances with their own adversaries, a process
that would not necessarily follow the principles and
practices that have evolved over decades among the
existing nuclear states. They would have the ability and
incentives to declare themselves as interested parties in
general confrontations.1

It is reasonable to assume that the United States would
have interests in all such confrontations, and therefore
would face greater nuclear risks and challenges than
any it has known thus far.
Beyond increasing the potential of more difficult
balance-of-power challenges, the proposed deal
undermines international institutions and rules that
are vital to a cooperative security model, and is not
useful to a model with the United States as the unipolar
power. A unipolar power needs rules to help identify
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the bad guys and rally support for its efforts to corral
them. Indeed, even a unipolar power in today’s world
cannot solve alone most of the problems that really
threaten it, so it needs to strengthen good rules and
convince other actors to buy into them.
The NSG was created by the United States in the
aftermath of the first Indian nuclear test in 1974, and
each episode of its strengthening has been driven by
the United States. Now the United States, perhaps with
congressional blessing, is preparing to act as if the NSG
is insignificant. It is difficult to see how this approach
would strengthen the NSG or even be neutral.
And if the United States unilaterally removes all
rules limiting nuclear cooperation with India before
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
India have established the terms of safeguards that
India is willing to adopt, the United States would be
undermining the IAEA. The IAEA is far from perfect.
It needs improvements, many of which require action
by the states comprising its board of governors. But it
has in recent years taken steps to enhance significantly
its capacity to detect efforts by states to hedge on their
nonproliferation commitments. As my colleague, former deputy director of the IAEA Pierre Goldschmidt,
explains, since 1998 the Agency has used improved
detection technologies and new analytical approaches
to strengthen the likelihood of gaining warning that a
state’s nuclear activities are not exclusively peaceful.
The Agency’s limitations pale in comparison to the
lack of political will by China and Russia, as vetowielding members of the United Nations (UN) Security
Council, to act decisively to enforce compliance with
rules. Nothing in the U.S. approach to the nuclear
deal with India increases respect for the IAEA or the
willingness of China and Russia to take more seriously
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their responsibility to enforce compliance with nuclear
nonproliferation rules. Rather than treating the IAEA
as an afterthought and thereby weakening its salience,
the United States should signal that it will not open
nuclear commerce with India without knowing
whether India will agree to safeguards that the IAEA
deems sufficient.
Without explosive testing, it is difficult for a state
newly acquiring nuclear weapons to be confident that it
actually has a weapon that will work. Explosive testing
also greatly improves a state’s capacity to impress its
own population (for political gain) and its neighbors
(for power and deterrent purposes). These are major
reasons why the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for
decades has been a top nonproliferation objective. The
United States has weakened the no-test constraint and
its own legitimacy, by refusing to ratify the treaty,
even as it has maintained since 1992 a moratorium
on nuclear testing. Recognizing the importance of
preventing the ripple effects that nuclear testing by
any country would cause, the United States and India,
in the July 2005 announcement of the proposed nuclear
deal, emphasized that India would maintain its own
moratorium. Yet, in subsequent negotiations and
statements, the impression has grown that, in the event
of renewed testing by India, the United States would
seek to help India maintain supplies of fuel and other
technology necessary to maintain nuclear reactors to
be built as a result of the international cooperation
opened because of the deal. This signal, too, alarms
countries that are vital to strengthening and enforcing
the nonproliferation regime.
Narrowing in on India, are the Realist implications
of the proposed deal as positive as the deal’s champions
assert? Realism, like all statecraft, aims to increase
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one’s power so that one can affect others more than
they affect oneself. But power has many components.
The Soviet Union was a superpower militarily, but it
collapsed because it lacked the economic productivity
and innovation required to meet the needs of its people
and compete in an international system. It threatened
many of its neighbors and disposed them to balance
against its power and compete in an enervating
arms race. It lacked the political harmony and justice
necessary to mobilize its human resources.
India is a stunningly diverse democracy of one
billion people, hundreds of millions of whom are
extremely poor. It is afflicted by secession movements,
lawlessness in some places, a violent rivalry with
Pakistan, unsettled borders with Pakistan and China,
inadequate infrastructure, and other challenges. How is
the need for more fissile materials for nuclear weapons
among the top 10 Indian requirements to be prosperous,
strong, stable global power? What is the scenario for
military conflict with China? What circumstances
today, or in the foreseeable future, would make it
imperative for India to need more nuclear weapons to
preserve peace with China, and what strategies should
be pursued now to redress such circumstances? Are
there alternatives, or greater priorities, than building
more nuclear weapons?
To the extent that American officials and supporters
of the proposed deal address this question, they seek
to have it both ways. On one hand, they argue that
India will not use international nuclear cooperation
to build a significantly larger nuclear arsenal. On the
other, they argue that India will not accept limitations
on a potential build up of its fissile material stockpile
for weapons, and the United States should not press
India on this.
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India’s history, and the perspectives and priorities
of its current leadership, indicate that the country
recognizes the extremely limited utility of nuclear
weapons and will eschew a major build-up. Given this
perspective, why not devote more creative diplomatic
energy to exploring with India, China, and Pakistan
how to limit the potential for further nuclear weapons
building?
Turning to the nuclear industry for civilian purposes,
in small-“c”-conservative terms, proponents of the
nuclear deal fail to appreciate that the scale of nuclear
electricity generation in the world today derives from
cultural, institutional, political, and economic patterns
that cannot be changed radically without dangerous
consequences.
Engineers sit at computer monitors and design
miraculous new reactors and spent-fuel reprocessing
and waste management techniques and pronounce that
the world can and therefore must build thousands of
new power reactors to save the planet, but people who
walk around in places like Nevada or New York (to
pick “N” states) or India or Iran or Indonesia (to pick
three “I” countries) know a core conservative truth:
that the people who must manage and live with this
technology are not ready to do so with the enthusiasm
and care necessary to turn engineers’ dreams into realworld realities.
Markets are imperfect. They often do not internalize
real social costs and therefore send erroneous signals.
They often are distorted by subsidies and other forms
of manipulation. But even imperfect markets indicate
whether societies are politically, economically, and
culturally “ready” to adopt major new technologies on
a massive scale. This is one reason why markets reflect
conservative wisdom: Markets may be more rooted
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in the social reality of a place at any given time than
centralized planning and investment are. The nuclear
industry has never done well in market-dominated
societies; it has done best in France, the Soviet Union,
Japan, South Korea, and now perhaps China and
India.
The nuclear project in India always has been
dominated by a nuclear establishment that has formed
a state within the state. This establishment has failed
to deliver on its promises and now reluctantly seeks
a bailout through the proposed U.S.-India deal. Prime
Minister Singh, an enlightened economist, may hope
that opening the Indian sector to international participation will engender some competitive discipline, but a
market is hardly envisioned. The Indian state will be
required to invest major subsidies, and the hope is that
Russian, French, and perhaps American suppliers will
do the same. This may turn out to be enlightened insofar
as more market-oriented energy supplies, particularly
fossil fuels, fail to internalize the social costs of climate
change and health effects of coal emissions.
Yet conservative suspicion is warranted. We
should ask whether societies are prepared to make the
investment and site-choosing decisions necessary to
add thousands of new nuclear power plants and the
waste management technologies that would be required
to reverse the growth of carbon dioxide emissions. We
should ask whether other strategies can achieve more
realistically and cheaply the desired public good.
These conservative Realist considerations suggest
that if other alternatives to the proposed U.S.-India
nuclear deal are not explored, there is a risk that
Asia will experience a dangerous and costly buildup of nuclear arsenals—a nuclear bubble much more
dangerous than housing or stock-market bubbles.
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These considerations suggest the following: Why
hasn’t the United States vigorously and thoroughly
pursued means to limit further fissile material
production for nuclear weapons in southern Asia,
including China? If China were to forego a major
increase in its nuclear arsenal, then India would not
feel the need to produce more plutonium or highly
enriched uranium for bombs. Pakistan would likely
follow along with such constraints if China and India
were to do so, with U.S. encouragement. India could
then put almost all of its nuclear facilities under
safeguards, which would buttress, rather than erode,
the global nonproliferation regime. International
partners could sell India nuclear fuel without thereby
augmenting India’s nuclear weapons arsenal.
Pursuing this objective would earn the U.S. global
credibility it badly needs to lead the struggle against
proliferation in Iran and elsewhere. If the President
could announce to the world that, “As of today, no
country is making additional nuclear weapons, none
is adding to the global glut of weapons plutonium and
highly-enriched uranium,” it would be much easier
to rally all countries to prevent Iran, North Korea, or
other challengers from producing materials that could
be used in nuclear weapons.
To make this objective a reality, China, India and
Pakistan are key. (Israel most likely would go along,
strengthening prospects of nonproliferation in the
Middle East). But China will not cut short the expansion
of its nuclear arsenal if the United States does not
reassure Beijing. U.S. plans to develop the capability
to preemptively destroy China’s nuclear forces and
command-and-control infrastructure intensify China’s
nuclear requirements. Faced with such a scenario,
China will not limit the expansion and modernization
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of its nuclear arsenal, which means that India will not
agree to limit its potential nuclear bomb production.
U.S. officials have never even tried to discuss with
Beijing, New Delhi, and Islamabad whether a nuclear
arms build-up can be avoided. Instead, they have
endorsed a bilateral deal with India that pushes in the
opposite direction, knowing that China will then seek
to reciprocate by offering nuclear cooperation with
Pakistan to keep up. Perhaps an Asian nuclear arms
competition cannot be avoided, but Congress should
not allow the United States to fuel one before the
administration has tried. The administration should be
required to report to Congress on the conditions under
which China, Pakistan, and India would agree to
join the United States, Russia, France, and the United
Kingdom—nuclear weapons states that have already
publicly undertaken moratoria on producing fissile
materials for nuclear weapons.
To make such an assessment, the United States
will have to talk with these countries about the issue.
Because Congress would dismiss the interests of any
country making far-fetched demands, each would have
an incentive to take the issue of a global moratorium
seriously. India might discount Chinese willingness to
declare a moratorium, by saying that China would still
retain a stockpile of fissile material that can be converted
to new weapons. Pakistan might say the same of India.
From this could emerge the first serious discussion
of the pros and cons of three-way regional nuclear
constraints. In any case, Congress and the world would
gain a clearer picture of the potential consequences of
the proposed nuclear deal with India.
In parallel with a U.S. exploration of this issue
with China, India, and Pakistan, Pakistan itself might
consider whether to declare a voluntary cessation of
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fissile material production through the end of the year,
and offer to extend it indefinitely if all countries with
unsafeguarded fissile material production facilities
join it. (Pakistan would not do so without the blessing
of China.)
Beyond the fissile material issue, there are two
important initiatives related to the NSG that should be
considered. If we cannot wait for the NSG to deliberate
and test the proposition that the deal as proposed will not
cause other leading members of the international community to weaken their support of the rule-based nonproliferation regime, the United States at least should
propose a process for strengthening international rules
in light of the India deal. One example would be to
work within the NSG to clarify the terms under which
a “safety exemption” should be allowed for nuclear
cooperation. Russia’s recent use of such an exemption
to provide fuel to the Tarapur reactor invites a further
weakening, rather than a strengthening, of NSG rules.
Returning to the nuclear testing issue, the United
States should reconsider its resistance to ratifying the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. If, as is likely, the
necessary two-thirds majority cannot be mustered in
the Senate to this end, the United States should clarify
at a minimum that it will not abet an Indian decision
to test by promoting work-around nuclear supply
arrangements.
It is possible that the U.S.-India deal is too far
advanced to improve it significantly. In that case, the
United States has a greatly increased responsibility
going forward to exert concentrated, sustained
leadership to minimize the undesired effects of the
deal. The natural temptation after completing the
arduous process of passing the deal will be to move
on to less demanding issues. This could gravely
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undermine the Realist interests of the United States
and the international system.
ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 7
1. Henry Kissinger, “A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy,”
Washington Post, May 16, 2006, p. A17.

228

STRATEGIC MATTERS

229

CHAPTER 8
WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM INDIA
AS A STRATEGIC PARTNER?
Ashley J. Tellis
It is probable that when the history of the George
W. Bush administration is finally written, the
transformation of the U.S.-Indian relationship will
be judged as the President’s greatest foreign policy
achievement. This success, if sustained through
wise policies and skillful diplomacy by future
administrations, will portend enormous consequences
for the future balance of power in Asia and globally
to the advantage of the United States. The rapid
transformation of the relationship between the world’s
oldest and the world’s largest democracies, which
began in the final years of the Clinton administration
and which received dramatic substantive impetus in
the Bush presidency, has had the effect of obscuring
the fact that the bilateral relationship between the
United States and India historically represented an
engagement marked by dramatic alterations.1
U.S-Indian Relations Historically:
A Giant Sine Wave.
During the dark years of World War II, the United
States was perhaps the most important country
to press Great Britain to end its colonial empire in
India. Shaped by America’s own ideals of liberty,
the Roosevelt and later the Truman administrations
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became strong advocates of Indian independence. The
post-Independence Indian leadership led by Jawaharlal
Nehru was eager to reciprocate American overtures
of friendship and, despite their formal invocation of
nonalignment in the face of the emerging Cold War,
sought to develop a close strategic relationship with
the United States that would provide India with arms,
economic assistance, and diplomatic support. Although
this effort was only partly successful, in some measure
because the United States still deferred to Great Britain
on issues relating to security in the Indian subcontinent
and more significantly because the emerging U.S.
vision of containment left little room for informal allies
like India, U.S.-Indian relations nonetheless remained
very cordial from 1947-62. The United States during
this period soon became the largest aid donor to India,
and Washington viewed India as an important theater
in the struggle against global communism despite
New Delhi’s reluctance to become formally allied with
Washington in its anti-communist crusade. The year
1962 in fact marked the zenith of U.S.-Indian relations
during the Cold War, when the United States strongly
supported India politically, diplomatically, and
militarily during the Sino-Indian war.
America’s growing involvement in Vietnam
thereafter, coupled with India’s own inward turn in the
aftermath of its defeat in 1962, resulted in the 1965-71
period marking the nadir in U.S.-Indian relations. The
growing U.S. disenchantment with Indian neutralism
in the face of years of American assistance, the
distractions of the Vietnam war, and the increasingly
manifest failures of Indian socialism, all together set
the stage for repeated confrontations: The 1965 IndoPakistani war witnessed the first formal U.S. arms
embargo on New Delhi—a dramatic reversal of the
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earlier U.S. policy of assisting India militarily and one
that was viewed in India as unjustified, given that India
was a victim of deliberate Pakistani aggression during
this conflict. The aftermath of the war also brought
new humiliations in the form of coercive American
efforts at conditioning food aid during the most
serious agricultural failure faced by India in the postIndependence period, an episode that led to the forced
devaluation of the Indian rupee and a minor economic
crisis. Finally, the most serious confrontation in U.S.Indian relations was during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani
war, when the Nixon administration, because of its
reliance on Pakistan as the intermediary in its opening
to China, supported Islamabad against New Delhi
despite the Pakistani junta’s brutalization of its eastern
provinces, which resulted in an armed revolt against
Islamabad that eventually precipitated a generalized
Indo-Pakistani war that locked India and the United
States on opposite sides.
The years 1971-82 were a frosty period in the
bilateral relationship as the United States attempted
to come to terms with its own defeat in Vietnam and
its gradual loss of influence in South Asia caused both
by the defeat of its ally, Pakistan, in the 1971 war and
the sharp increase in Soviet influence as a result of
the Indo-Soviet Treaty that was concluded just prior
to the 1971 war. Just as the United States and India
began to grow comfortable in the mutual distance
that had set in as a result of the recriminations of 1971,
another great Republican president, Ronald Reagan,
made a concerted effort to heal the breach between
the two democracies. Although Reagan’s intentions
were shaped greatly by his desire to avoid ceding
India to the Soviet sphere of influence permanently,
his overtures of friendship were welcomed gladly by
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then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi because of
her own desire to maintain a durable breathing space
between India and the Soviet Union. Thus, the 198291 period witnessed a delicate and gradual warming
of U.S.-Indian relations: The warming was symbolized
by new American efforts to accommodate Indian
desires for dual-use high technologies in an effort to
wean New Delhi away from excessive dependence on
Moscow, while the delicacy was repeatedly displayed
as India sought to avoid becoming engulfed by the
new Reagan strategy of confronting the Soviet Union
in what would eventually become the death knell for
Washington’s Communist rival.
The year 1991 brought the Cold War to a dramatic
close with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. To all
intents and purposes, India appeared like the loser
in South Asia, and Pakistan the improbable winner.2
India’s principal patron, the Soviet Union, had lost
the Cold War and had disappeared from the political
landscape. Pakistan’s principal patron, the United
States, had won the Cold War, and its lesser patron,
China, stood to gain from the Soviet demise. While
that might have seemed like an initial advantage as
far as Pakistan was concerned, the real consequence
turned out to be that the collapse of superpower
competition afforded the United States the opportunity
to cut Pakistan loose as an ally and reengage India
in order to construct that bilateral partnership that
both sides desired since India’s independence but
which eluded them throughout the Cold War. The
years 1991-98, therefore, saw renewed efforts on both
sides to build a new relationship unconstrained by
the pressures that were dominant during the Cold
War. The absence of bipolarity meant that the United
States and India could judge each other on their own
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terms and seek a relationship based on the strength of
their direct mutual interests rather than the derivative
pressures arising from their relations with others.
The maturing of the Indian economy, which was an
underperformer for much of the Cold War period,
provided added impetus for seeking a new bilateral
relationship on both sides. For the United States, India
held the promise of becoming a big emerging new
market for American goods and services, whereas
the United States remained for New Delhi a critical
source of trade and investments, high technology,
and above all political reassurance and diplomatic
support.3 Although U.S.-Indian relations throughout
this decade were shadowed by new U.S. pressures
on nonproliferation—arising entirely out of the U.S.
conviction that capping, rolling back, and eventually
eliminating India’s nuclear weapons program was
critical to its larger global strategy of controlling the
spread of nuclear weapons—both sides attempted as
best they could to prevent their disagreements on this
issue from impeding the rapprochement in bilateral
relations.
The strategy adopted for this purpose by the Clinton
administration was that of a “carve out,” meaning that
the United States would segregate its disagreement
with India on nuclear weapons, while proceeding to
improve bilateral relations in all other issue areas.
Unfortunately, this strategy quickly reached the
limits of its success, in part because India’s economic
development had by now reached a point where its
further growth required expanded access to a range
of dual-use high technologies, all of which, being
controlled by various global nonproliferation regimes
managed by the United States, would stay perpetually
beyond New Delhi’s reach so long as the “carve out”
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approach pursued by the United States dominated
Washington’s efforts to rebuild relations with India.
In these circumstances, the Clinton administration’s
efforts—while no doubt well-intentioned and
arguably even justified at that point in time—became
an enormous source of frustration to India. Even
worse, the administration’s nonproliferation successes
in the global arena, such as the indefinite extension
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the conclusion
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), were
seen as fundamentally undermining Indian efforts at
maintaining its “nuclear option” and thereby put New
Delhi on a collision course with Washington. Ironically
therefore, the 1991-98 period, which witnessed strong
efforts on both sides to construct a new bilateral
relationship unhampered by historic Cold War
pressures, quickly ended with a bang—literally—as
New Delhi tested a series of nuclear weapons in May
1998 and in a deliberate challenge to the United states
promptly declared itself to be a “nuclear weapons
state.”4
The testing of nuclear weapons by India—followed
quickly by tests in Pakistan—resulted, once again, in
a meltdown in U.S.-Indian relations as the Clinton
administration imposed a series of nuclear-related
sanctions on India. These sanctions, which came during
a period of highly-charged atmospherics and shrill
diplomacy, proved to be more a psychological than a
material blow to India’s strategic programs, but they
had the effect of resuscitating past Indian memories of
U.S. opposition. This discomfiting moment in bilateral
relations might have lasted longer than it finally did if
it were not for Pakistan’s aggression in Kargil, a region
that lies along the northern frontiers of the disputed
state of Jammu and Kashmir. This ill-advised adventure,
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once again, brought the United States and India together
in an intense bout of collaborative diplomacy that had
the beneficial result of removing much, though not all,
of the mutual discord that had set in after the nuclear
tests. It also strengthened the commitment of both
sides to work out the disagreement on nuclear issues in
a constructive way leading first to an intensely useful
14-round dialogue between U.S. Deputy Secretary
of State Strobe Talbott and India’s Foreign Minister
Jaswant Singh and finally to a wildly successful March
2000 visit by President Bill Clinton to New Delhi.5 By
the time the Bush administration arrived in office,
therefore, U.S.-Indian relations were once more on
the path to improvement, but still lacked a decisive
resolution of the one issue that bedeviled mutual ties
since 1974: India’s nuclear weapons program and its
status as an outlier in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
When viewed in retrospect, however, the dispute
over India’s nuclear program was merely the third
impediment to the strong bilateral relationship that
President Truman and Prime Minister Nehru had
envisaged at the time of India’s independence in 1947.
The first and most significant impediment throughout
the Cold War was simply India’s quest for strategic
autonomy. This desire for freedom to choose one’s
own ideology, policies, and friends sat uncomfortably
with U.S preferences at a time when Washington
was engaged in a global confrontation with Soviet
communism. In that Manichean struggle, the Indian
desire for nonalignment was viewed occasionally
in the United States as a form of moral indifference
in the struggle between good and evil. Even when
moral considerations were not at issue, the pursuit
of U.S. global interests, which resulted initially in
formal or tacit alliances first with Pakistan and later
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with China—both Indian rivals—resulted in strained
relations with New Delhi. These strained relations
were to engender a deepening of Indo-Soviet ties, as
New Delhi sought to acquire a superpower patron of
its own to deal with the threat to its security first posed
by an American-supported Pakistan and later by an
American-supported China. The end of the Cold War,
however, decisively removed this first impediment
to closer U.S.-Indian relations and, while it does not
assure perfect amity between the two countries by
itself, it at least removes a key structural impediment
that historically impeded the development of close
collaboration.
The second impediment to close bilateral ties arose
from factors specific to India: New Delhi’s relative
weakness during much of the Cold War. The traditional
Indian strategy of relying on a centrally planned
economy that emphasized self-reliance (at least in
the industrial sector) failed to advance both political
and development goals and instead institutionalized
poor management, pervasive inefficiency, a rentier
bureaucracy, the stifling of initiative, low rates of return,
the absence of internal and foreign competition, and
depressed rates of economic growth. The net effect was
that India not only failed to develop into the great power
that it sought to become at the time of its independence,
it actually lost out in relative terms to the Asian tigers
which were its economic peers as late as the early 1960s.
India’s pervasive economic underperformance and its
lack of connectivity to the Western economic system (or
the global economy) arising from its autarkic policies
virtually guaranteed its strategic irrelevance during
the Cold War.6 Whatever relevance India had derived
was mostly because it was viewed as a battleground
during the early phase of U.S-Soviet competition. Once
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a more mature understanding of the global balance of
power set in (as was the case during the latter half of
the Cold War), India, with its relatively poor economic
performance, provided the United States with few
stakes in its success. As a result, Washington made
some efforts to wean New Delhi away from Soviet
enticements after 1982, but India’s marginality in the
global economic system guaranteed that these efforts
would never be robust or long-lasting. The steady
shift in Indian economic fortunes after about 1980, and
the relatively high growth rates sustained since 1991,
ensures however that the future of U.S.-Indian relations
is likely to replicate the past. Today, India is widely
viewed as a rising economic power and virtually all
studies suggest that its economy will find a place within
the world’s top three or four largest concentrations of
economic power sometime during the first half of this
century.7 This reality by itself ensures that the second
structural impediment that prevented the growth of
close U.S-Indian relations—New Delhi’s economic
underperformance and, by implication, its strategic
irrelevance—is on the cusp of disappearing forever.
By the time the Bush administration took office in
2001, therefore, there remained only one last structural
impediment to closer U.S-Indian ties and that was
New Delhi’s anomalous nuclear status in the post-1974
period: a state with nuclear weapons, but not a nuclear
weapons state. It is this reality that President Bush
has gone to great lengths to correct, first through the
Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) concluded
during his first term, and then through the July 18, 2005,
Joint Statement with Prime Minister Singh, wherein
he proposed the renewal of international nuclear
cooperation with New Delhi, which is tantamount to
accepting India as a de facto nuclear weapons state.8
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Although it is unclear at the time of this writing
what the legal future of this proposal will be, the fact
remains that Bush’s bold initiative is colored greatly by
his judgment that avoiding the sine wave oscillations
characterizing the bilateral relationship in previous
decades will be critical if the United States is to master
the geopolitical challenges that are likely to confront it,
especially in Asia, in the 21st century. In this context,
setting aright the U.S-Indian relationship in a way
that assists the growth of Indian power is judged
to be essential to U.S. interests because it permits
Washington to “pursue a balance-of-power strategy
among those major rising powers and key regional
states in Asia which are not part of the existing U.S.
alliance structure—including China, India, and a
currently weakened Russia,” a strategy that “seeks to
prevent any one of these [countries] from effectively
threatening the security of another [or that of the
United States] while simultaneously preventing any
combination of these [entities] from ‘bandwagoning’
to undercut critical U.S. strategic interests in Asia.”9
The Value of a Transformed U.S.-Indian
Relationship.
The principal value in transforming the U.S.-Indian
relationship is that it provides hope for reaching the
summum bonum that eluded both sides during the Cold
War. The possibility of decent U.S.-Indian relations
during that period survived at the end of the day
only because of the shared values that derived from
a common democratic heritage. As the historical
record of this epoch in the previous section indicated,
these values sufficed to prevent both countries from
becoming real antagonists, but they could not prevent
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the political estrangement that arose regularly as a
result of divergence in critical interests. With the passing
of the bipolar international order and with India’s own
shift towards market economics at home, the traditional
commonality of values is now complemented by an
increasingly robust set of intersocietal ties based on
growing U.S.-Indian economic and trade linkages, the
new presence of Americans of Indian origin in U.S.
political life, and the vibrant exchange of American and
Indian ideas and culture through movies, literature,
food, and travel.
These links are only reinforced by the new and
dramatic convergence of national interests between the
United States and India in a manner never witnessed
during the Cold War. Today and for the foreseeable
future, both Washington and New Delhi will be bound
by a common interest in:
• Preventing Asia from being dominated by any
single power that has the capacity to crowd out
others and which may use aggressive assertion
of national self-interest to threaten American
presence, American alliances, and American
ties with the regional states;
• Eliminating the threats posed by state sponsors
of terrorism who may seek to use violence
against innocents to attain various political
objectives, and more generally neutralizing the
dangers posed by terrorism and religious
extremism to free societies;
• Arresting the further spread of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and related
technologies to other countries and subnational
entities, including substate actors operating
independently or in collusion with states;
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• Promoting the spread of democracy not only as
an end in itself but also as a strategic means of
preventing illiberal polities from exporting their
internal struggles over power abroad;
• Advancing the diffusion of economic
development with the intent of spreading peace
through prosperity through the expansion
of a liberal international economic order
that increases trade in goods, services, and
technology worldwide;
• Protecting the global commons, especially the
sea lanes of communications, through which
flow not only goods and services critical to the
global economy but also undesirable commerce
such as drug trading, human smuggling, and
WMD technologies;
• Preserving energy security by enabling stable
access to existing energy sources through
efficient and transparent market mechanisms
(both internationally and domestically), while
collaborating to develop new sources of energy
through innovative approaches that exploit
science and technology; and,
• Safeguarding the global environment by
promoting the creation and use of innovative
technology to achieve sustainable development;
devising permanent, self-sustaining, marketbased institutions and systems that improve
environmental
protection;
developing
coordinated strategies for managing climate
change; and assisting in the event of natural
disasters.
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It would not be an exaggeration to say that for
the first time in recent memory Indian and American
interests in each of these eight issue-areas are strongly
convergent.10 It is equally true to assert that India’s
contribution ranges from important to indispensable
as far as achieving U.S. objectives in each of these
issue-areas is concerned. That does not mean, however,
that the United States and India will automatically
collaborate on every problem that comes before the
two countries. The differentials in raw power between
the United States and India are still too great and
could produce differences in operational objectives,
even when the overarching interests are preeminently
compatible. Beyond the differentials in raw power,
bilateral collaboration could still be stymied by
competing national preferences over the strategies used
to realize certain objectives. And, finally, even when
disagreement over strategies is not at issue, differences
in negotiating styles and tactics may sometimes divide
the two sides.
What does it mean, then, to say that U.S.Indian interests are strongly convergent, if bilateral
collaboration cannot always be assumed to ensue
automatically? It means three things. First, that there is
a grand summum bonum that the two sides can secure
only collaboratively, even though each party is likely
to emphasize different aspects of this quest. For the
United States, the ultimate value of the U.S.-Indian
relationship is that it helps preserve American primacy
and the exercise thereof by constructing a partnership
that aids in the preservation of the balance of power
in Asia, enhances American competitiveness through
deepened linkages with a growing Indian economy, and
strengthens the American vision of a concert of democratic states by incorporating a major non-Western
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exemplar of successful democracy such as India. For
India, the ultimate value of the U.S.-Indian relationship
is that it helps New Delhi to expand its national power.
Although this growth in capabilities leads India
inexorably to demand formally a “multipolar” world—
a claim that, strictly speaking, implies the demise of
American hegemony—the leadership in New Delhi is
realistic enough to understand that American primacy
is unlikely to be dethroned any time soon and certainly
not as a result of the growth in Indian power. Rather,
because Indian power and national ambitions will
find assertion in geographic and issue areas that are
more likely to be contested immediately by China
rather than by the United States, Indian policymakers
astutely recognize that only protective benefits accrue
to New Delhi from American primacy, despite their
own formal—but not substantive—discomfort with
such a concept.
Second is that the United and India share a
common vision of which end-states are desirable and
what outcomes ought to be pursued—however this
is done—by both sides. Irrespective of the tensions
that inhere in the competing visions of hegemony and
multipolarity at the level of theory and in the grand
strategies formally pursued by the two countries, both
Washington and New Delhi are united by a common
understanding of which strategic end-states are in
the interests of both sides. Thus, both countries, for
example, agree that a powerful authoritarian China
that has the capacity to dominate the Asian landmass
serves neither American nor Indian interests. Both
sides similarly understand that a radicalized Islam at
war with itself and the world outside it threatens the
security of both countries even if only in different ways.
Further, neither country believes that despite their own
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possession of nuclear weapons and their reluctance
to surrender these capabilities either permanently
or to some global authority, other states or nonstate
actors—even if friendly—ought to be encouraged to
acquire such capabilities. Such a list can be developed
further, only proving that the ambiguities that lie in
each country’s conception of the summum bonum at the
grand strategic level does not in any way translate into
fundamental differences at the practical level where
certain critical political goals are concerned. As a result,
not only is a close U.S.-Indian bilateral relationship
eminently possible, it is fundamentally necessary
since both countries will be increasingly critical to the
achievement of those goals valued by each side.
Third, that there are no differences in vital interests,
despite the tensions in the competing grand strategies,
which would cause either party to levy mortal threats
against the other or would cause either country to
undercut the other’s core objectives on any issue of
strategic importance.
These two realities—informed by the convergence
in interests, values, and intersocietal ties—provide
a basis for strong practical cooperation between the
United States and India. They are realities that do
not define U.S. bilateral relations with any other
major, continental-sized, state in Asia. The fact that
the United States and India would never threaten
each other’s security through the force of arms—and
have never done so historically despite moments of
deep disagreement—provides an enormous cushion
of comfort in the bilateral relationship because it
insulates policymakers on both sides from having to
confront the prospect of how to manage the most lethal
threats that may otherwise be imagined. U.S. relations
with neither Russia nor China enjoy any comparable
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protection. Therefore, even when U.S.-Indian relations
may be confronted by profound disagreement, these
altercations would be no better and no worse that those
arising with other friends and allies. This reality in
effect, then, bounds the lowest limits of the relationship:
While disagreements between friends and allies are
never desirable, they at least hold out the reassurance
that these disputes will not end up in violent conflict
and that by itself provides an opportunity for exploring
some reasonable “positive sum” solutions.
Given these three judgments, President Bush’s
decision to accelerate the transformation in U.S.Indian relations (through multiple avenues now being
contemplated by the administration) represents an
investment not only in bettering relations with a new
rising power in what will become the new center of
gravity in global politics—Asia—but also, and more
fundamentally, an investment in the long-term security
and relative power position of the United States.
The Practical Consequences of Transforming
the U.S.-Indian Relationship.
Several practical implications flow from the three
realities that define the U.S.-Indian relationship. To
begin with, the strengthening U.S.-Indian bond does
not imply that New Delhi will become a formal alliance
partner of Washington at some point in the future. It
also does not imply that India will invariably be an
uncritical partner of the United States in its global
endeavors. India’s large size, its proud history, and its
great ambitions, ensure that it will likely march to the
beat of its own drummer, at least most of the time. When
the value of the U.S.-Indian relationship is at issue, the
first question for the United States, therefore, ought
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not to be, “What will India do for us?”—as critics of the
Bush administration’s civilian nuclear agreement with
New Delhi have often asserted in recent memory.11
Rather, the real question ought to be, “Is a strong,
democratic (even if perpetually independent) India in
American national interest?” If this is the fundamental
question and if the answer to this question is “Yes”—as
it ought to be, given the convergence in U.S. and Indian
national security goals—then the real discussion about
the evolution of the U.S.-Indian relationship ought to
focus on how the United States can assist the growth
of Indian power, and how it can do so at minimal cost
(if that is relevant) to any other competing national
security objectives.12
Advancing the growth of Indian power consistent
with this intention, as the Bush administration
currently seeks, is not directed, as many critics have
alleged, at “containing” China. A policy of containing
China is neither feasible nor necessary for the United
States at this point in time. India, too, currently has
no interest in becoming part of any coalition aimed
at containing China. This is not because New Delhi
is by any means indifferent to the growth of Chinese
capabilities but because Indian policymakers believe
that the best antidote to the persistently competitive
and even threatening dimensions of Chinese power
lies, at least in the first instance, in the complete and
permanent revitalization of Indian national strength—an
objective in which the United States has a special
role.13 The United States, in turn, has a complementary
perspective. Rather than merely “containing” China,
the administration’s strategy of assisting India to
become a major world power in the 21st century is
directed, first and foremost, towards constructing a
stable geopolitical order in Asia that is conducive to
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peace and prosperity. There is little doubt today that
the Asian continent is poised to become the new locus
of capabilities in international politics. Although lower
growth in the labor force, reduced export performance,
diminishing returns to capital, changes in demographic
structure, and the maturation of the economy all
suggest that national growth rates in several key Asian
states—in particular Japan, South Korea, and possibly
China—are likely to decline in comparison to the
latter half of the Cold War period, the spurt in Indian
growth rates, coupled with the relatively high though
still marginally declining growth rates in China, will
propel Asia’s share of the global economy to some 43
percent by 2025, thus making the continent the largest
single center of economic power worldwide.
An Asia that hosts economic power of such
magnitude, along with its strong and growing
connectivity to the American economy, will become
an arena vital to the United States—in much the same
way that Europe was the grand prize during the Cold
War. In such circumstances, the administration’s
policy of developing a new global partnership with
India represents a considered effort at “shaping” the
emerging Asian environment to suit American interests
in the 21st century. Even as the United States focuses
on developing good relations with all the major Asian
states, it is eminently reasonable for Washington not
only to invest additional resources in strengthening
the continent’s democratic powers but also to deepen
the bilateral relationship enjoyed with each of these
countries—on the assumption that the proliferation
of strong democratic states in Asia represents the best
insurance against intracontinental instability as well
as against threats that may emerge against the United
States and its regional presence. Strengthening New
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Delhi and transforming U.S-Indian ties, therefore,
has everything to do with American confidence in
Indian democracy and the conviction that its growing
strength, tempered by its liberal values, brings only
benefits for Asian stability and American security.
As Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns succinctly
stated in his testimony before the House International
Relations Committee on September 8, 2005, “By
cooperating with India now, we accelerate the arrival
of the benefits that India’s rise brings to the region and
the world.”14
Once the fundamental argument is understood—
that India’s growth in power is valuable to the United
States principally not because of what it does for us,
but because of what it enables New Delhi to become
in the context of an emerging Asia—the secondorder consideration of whether (and how) India will
collaborate in endeavors critical to the United States can
be appreciated in proper perspective. Only when the
importance of strengthening India in America’s own
self-interest is affirmed, however, does the question of
whether and how New Delhi would partner with the
United States become a useful one. It is not necessary
to have a Realist obsession with great power politics in
order to defend the validity of such an approach. As
George Perkovich, arguing from what is unabashedly
a Liberal-Humanist perspective, has concluded,
deepened U.S.-Indian relations that have the effect of
strengthening India make strategic sense whether or
not New Delhi supports Washington on a range of
political issues because:
. . . India is too big and too important in the overall global
community to measure in terms of its alignment with any
particular U.S. interest at any given time. It matters to
the entire world whether India is at war or peace with its
neighbors, is producing increasing prosperity or poverty
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for its citizens, stemming or incubating the spread of
infectious diseases, or mimicking or leapfrogging climatewarming technologies. Democratically managing a
society as big, populous, diverse, and culturally dynamic
as India is a world historical challenge. If India can
democratically lift all of its citizens to a decent quality
of life without trampling on basic liberties and harming
its neighbors, the Indian people will have accomplished
perhaps the greatest success in human history.
India will struggle to do this largely on its own, disabused
of notions that the United States or others might help
without asking anything in return. This capacity to do
things on one’s own is autonomy, a form of power that
India has achieved to its great credit. To go further and
make others do what one wants them to do through
payment, coercion, or persuasion is a more demanding
measure of power. Iraq raises questions whether even
the United States has this power. India, to be great, has
more urgent things to do.15

Although Perkovich’s argument may not satisfy
a hard-nosed Realist concerned about protecting U.S.
national security interests conventionally understood,
there is nonetheless good news even from a narrowly
self-interested perspective of American national
interests. The good news about India’s obsession
with its national autonomy is that while it does not a
priori guarantee New Delhi’s support for Washington
in regards to any specific operational objective,
implementation strategy, or political tactic (even when
the larger interests are otherwise identical), it does not
preclude such assistance either. In fact, during the last
5 years, India has built up an impressive record of
backing the United States in a wide variety of issueareas, despite its formal and continuing commitment
to “nonalignment” as a foreign policy doctrine. The
list of Indian initiatives in support of the United States
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is a lengthy one—many specific activities are in fact
still classified—but the following iteration highlights
the reality and the possibilities of U.S.-Indian strategic
collaboration.
Since 2001, India:
• Enthusiastically endorsed President Bush’s
new strategic framework, despite decades of
objections to U.S. nuclear policies, at a time
when even formal American allies withheld
their support;
• Offered unqualified support for the U.S. antiterrorism campaign in Afghanistan to include
the use of numerous Indian military bases, an
offer that was never made even to the Soviet
Union which functioned as New Delhi’s patron
during the last decades of the Cold War;
• Expressed no opposition whatsoever to President Bush’s decision to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty, despite the widespread international
and domestic condemnation of the U.S. action;
• Endorsed the U.S. position on environmental
protection and global climate change in the face
of strident global opposition;
• Assisted the U.S. initiative to remove Jose
Mauricio Bustani, the Director-General of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons despite strong third-world opposition
in the United Nations (UN);
• Protected high-value U.S. cargoes transiting
the Straits of Malacca during the critical early
phase of the global war on terror, despite the
absence of New Delhi’s traditional requirement
of a covering UN mandate;
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• Eschewed leading or joining the international
chorus of opposition to the U.S.-led coalition
campaign against Iraq, despite repeated
entreaties from other major powers and thirdworld states to that effect;
• Considered seriously—and came close to
providing—an Indian Army division for
postwar stabilization operations in Iraq despite
widespread national opposition to the U.S.-led
war;
• Signed a 10-year defense cooperation framework
agreement with the United States that identifies
common strategic goals and the means for
achieving them despite strong domestic
opposition to, and regional suspicion about,
such forms of collaboration with Washington;
• Collaborated—and continues to partner—
with the United States by becoming one of the
largest donors to the reconstruction effort in
Afghanistan despite strong—and continuing—
U.S. efforts to limit Indian assistance in certain
programs because of sensitivities involving
Pakistan; and,
• Voted with the United States at the September
2005 IAEA Board of Governors meeting to
declare Iran in “non-compliance” with the NonProliferation Treaty, despite strong domestic
opposition and international surprise.
These examples, viewed in their totality, illustrate
several important aspects of U.S-Indian strategic
collaboration. First, despite the absence of preexisting
guarantees, bilateral cooperation between Washington
and New Delhi is eminently possible on many issues
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vital to the United States. Second, from the perspective
of American interests, what New Delhi does in some
instances may be just as important as what it refrains
from doing. Third, in every instance where the United
States and India have been able to collaborate during
the last 5 years, the most important ingredients that
contributed to achieving a fruitful outcome were the
boldness of leadership, the astuteness of policy, and
the quality of diplomacy—both American and Indian.
As we look at the three most pressing challenges
likely to dominate the common attention of the United
States and India in the first half of the 21st century—
the rise of China amidst Asian resurgence in general,
the threat of the continuing spread of WMD, and the
dangers posed by terrorism and religious extremism
to liberal societies—two assertions become almost selfevidently true: Not only are the United States and India
more intensely affected by these three challenges in
comparison to many other states in Europe and Asia, but
effective diplomacy, wise policy, and bold leadership
also will make the greatest difference in achieving the
desired “strategic coordination” between Washington
and New Delhi that serves American interests just as
well as any recognized alliance.16
Since the character of U.S. policy, leadership, and
diplomacy—whether tacit or explicit—will be critical
to making such U.S.-Indian collaboration possible,
both the administration and the Congress will have to
partner in this regard. The most important contribution
that the legislative branch can make here is by helping
to change India’s entitative status from that of a target
under U.S. nonproliferation laws to that of a full partner.
The administration’s civilian nuclear agreement with
India is directed fundamentally towards this objective.
To be sure, it will produce important and tangible
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nonproliferation gains for the United States, just as
it will bestow energy and environmental benefits on
India.17 But, at a grand strategic level, it is intended to
do much more: Given the lessons learned from over
50 years of alternating engagement and opposition,
the civil nuclear cooperation agreement is intended to
convey in one fell swoop the abiding American interest
in crafting a full and productive partnership with India
to advance our common goals in this new century. As
Undersecretary of State Burns phrased it in his recent
testimony, “our ongoing diplomatic efforts to conclude
a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement are not simply
exercises in bargaining and tough-minded negotiation;
they represent a broad confidence-building effort
grounded in a political commitment from the highest
levels of our two governments.”18
Many administrations before that of George
W. Bush also sought this same objective, but they
invariably were hobbled by the constraints of U.S.
nonproliferation laws that treated India as a problem
to be contained rather than as a partner to be engaged.
Not surprisingly, these efforts, though admirable,
always came to naught for the simple reason that it
was impossible to craft a policy that simultaneously
transformed New Delhi into a strategic partner on the
one hand, even as it was permanently anchored as the
principal nonproliferation target on the other. These
prior American efforts, however, served an important
purpose: They confirmed that trying to transform
the bilateral relationship with India always would be
frustrated if it was not accompanied by a willingness to
reexamine the fundamentals on which this relationship
was based.
To its credit, the Bush administration learned the
right lessons in this regard. Recognizing that a new
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global partnership would require engaging New Delhi
not only on issues important to the United States, the
administration has moved rapidly to expand bilateral
collaboration on a wide range of subjects, including
those of greatest importance to India. The agreement
relating to civilian nuclear cooperation, thus, is part
of a larger set of initiatives involving space, dualuse high technology, advanced military equipment,
and missile defense. Irrespective of the technologies
involved in each of these realms, the administration
has approached the issues implicated in their potential
release to New Delhi through an entirely new prism.
In contrast to the past, the President views India as
part of the solution to proliferation rather than as part
of the problem. He views the growth of Indian power
as beneficial to the United States and its geopolitical
interests in Asia and, hence, worthy of strong American
support. And he is convinced that the success of Indian
democracy, the common interests shared with the
United States, and the human ties that bind our two
societies together, offer a sufficiently lasting assurance
of New Delhi’s responsible behavior as to justify the
burdens of requesting Congress to amend the relevant
U.S. laws (and the international community, the
relevant regimes).
In reaching this conclusion, the administration
has—admirably—resisted the temptation of “pocketing” India’s good nonproliferation record and its recent
history of cooperation with the United States, much to
the chagrin of many commentators who have argued
that New Delhi ought not to be rewarded for doing
what it would do anyway in its own national interest.
On this question, too, the President’s inclinations
are correct: Given India’s importance to the United
States in regard to each of the issue-areas identified
earlier in this chapter, reaching out to New Delhi
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with the promise of a full partnership is a much better
strategy for transforming U.S.-India relations than the
niggardly calculation of treating Indian good behavior
as a freebie that deserves no compensation because
New Delhi presumably would not have conducted
itself differently in any case. On all these issues,
President Bush has made the right judgment—after a
hiatus of many decades—with respect to India and its
importance to the United States. In that judgment lies
the best hope for avoiding yet another unproductive
sine wave in bilateral relations in this new century.
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This article examines the nature and extent of the IndoIranian relationship. Interest in this bilateral relationship
piqued in the United States due to the policy debate
surrounding the United States-India civilian nuclear
agreement and the ever-deepening Iranian nuclear crisis.
While it has become de rigueur to suggest that this
relationship is centered on hydrocarbon politics, this article
contends that the Indo-Iranian relationship has much more
to do with India’s great power aspirations and concomitant
expansive agenda for Central Asia. This article concludes
with some reflections on the limits of this relationship and
the importance of India to international efforts to contain
Iran.
Since the 1990s, Delhi and Tehran have sought
to forge a robust and comprehensive relationship
inclusive of energy and other forms of commercial
cooperation, infrastructure development in Iran and
beyond, as well as military and intelligence ties. These
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bilateral developments have enjoyed widespread
support among Iranian and Indian polities. Despite
extensive regional press coverage, Indo-Iranian
rapprochement has drawn the attention of the United
States only episodically and never as intensely as in
2006. Arguably, increased scrutiny of the Indo-Iranian
relationship arose due to the temporal convergence
of two unrelated developments: the ever-deepening
Iranian nuclear crisis and the efforts of President
George Bush to persuade the U.S. Congress to adopt
legislation enabling a civilian nuclear deal for India.
This deal was seen by many policymakers in India and
the United States as an integral part of an overall suite
of engagements to help India become a global power
and a strategic U.S. ally.
Underscoring the interplay between these two
developments, critics of the nuclear deal argued that
it would weaken the nonproliferation regime at a time
when it must be adequately robust to counter Iranian
intransigence towards its nuclear program. Both
opponents of the administration’s proposed Indo-U.S.
civilian nuclear deal and proponents of some variant
of such a civilian nuclear deal questioned the “strategic
and military” ties that New Delhi and Tehran have
trumpeted to their domestic audiences.
India’s votes at the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) “against Iran” in September 2005
and February 2006 were important tests for those
policymakers who were dubious about India’s
intentions. While India did vote for the resolutions
finding Iran to be in non-compliance in September 2005
and later to refer Iran to the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) in February 2006, there were earlier
signs that India would either abstain or even oppose
the United States on these issues. Notably, India’s
foreign minister, Natwar Singh, declared in October

260

2005 that India would not support U.S. efforts to refer
Iran to the UNSC, which outraged key members of the
U.S. Congress.
Some policymakers and analysts questioned the
wisdom of promoting India as the newly designated
strategic ally of the United States while it has what
both New Delhi and Tehran call a strategic alliance.
(India—like many countries—maintains several
bilateral relations that are “strategic” in name only.)
Detractors of the nuclear deal voiced concerns about
two Indian nuclear scientists (Y.S.R. Prasad and C.
Surendar) who provided assistance to Iran’s nuclear
program. Both were eventually sanctioned by the
United States under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of
2000, although sanctions on Surendar were eventually
dropped. Some congresspersons were disconcerted by
the second Indian-Iranian naval exercise that took place
in March 2006—coincident with President Bush’s visit
to South Asia. While the U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear
deal was finally signed into law by President Bush
on December 18, 2006, the House and Senate tried—
but failed—to require India to halt its fissile material
production and/or end its military relations with Iran
as preconditions for nuclear cooperation.
Throughout Congress’ deliberation on the civilian
nuclear deal, administration officials consistently
downplayed Delhi’s ties with Iran by reducing them to
India’s growing energy needs. Officials argued that the
civilian nuclear engagement would diminish India’s
reliance upon Iran, or at least provide the opportunity
for the United States to shape India’s relationship with
Iran.1 Given the various apprehensions about the IndoIranian relationship in the context of the nuclear deal,
the Congressional Research Service authored a report
examining the extent of the relationship, ostensibly to
put to rest some of these concerns. While acknowledging
that some differences in preferred policy towards
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Iran could emerge, that report too concluded that
India’s motivations to pursue relations with Iran were
primarily rooted in India’s growing energy needs and
therefore are relatively benign to U.S. interests.2
This essay seeks to challenge the view that India’s
ties to Iran are primarily tied to hydrocarbon politics.
Rather, this paper argues that the Indo-Iranian
relationship has much more to do with India’s great
power aspirations and concomitant agenda to expand
its presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. This
paper concludes with a discussion of the constraints
that may limit the extent of Indo-Iranian engagement.
BACKGROUND ON THE INDO-IRANIAN
RAPPORT
On March 15, 1950, New Delhi and Tehran signed a
friendship treaty which called for “perpetual peace and
friendship” between the two states. In principle, this
document committed the two to amicable relations;
however, in practice, both states were mired—albeit
to differing extents at different times—in opposing
Cold War alliances that precluded the development
of robust bilateral ties. Iran, under the leadership of
Muhammad Reza Shah, had close ties to the United
States and Pakistan through Iran’s participation in
the Baghdad Pact (later renamed the Central Treaty
Organization, CENTO). During the 1965 and 1971 wars
between India and Pakistan, Iran provided military
assistance to Pakistan. (Iran was part of Pakistan’s
purported “strategic depth.”) Nehru derided such
alliances as a “wrong approach, a dangerous approach,
and a harmful approach”3 and championed instead
the Non-Aligned Movement. Despite this aversion to
superpower alliances, India forged close ties to the
Soviet Union, which became India’s primary defense
supplier.
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Although India largely welcomed Iran’s 1979
Revolution as an expression of national self-assertion,
and although the post-revolutionary Iranian leadership
was generally well disposed towards India, significant
differences persisted between New Delhi and
Tehran. Iran was more critical of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan than was India. India, under Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, avoided public condemnation
even though privately she was deeply vexed that
Moscow brought superpower confrontation into
India’s extended strategic environment. During the
Iran-Iraq War, India remained ambivalent as it tried to
simultaneously protect its oil interests in both states.
India, with its large Muslim minority, was chary of
Iran’s exporting its revolution and was discomfited
by the fact that Iran, with clerical rule, had moved
far away from democracy and espoused support for
Kashmiri self-determination.4 While the decades of the
1970s and 1980s witnessed tensions between the two,
there were episodic but notable periods of positive
engagement, and the two sustained economic ties
during this period, particularly on energy issues.
Significant improvements in relations did not
materialize until the end of the Cold War. One of the
most consequential events in their shared recent history
was Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s 1993 state
visit to Iran. Rao became the first Indian Prime Minister
to visit Iran since the revolution, and his state visit was
declared a “turning point” in bilateral relations by
Iran’s then-President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In
1995, Rafsanjani made a reciprocal visit to India. While
high-level visits continued after 1995—which did much
to solidify in some measure their mutual economic
interests in key technological sectors—the next state
visit did not occur until 2001, when Prime Minister Atal
Bihar Vajpayee visited Tehran. This visit culminated in
the 2001 Tehran Declaration, signed by Prime Minister
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Vajpayee and Iran’s President Muhammad Khatami.
The Tehran Declaration laid the foundation for Indian
and Iranian cooperation on a wide array of strategic
issues, including defense cooperation.5
Two years later, in January 2003, President
Khatami traveled to Delhi, where he was welcomed
as the “Chief Guest” at India’s 2003 Republic Day
celebrations—an honor generally reserved for the
most important of personages. Both leaders signed the
New Delhi Agreement, which was important both in
its timing and substance. India’s feting of Khatami,
contemporaneously with both the U.S. military buildup
in the Persian Gulf in preparation for the second U.S.
war in Iraq and with an unprecedented qualitative and
quantitative expansion in U.S.-Indian military ties,
declared the importance that New Delhi attaches to its
relationship with Iran. The New Delhi Declaration was
also important in its substance. Expanding off of the
Tehran Declaration, this accord further committed the
two states to deeper levels of engagement, including
military cooperation.6
INDIA’S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Indian analysts and defense managers often describe
India’s strategic environment in terms of the entire
Indian Ocean basin. The westernmost frontier of this
strategic area stretches to the Straight of Hormuz and
the Persian Gulf. Occasionally, Indian analysts claim
the eastern coast of Africa as the westernmost border
of this strategic space. To the east, it encompasses the
Strait of Malacca and abuts the South China Sea. To the
north it is comprised of Central Asia, and to the south,
it extends to Antarctica.
Within this extended strategic neighborhood,
India first and foremost seeks to be recognized as the
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preeminent power within the Indian Ocean basin. New
Delhi already considers itself to be the preeminent
power of South Asia. India also seeks to be—and to
be seen as—a global power in due course.7 New Delhi
believes that it has a natural role in shaping regional
security arrangements to foster stability throughout
the Indian Ocean basin and beyond. India’s Ministry of
Defence Annual Report 2005-2006, for example, notes
the “slow but steady” progress made in achieving
“a truly multipolar world, with India as one of the
poles . . . .”8 India is also willing to be proactive to
prevent developments that are fundamentally inimical
to its interests by relying upon two instruments of
India’s “soft” power: its economic and political sources
of influence.9
Consonant with New Delhi’s expansive set of
interests within the entire Indian Ocean basin, India
has pursued actively a “Look East” policy and has
maintained a very sophisticated greater Middle East
policy that includes Israel, Iran, and several Central
Asian and Arab states. Of particular import for this
discussion is India’s continuous effort to consolidate
its strategic footing in Afghanistan and other parts
of Central Asia, including two airbases in Tajikistan.
Iran is critical to these efforts in many ways, because
it provides India much-needed geographical access
to these theatres.10 In addition, since 2001, India has
secured an unprecedented expansion in ties with the
United States and has advanced its relations with
the European Union and China. Regarding its varied
dealings with countries that have outstanding conflicts
with each other, India has consistently signaled its
intentions to maintain its “strategic independence”
by pursuing bilateral relations consistent with Delhi’s
regional requirements—irrespective of discord that
these states may have with each other.
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In recent years, India has sought to demonstrate
that its security calculus is more inclusive than
Pakistan both to counter the once-prevalent view that
India is shackled to Pakistan and to establish India as
an important power beyond the perimeters of South
Asia. In short, India wants to be a supra-regional
power, and it wants to be seen as one in other capitals.
Central Asia, which includes Afghanistan along with
Iran, comprises an important theater for this power
projection, and only some of India’s interests in Central
Asia are Pakistan-focused. India sees enormous energy
potential in the region. India is currently the world’s
sixth largest energy consumer, with more than half of
its electricity production based upon coal.11 In 2003,
India produced 33 million tons (mt) of crude oil; it
imported 90 mt—or 73 percent of its total requirement
of 123 mt.12 Some analysts believe that by 2020, India
may become the fourth largest consumer, following
only the United States, China, and Japan.13 India hopes
that it can diversify its energy sources and Central
Asia, with 2.7 percent of the world’s confirmed oil
deposits and seven percent of the world’s natural gas
deposits, has long figured imminently in these plans.14
India also sees Central Asia and Iran as enormous
potential consumer markets for Indian products as
well as its human capital and manpower. Militarily
and strategically, Central Asia is an important area for
Indian presence, at least in part to deny Pakistan the
“strategic depth” it craves.
Iran Matters.
India needs Iran to achieve its varied objectives
in Central Asia. Iran, for its part, sees a tremendous
complementarity of interest with India. Both states
seek to undermine unipolarity, and both states are
uncomfortable with the role that the United States has
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played and will likely continue to play in the Middle
East—despite the fact that both states have very
different relations with the United States.
Both Iran and India share concerns about the
domestic security situation in the Central Asian
states, fear a recrudescence of [Sunni] Islamist power
in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and are wary of the
multitude of security threats that Pakistan poses to the
region and beyond. Iran and India are both optimistic
about the commercial benefits of Central Asian markets
and hope to share the spoils of the North-South Transit
Corridor. Iran will require massive infrastructure
investments to extract maximum benefits from this
corridor, and India is lined up to provide cost-effective
intellectual and material assistance in the development
of information technology networks, ports, roads, and
rail projects. Both India and Iran see tremendous value
in military cooperation, even if to date, few large-scale
military interactions have taken place.
Finally, Tehran and Delhi derive benefits from their
relationship domestically and internationally. India
continues to confront communal conflict between its
varied Muslim and Hindu communities. Close ties
with Iran and a diverse array of other Muslim states
(including states with important Muslim minorities)
help diminish some Muslims’ fears at home and abroad
that India has become Islamophobic. These perceptions
have been galvanized by, inter alia, India’s recent
efforts to promote a tripartite relationship with the
United States and Israel to combat Islamist terrorism,
the rise of Hindu nationalism, and the episodic but
sanguineous incidents of anti-Muslim violence (such
as the Gujarat massacres of Muslims in 2003 and the
anti-Muslim riots following the destruction of the Babri
Masjid in late 1992 and early 1993).15 Such ties also help
circumvent Pakistan’s efforts in multilateral fora (such
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as the Organization of Islamic Countries) to raise the
issue of Kashmir.
Iran, for its part, needs a partner like India with
a sophisticated and complex set of international
relations. This is at least in part because of Iran’s
increasing isolation as a result of the 2005 election of
the hardliner president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and
Iran’s unrelenting intransigence on the nuclear issue.
While the U.S. position towards Iran began to harden
in 2002, members of the European Union were at odds
with the United States. This has changed, with members
of the European Union increasingly espousing similar
positions to that of the United States. After months of
negotiations, the UNSC voted unanimously to impose
sanctions in December 2006 for Iran’s refusal to halt
uranium enrichment.
While Indo-Iranian relations were strained by India’s
votes at the IAEA in September 2005 and February
2006, ultimately India’s actions demonstrated Delhi’s
ability to finely balance its need for Tehran with its
interest in securing its ties to the United States and the
international community. At a time when Iran’s regime
has many vociferous detractors, India has remained an
equally vocal defender of both Iran and its relationship
with Iran. Notable in this regard was the February
2007 visit to Iran by India’s Foreign Minister Pranab
Mukherjee, amid heightened U.S.-Iranian discord and
increasing evidence of Iranian involvement in Iraq.16
While many non-Indian observers focused on the
simple fact that India voted “against Iran,” Indian
officials consistently explained its actions at the
IAEA to domestic and Iranian audiences alike that
India went to great lengths to help Iran during the
various IAEA standoffs. Indian officials dilated upon
the fact that India worked assiduously to ensure
that the United States, France, Germany, and Britain
did not “ride roughshod over Iranian interests” and
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lobbied the Europeans to amend their 2005 resolution,
which called for an immediate referral to the UNSC.
Following the February 2006 vote to refer Iran to
the UNSC, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
explained this decision in terms of helping to provide
diplomatic solutions to the impasse and encouraging
all parties to eschew confrontation and inflexibility.17
While it is likely that Indian interlocutors are correct
to suggest that Iran’s situation could have been direr
without Indian intervention, it is unclear that Iran sees
the Indian role in this way. India’s involvement in the
Iran nuclear impasse also afforded it an interesting
opportunity to demonstrate leadership on an issue on
which it has a unique perspective.
INDO-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP
In Structure.
The first institutional mechanisms established to
guide Indo-Iranian relations is the “The Indo-Iran Joint
Commission,” which was established in 1983. This
commission convenes at the foreign ministerial level to
discuss and review progress made on economic issues.
A second major milestone in the institutionalizing of the
relationship was the signing of the Tehran Declaration.
Signed by Iran’s President Khatami and India’s Prime
Minister Vajpayee during the latter’s April 2001 visit
to Tehran, this accord focused heavily upon energy
and commercial concerns, including a commitment to
accelerate the development of a gas pipeline and the
finalizing of an agreement by which Iran would provide
India with liquefied natural gas (LNG). This agreement
also reaffirmed their commitment to develop the NorthSouth Corridor and to encourage their commercial
sectors to utilize this corridor. They also agreed to
promote scientific and technical cooperation.18
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One of the important mechanisms that emerged
from the 2001 meeting was the India-Iran Strategic
Dialogue. The first such meeting was held in October
2001 and was convened by India’s then-foreign
secretary, Chokila Iyer, and by Iran’s deputy foreign
minister for Asia and the Pacific, Mohsen Aminzadeh.
That first meeting focused on three major areas of
mutual concern: first, regional and international
security perspectives; second, the security and defense
policies of India and Iran; and third, issues related
to the international disarmament agenda. This body
subsequently met four times, the last time being in
May 2005. That meeting, convened by Aminzadeh and
Undersecretary of Indian Ministry of External Affairs
Rajiv Sigri, focused heavily on gas pipelines and upon
a bilateral agreement for LNG.19
The most recent and arguably most substantial set
of frameworks guiding Indo-Iranian relations is the
January 2003 New Delhi Declaration, penned during
President Khatami’s visit to New Delhi, along with
seven additional Memoranda of Understanding.20 This
document built and expanded on the 2001 accord. It
focused upon international terrorism and the shared
position that the Iraq situation should be resolved
through the United Nations. Both states expressed an
interest that they should pursue enhanced cooperation
in the areas of science and technology, including:
information technology, food technology, and
pharmaceutical development and production. Some
reports also suggest that space advancements (for
instance, satellite launch) were discussed, although
there is no such mention of them in the actual accord.21
The enduring mainstays of the engagement—
hydrocarbon and water issues—and mutual interests
in exploring education and training opportunities also
figured prominently. Both concurred that there should
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be close cooperation on efforts to reconstruct and
rehabilitate Afghanistan.22
One of the key instruments signed during Khatami’s
2003 visit was the “Road Map to Strategic Cooperation.”
This document follows the New Delhi Declaration
closely and establishes a targeted framework for
fulfilling the objectives set forth by the Declaration.
The key areas mapped out include concrete steps on oil
and gas issues (such as the ever-challenging pipeline
project), the commitment to expand non-hydrocarbon
bilateral trade and other forms of significant economic
cooperation, and the joint effort to further develop the
Chahbahar port complex, the Chahbahar-Fahranj-Bam
railway link, and the Marine Oil Tanking Terminal.
Perhaps the most controversial commitment spelled
out included more robust defense cooperation
between the two.23 The document committed both
sides to exploring political dialogue and modalities of
cooperation on issues of strategic significance through
the mechanisms of the Indo-Iran Strategic Dialogue,
foreign office consultations, and the institutional
interaction of both national security councils.
In Substance.
Energy and Commercial Interests
As reflected in the 2001 Tehran Declaration and the
2003 New Delhi Declaration, India and Iran want to
move ahead on commercial and energy issues. Iran has
the third largest reserve of oil, with proven reserves
of nearly 132 billion barrels.24 Iran also has the second
largest proven reserve of gas with 971 trillion cubic
feet.25 Iran is anxious to get its hydrocarbons out of
the ground and into new markets, and energy-hungry
India wants to be such a market. India is not alone in
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seeking Iran’s oil and gas. China, India’s long-term
strategic peer with exacting energy demands, seeks
Iranian and Central Asia resources, and this need for
energy resources will become yet another theater of
competition for these two Asian giants.
However, progress on the energy relationship has
been slow in developing. Currently, Indian crude oil
imports from Iran range between 100,000 and 150,000
barrels per day (bpd), accounting for about 7.5 percent
of India’s total crude oil imports (around two million
bpd).26 India also seeks to obtain natural gas from Iran
via the much-disputed “pipeline” by transporting gas
from Iran to India via Pakistan. India and Iran also
have ostensibly “finalized” a $22 billion deal whereby
Iran will supply five million tons of LNG to India
each year. The deal was signed by India’s GAIL (Gas
Authority of India Limited) and Iran’s NIGEC (National
Iranian Gas Export Company), a subsidiary of the
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). According to
this agreement, LNG will be supplied over a 25-year
period, commencing from 2009, at a price of U.S. $3.21
per Million British Thermal Units (MMBTU).27
Due to the fact that Iran lacks the capability to produce
LNG, India’s GAIL has committed to help construct
an LNG plant in Iran. However, industry analysts are
doubtful that Iran will obtain such a capability any
time soon. First and foremost, American components
are generally necessary for such plants, and the United
States will not provide Iran such components. To date,
no LNG terminal has ever been built without any
American-made components, and most LNG plants
use processes developed by U.S. companies. Needless
to say, should GAIL proceed with these plans, it could
run afoul of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which
requires sanctions on yearly investments in excess of
$20 million in Iran’s energy sector.28
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India and Iran continue to make progress on their
commitment to build a North-South Corridor with
Russia. Russia, Iran, and India signed this agreement
(called the Inter-Governmental Agreement on
International “North-South Transport Corridor”) in
September 2000 in St. Petersburg. Since this corridor
is a part of an Indo-Iranian initiative to facilitate the
movement of goods across Central Asia as well as
Russia, both India and Iran entered into an earlier
trilateral agreement with Turkmenistan in 1997. This
North-South Corridor permits the transit of goods
from Indian ports to Iran’s port of Bandar Abbas,
or hopefully Chahbahar. Goods transit Iran via rail
to Iran’s Caspian Sea ports of Bandar Anzali and
Bandar Amirabad. They are then transferred to ports
in Russia’s sector in the Caspian. From there, the
route extends along the Volga River via Moscow and
onward to northern Europe. This is intended to serve
as an alternative cargo route, linking Indian products
with Russia through the Baltic ports of St. Petersburg
and Kotka in Rotterdam or through the Ukrainian
Black Sea ports of Illychevsk and Odessa to connect
to the Mediterranean. With a length of only 6,245 km,
it is an enormous improvement over the 16,129 km
route through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean.
Indian officials are very enthusiastic about this route,
because it will reduce the logistics of moving goods
and diminish travel time and transport costs. Trial runs
began in early 2001, with some 1,800 freight containers
moving through it; officials expected those figures to
rise by the end of 2002. According to early reports in
2002, officials expected the corridor to handle 15 to 20
million tons of freight at $10 billion per year.29
As a part of this agreement, India agreed to help
expand the Iranian port of Chahbahar and lay railway
tracks that would connect Chahbahar to the Afghan
city of Zaranj. Iran hopes that expanding Chahbahar
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will relieve some of the congestion of Bandar Abbas.
Part of the concern that emanates from this activity is
the ambiguity about what kind of facility or facilities
will materialize at Chahbahar. Currently, India claims
that this will be a commercial port. However, others
in the region—such as Pakistan and China—fear that
once it is complete, Indian naval vessels will have a
presence there. These apprehensions are important
and may affect the Chinese and Pakistani planning at
Pakistan’s Gwador port. The Gwador port lies along
Pakistan’s Makran coast, only a few hundred kilometers
from Chahbahar. Gwador is being modernized and
expanded with Chinese capital, and it is hoped that this
port will diminish Pakistan’s vulnerability to a naval
blockade of its major port in Karachi. It has added
importance in light of purported Indian and Iranian
activities at Chahbahar.
India has also committed to upgrading the 215kilometer road that links Zaranj and Delaran as part
of a circular road network that will connect Herat and
Kabul via Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and Kandahar in
the south. This would permit Indian goods to move into
Afghanistan via Delaran and beyond. This initiative
to expand trade into Afghanistan is part of a trilateral
agreement that was signed with Afghanistan in January
2003. This agreement permits Afghan exporters to use
Chahbahar with a 90 percent reduction on port fees and
a 50 percent saving on warehousing charges. Afghan
vehicles are also given full transit rights on the Iranian
road system.30
Business delegations have played an important role
in consolidating business ties between the two countries.
Khatami’s 2003 delegation to New Delhi included a
65-member business group, and they weighed some
$800 million in joint ventures that would involve 400
Indian and Iranian companies. India’s Ministry of
External Affairs contends that Indian investment was
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sought in Iran’s automobile, information technology
(IT), and textile sectors, and it was agreed that India
could provide Iran with commodities such as sugar,
rice, pharmaceuticals, food oils, and engineering
goods. Both sides made a concerted effort to push
non-oil trade. One of the means by which this is going
forward is the Joint Business Council set up by the
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the
Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, and Mines.31
Overall, the trade picture appears to be positive: The
total value of all trade for the fiscal year ending March
2005 was $1.6 billion, compared to $1.18 for 2003-2004
and $913 million in 2002-2003. While this represents a
growth trajectory, the total trade between the United
States and India in 2005 was about $27 billion.32
Defense and Intelligence Ties?
While these two states have been talking about
“strategic relations” for some time with few concrete
results, the last few years have witnessed ostensibly
substantive advances. India and Iran also established a
joint working group on counterterrorism and counternarcotics, reflecting their mutual security concerns in
these functional areas. Moreover, as noted, they have
instituted a strategic dialogue that has met four times
between October 2001 and early 2007. This dialogue
is the forum designed to explore opportunities for
cooperation in defense in agreed areas, including training and exchange visits consonant with the commitments articulated in the 2003 New Delhi Declaration.
Some analysts claimed that the agreement would boost
Indian armament exports to Iran, a view that is shared
by Iranian analysts as well.33 Notwithstanding those
assertions, such exports have not occurred, and they
are not likely in the near future.
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According to some analysts, Iran hopes that
India will provide expertise in electronics and
telecommunications as well as upgrades for many of its
legacy Russian weapons systems.34 While little in this
regard has materialized, there have been various and
consistent reports of specific military deals between
India and Iran. In 2001, Indian Defense Secretary
Yogendra Narain met with his Iranian counterpart Ali
Shamkani to explore arm sales to Iran.
According to the Indian press, India has trained Iranian naval engineers in Mumbai and at Visakhapatnam. Reportedly, Iran is also seeking combat training
for missile boat crews and hopes to purchase simulators for ships and subs from India. Iran also anticipates
that India can provide midlife service and upgrades
for its MiG-29 fighters and retrofit its warships and
subs in Indian dockyards. India helped Iran develop
batteries for its submarines, which are more suitable for
the warm-weather gulf waters than those supplied by
the Russian manufacturer. Some analysts claimed that
Iran wanted Indian technicians to refit and maintain
Iran’s T-27 tanks as well as its BMP infantry fighting
vehicles and the towed 105 mm and 130 mm artillery
guns. India is also planning to sell Iran the Konkurs antitank missile.35 There were several reports of a bilateral
accord that would permit India to access Iranian military
bases in the event of war with Pakistan. This accord
allegedly would also permit India to rapidly deploy
troops and surveillance platforms as well as military
equipment in Iran during times of crisis with Pakistan.
If true, this is a turning point in regional relations and
one that will, in principal, put Iran in opposition to
Pakistan. These same reports claim that Indian and
Iranian troops will conduct combat training, and naval
forces will conduct “operational and combat training
on warships and missile boats.”36
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There has been some activity in the naval sphere; the
two navies carried out their first joint naval maneuvers
in the Arabian Sea in March 2003. This exercise was
likely motivated at one level by the mutual concern
about the security of sea-lanes of control and at another
level by their discomfort with the increasing presence
of the United States in the Persian Gulf in preparation
for the invasion of Iraq. This 2003 naval exercise was
notable because it both coincided with the mounting
U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and Arabian
Sea, and because among the burgeoning U.S.-Indian
defense ties, the U.S.-Indian naval relationship has
been the most dramatic in its depth and breadth.37
India and Iran conducted their second naval exercise
on March 3-8, 2006, overlapping with President Bush’s
trip to Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. There has
been considerable acrimony over the precise nature of
this engagement. According to a March 27, 2006 article
published in Defense News, this naval engagement
took place in Kochi and involved the IRIS Bandar
Abbas (a fleet-supply-turned training vessel) and the
IRIS Lavan, an amphibious ship. A spokesman for
the Indian Navy’s Southern Command reportedly
explained that Indian naval instructors briefed nearly
220 sailors. The exercise, coming at a time when
Congress was being asked to consider a civilian
nuclear deal with India, antagonized critics of the deal.
Indian and U.S. government officials have been busy,
first denying the visit took place and next dismissing
the characterization of the visit as exaggerated. Both
U.S. and Indian officials deny that any “training” took
place and that this was a standard port call.38
To focus merely on the substance (or lack thereof) of
that particular exercise is to miss the larger picture of
Indo-Iranian naval ties as described by Indian analysts.
Recently, a senior fellow with India’s Observer Research
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Foundation described Indo-Iranian maritime relations
in the following way:
India and Iran have enjoyed good maritime
relations that include high-level political and
military visits, joint-naval exercises, naval technology cooperation, and maritime infrastructure
developments symbolized by port development
in Chahbahar. Naval cooperation between the
two sides dates back to the mid-1990s when the
Indian Navy helped the Iranian Navy to adapt
four Russian-built Kilo-class submarines for
warm water conditions in the Persian Gulf.39

Another important aspect of that naval visit was its
timing and symbolism. As noted, it was concurrent
with President Bush’s visit to South Asia, during
which President Bush agreed to deliver to India a pathbreaking civilian nuclear deal that required legislative
action by Congress and concomitant review of the deal
and its implications. Indian officials correctly noted
that the naval exercise was months in the planning.
While this is surely true, it is equally true that the
Bush visit was also months in the planning. The naval
exercise—particularly one as unimportant as officials
indicate—could have been postponed. Given the
symbolic importance of such an exercise, the conduct
of the exercise signaled to Tehran that India’s foreign
policies would not be dictated by Washington.40
Numerous analysts of South Asia infer that there are
close security ties between Delhi and Tehran because
of the Indian consulate in Zahedan with a likely
intelligence presence there. India also established a
consulate in Iran’s port city of Bandar Abbas in 2001,
which will permit India to monitor ship movements
in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.41 From a
regional security point of view, the volume of defense
trade, measured in dollars, may be less relevant than
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the kind of activities that appear to be ongoing, many of
which may be more qualitative in nature. The presence
of Indian engineers at Chahbahar and of Indian military
advisors and intelligence officials in Iran confers
to India a significant access to Iran. This access has
tremendous import for India’s ability to project power
vis-à-vis Pakistan and Central Asia. It clearly provides
India an enhanced ability to monitor Pakistan and even
launch sub-conventional operations against Pakistan
from Iran. Of late, numerous Pakistani officials opine
that India is supporting the insurgency in Pakistan’s
troubled Baluchistan province and is exploiting its
position in Afghanistan to enhance its intelligence
activities against Pakistan. Pakistani observers also
note that the presence of Indian engineers (and
perhaps naval personnel in the future) at Chahbahar
has particular utility for monitoring what is happening
at Pakistan’s Gwador port.
Technical Areas of Cooperation
It is clear that India has cooperated with Iran on
civilian nuclear programs in the past. India sought
to sell Iran a ten-megawatt research reactor to be
installed at Moallem Kalyaeh in 1991, and may have
also considered selling Iran a 220-megawatt nuclear
power reactor. While both were to be placed under
IAEA safeguards, the United States pressured India
not to go through with the sales, fearing that Iran
would use these facilities to make weapons-grade
fissile materials.42
The issue of nuclear cooperation again emerged
in October 2004, during a discussion between then
President Khatami and India’s late national security
advisor, J.N. Dixit, in Tehran. Topics of discussion
included regional security as well as economic and
energy cooperation. Iran reiterated its commitment to
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cooperate with the IAEA and the Indian side confirmed,
“New Delhi would always support Tehran’s peaceful
use of nuclear technology.”43 Controversy arose over
reports of two Indian nuclear scientists, Y.S.R. Prasad
and C. Surendar, who took assignments to provide
technical assistance to Iran’s nuclear program. Both
served as chairman and as managing director of the
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL).
The United States imposed sanctions upon them in
September of 2004 under Sections 2 and 3 of the Iran
Proliferation Act (INA) of 2000. India objected to such
sanctions and countered that Surendar had never
visited Iran while in service or after his retirement, and
Prasad’s visits and consultancy services were provided
under the aegis of the IAEA. Ultimately, sanctions
remained against Prasad, while those against Surendar
were dropped.44
Reports of Indo-Iranian space cooperation also
galvanized small pockets of opposition to the “other
Indo-U.S. deal” on space cooperation, presumably
out of concern that U.S. technologies could find their
way into the hands of Iranian scientists. Such critics
note that Iran is interested in expanding its nascent
space and satellite program, and this will require
a variety of dual-use items that could assist Iran’s
missile development program and improve satellite
capabilities.45 Late in February 2003, the Times of India
reported “India and Iran have an ongoing co-operation
in space research,” and quoted remarks of the managing
director of Iran’s ComKar System Communications,
who claimed that his organization “already cooperates
with ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization).”
Unfortunately, little information is available about the
nature of the cooperation or even if the cooperation
really was “space cooperation” rather than more
mundane communications-related projects.46
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON CONSTRAINTS
AND IMPLICATIONS
Constraints.
While Iran is important to India, there are constraints
that restrict India’s reach into Iran—even if they are
fewer than in the recent past. Until circa 2004, both the
United States and Israel counseled India to minimize
defense, energy, and strategic relations with Iran.47 However, by 2005, officials from the Bush Administration
expressed confidence that the relationship does not adversely affect major U.S. interests.48 Whether this
attitude will persist within the newly elected and
Democrat-led U.S. Congress remains to be seen. Many
in Congress will be watching India closely as the
confrontation with Iran continues to intensify.49
As for Israel, Ariel Sharon expressed apprehension
about India’s ties with Iran during his 2003 visit to
India, even though he eventually said he was satisfied
with India’s explanation of its relations with Iran.
However, Israel again raised the issue during the
Indo-Israeli Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism
in November 2004.50 Whether or not Israel currently
shares the U.S. insouciance is difficult to assess, but
Israel’s concerns will remain salient for New Delhi,
because Israel is India’s largest arms supplier. Defense
cooperation between India and Israel has expanded
since official normalizations of relations in 1992 and
includes sales of large weapons systems and extensive
military training.51
Both India and Israel have considerable expertise
in providing maintenance and upgrades for legacy
Russian weapons platforms. As such there is an
explicit symmetry between the kinds of defenserelated services that Israel has furnished to India and
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the kinds of services that India seeks to provide to Iran
and other Central Asian states. Israel has helped India
with avionics upgrades with its MiGs, and in turn,
India hopes to provide similar services to countries
throughout the region. Thus Israel has good cause for
unease, and India is not insensitive to this discomfiture.
Consequently, Israeli equities will remain a part of
New Delhi’s decision calculus vis-à-vis Iran for the
policy-relevant future and will serve as an important
impediment to India’s efforts to engage Iran.
As the Iran standoff continues and as the global
consensus coalesces around sanctioning Iran, India’s
cooperation in maintaining that isolation will become
increasingly important. Some of India’s planned
investment to help Iran acquire an LNG capability will
likely run afoul of U.S. law and will undermine U.S.led efforts to constrain and even punish Iran. While no
one doubts that India prefers an Iran without nuclear
weapons, India has signaled little intention to sacrifice
all that hinges upon Iran. Now that India has secured a
civilian nuclear deal with the United States, it remains
to be seen whether Delhi will contribute to these
important efforts. Some lawmakers such as the new
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Tom Lantos, have already expressed such doubts in
the wake of Mukherjee’s 2007 visit to Tehran.52
Despite the Bush Administration’s explicit
forbearance on the Iran factor, Indian strategists
and policymakers ultimately understand that U.S.
patronage is likely necessary for it to achieve all that it
aspires. In the past, India reasonably had few hopes to
believe that the United States could or would support
India’s bid for great power aspirations and instead saw
the United States as niggardly seeking to restrain India
from assuming its rightful global role. Under such
perceived conditions, it behooved India to hope for the
best with respect to the United States while diversifying
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its options and cultivating ties with other important
countries. India now has much greater expectations
from its relationship with the United States and will
tread carefully to preserve it.
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CHAPTER 10
WILL INDIA BE A BETTER STRATEGIC
PARTNER THAN CHINA?
Dan Blumenthal
The Joint Declaration signed on July 18, 2005, by
President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh has been heralded in some quarters
as the equivalent of President Richard Nixon’s opening
to China. America agreed to recognize India as a
“responsible state with advanced nuclear technology”
and pledged to support its civilian nuclear program
and urge others to do the same. This agreement caught
observers in the strategic community and Congress
by surprise. Even supporters of closer relations with
India had a difficult time understanding why the
United States made a seemingly large concession on
nonproliferation rules in exchange for a vague exchange
of Indian support to help the United States combat
HIV/AIDS, support those countries that seek a “U.S.India Global Democracy Initiative,” and otherwise
support India’s economic development in a number of
areas—there simply seemed to be too little Indian quid
for the American quo.
The opening to China under President Nixon and
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger provides
some illumination on the current attempts to negotiate
a “strategic partnership” with India. In both cases,
expectations ran high as to what the two countries might
accomplish in a new partnership. Both “openings”
also were informed by an underlying strategic logic.
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In the case of China, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to
accomplish a strategic triangulation—an improvement
of relations with both the Soviets and the Chinese at a
time when the two were at the height of hostility. In so
doing, the American government would create more
options for itself in its great power game with Moscow.
In addition, Nixon and Kissinger strongly believed that
China could help ease America’s exit from the Vietnam
War, and even enlisted Beijing’s help in brokering a
political deal in Vietnam.
But the relationship did not turn out as planned
by its creators. China is prospering and no longer a
Maoist state that is a declared enemy of the United
States. However, American policymakers increasingly
are concerned that a rich, strong, yet still authoritarian
China increasingly will pose security challenges to
Washington. Indeed, though it always uses diplomatic
and coded language, Washington now views China
as a long-term strategic competitor. The U.S. National
Security Strategy talks of “hedging” against China,
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review names China as
the only country that competes militarily with the
United States and points at ways that Washington will
try to maintain its strategic supremacy.1 America’s
China policy since the end of the Cold War has been
to help Beijing become richer and stronger, hoping
that it would become democratic, and its rise would
be peaceful. Washington premised its economic and
technology policy on this belief. Now, uncertain about
China’s strategic intentions, America fears it may have
helped create a strategic competitor.
Today, as Washington changes its India policy,
it finds itself confronting a host of geopolitical
challenges. On the one hand, it is engaged in a long
global counterinsurgency against radical Islamic
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terrorists. On the other, a rising China will pose a longterm challenge so long as it defines its core interests
as incompatible with those of America. In both cases,
America must enlist allies to secure its interests and
sustain the U.S.-led world order that has been the basis
of global economic development and relative peace for
over 60 years. And in both cases, American strategists
believe that the ultimate solution lies in the eventual
democratization of the regions and countries that pose
these overriding threats.
India may prove a partner in confronting both of
these challenges. First, as a liberal democratic country,
Delhi accepts the notion that the more democracy
spreads, the safer Indians will be. Second, India has been
one of the foremost targets of jihadi terrorist attacks
and shares an interest with Washington in bringing
them to an end. Third, China has been a historic rival to
India, and China’s growing power is viewed in Delhi
with much apprehension. India shares an interest with
Washington in maintaining a balance of power in Asia
that ensures that China will not predominate.
However, India is a rising power with its own
aspirations. Though it likely will not challenge U.S.
hegemony in Asia in the short term, neither will it
necessarily accept a hegemonic America in perpetuity.
The fact that India is a liberal democracy will help the
two countries develop necessary accommodations
with less suspicion and tension than characterize
the Sino-American relationship. But India’s path to
power will be a long and bumpy one as it works out
its place in the region and the world. The legacy of a
“nonaligned” foreign policy and fiercely independent
strategic culture will make the prospects for strategic
partnership more difficult.
India’s desire to maintain good relations with
problematic countries along its periphery, including
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Iran, should worry American policymakers. Though
the Indo-American relationship has more potential
than the Sino-American one, Beijing and Washington
had an agreed-upon threat to focus their efforts. In
contrast, Washington’s biggest threat today is jihadi
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD); Iran plays a big part in both. But
India does not view Tehran as a threat. In addition,
Delhi sees much of its strategic environment through
the lense of its tension with Pakistan, while Islamabad
is a necessary American partner in the war on terror.
India will continue to modulate its nuclear policy in
accordance with its competition with Pakistan and
Pakistan’s primary nuclear backer in Beijing. This, too,
is cause for caution, as the nuclear equation in Asia is
changing fast and is difficult to control.
The most persuasive argument for a new kind
of relationship with India is not that today the two
countries can cooperate as full partners the way
Washington does with Australia, the United Kingdom,
and increasingly with Japan. Rather, it is that India’s
power is rising, and that rise will change the geopolitical
landscape profoundly. Because of India’s potential to
play a productive role internationally, America has a
strong interest in assisting and influencing that rise.
It is with this strategic logic in mind that this
chapter turns to the comparison between America’s
two big “openings” and tries to distill lessons for
how to proceed with India in a fashion that will not
end up harming Washington’s interests. This chapter
assumes that the way countries enter into negotiations
governs long-term relations—expectations can be
made too high or too low; governments can oversell to
their publics; and decisions made on seemingly trivial
matters can take on lives of their own as bureaucratic
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constituencies form to perpetuate narrow polices that
conflict with larger, evolving goals. This chapter finds
that America risks misperceiving Delhi’s long-term
intentions, and has not sufficiently hedged against
a series of risks in its new relationship with Delhi,
namely, India’s ongoing partnership with Iran and its
approach to strategic weaponry.
U.S. AND CHINA: LESSONS LEARNED?
1972: The Opening.
Before his historic trip to China, President Nixon
jotted down notes that would guide his negotiation
posture. In one category, he listed what America
wants: “1. Indochina? 2. Communists—to restrain
Chicom . . . expansion in Asia; and 3. In Future-–reduce
threats of confrontation with Chinese superpower.”
He then listed China’s goals: “1. Build up their world
credentials; 2. Taiwan; and 3. Get the United States out
of Asia.” A third list contained “What we both want: 1)
Reduce danger of confrontation; 2) A more stable Asia;
3) A restraint on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR).”2
Nixon and Kissinger believed that America had
much to gain from working toward a normalization
of relations with China and hoped that an American
thaw in relations with both the Soviets and the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) would allow Washington
to play one off the other and improve its strategic
position relative to both. Nixon and Kissinger’s
original formulation was an equal and simultaneous
thaw—only later did the relationship with China take
on an overt anti-Soviet cast. The United States was in
an intense strategic competition with both the Soviets
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and the Chinese at the same time, and many strategists
viewed China as the more intense rival.3
Nixon also thought that improving relations
with the Chinese could defuse the Sino-American
rivalry, particularly with respect to Chinese support
of Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. And
Nixon and Kissinger thought Washington could
secure Beijing’s assistance in brokering a peace deal in
Vietnam and thus allow the United States to exit the
war “with honor.”
It was clear to both men that the price for a diplomatic
breakthrough would be major concessions on Taiwan,
with which America had a treaty alliance and a longstanding partnership. Besides retaking Taiwan, Beijing
also wanted to enhance its international status, and by
1978, as President Jimmy Carter and National Security
Advisor Zbignew Brzezinski negotiated the terms of
normalization, to grow its economy, modernize, and
become a great power.
Nixon and Kissinger pursued the China opening
against the backdrop of domestic political competition.
Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy, the politician
most feared by Nixon as a presidential contender, called
for recognition of China at the United Nations (UN)
and the drawdown of U.S. troops from Taiwan. Beijing
played American politics skillfully, advantaging their
diplomatic jockeying by sounding out Kennedy as well
as other presidential contenders such as Ed Muskie
and George McGovern about traveling to China.4
Kissinger went to China in 1972 in a climate of
domestic political pressure, and highly desirous of a
diplomatic coup. He thus prepared to makes concessions
on Taiwan beyond what had been planned originally.
At the outset of discussions, he told Premier Zhou Enlai
that America would not support: 1. two Chinas, one
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Taiwan and one China; or 2. an independent Taiwan.
Pocketing those concessions, Zhou indicated that the
talks could proceed.5
Kissinger made another rather extraordinary
concession: He told Zhou Enlai that the United
States would tell China about any Soviet-American
understanding that would affect Chinese interests,
and share sensitive intelligence on Soviet troop
deployments.6 Beijing obviously was receptive, as
Soviet troops had amassed on China’s borders, the two
had engaged in intense border clashes throughout the
late 1960s, and the Soviets were threatening to destroy
China’s nuclear facilities.
During Nixon’s follow-up trip, he reiterated
Kissinger’s assurances on Taiwan, confirmed
Kissinger’s assurances on the Soviet Union, promised
to help restrain Japan’s influence over Taiwan, and
agreed to collaborate with China on India—a signal
that the United States and China thereafter would be
two poles in the Asian power structure. Moreover, the
President and his National Security Advisor established
a pattern of relations with China that their successors
would continue: Nixon and Kissinger made more
concessions than they had intended during meetings
with Chinese leaders and conducted much of their
work in secrecy, fearful that a skeptical public would
not support the private concessions that they were
making. And, as the talks progressed, the Americans
felt the need to provide the Chinese with carrots—
mostly in the form of important technology—to ensure
that the “the process would not be derailed.”7
While the opening to China was governed by a power strategic logic—especially more maneuverability for
the United States in its relations with the Soviets and
an end to a “two front” Cold War—the bureaucratic
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and political pressures felt by the chief American
protagonists resulted in less than optimal outcomes. The
United States gave much more on Taiwan than they had
wanted or arguably needed, changing from a promise
of a drawdown of troops to a private acceptance of
the Chinese position. And the Chinese, who had more
to fear immediately from the Soviets than the United
States, received a powerful assist against that threat.
The power gap between the two was tremendous—
China was still an impoverished country with a gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita of $129 and the
bulk of its citizens living in poverty.8 The United States
was one of two superpowers with a GDP per capita
of $19,371. The reality of this power differential meant
that the United States would carry China along, and
Washington had to exaggerate China’s importance to
sell the relationship as a partnership.
1979: The Normalization.
Under President Carter and Brzezinski, the new
China policy took a more overtly anti-Soviet cast.
Brzezinski arranged for the Chinese to purchase
advanced weaponry from Western Europe and for
detailed policy and intelligence briefings for the
Chinese on Soviet capabilities and intentions by defense
officials. Carter allowed his Department of Defense
(DoD) to lay the groundwork for direct military sales
and the easing of export controls on “dual use” items
that would benefit the Chinese military.
During his May 1978 trip to China, Carter also
accepted China’s terms on Taiwan to set normalization
talks in motion. There would be no official U.S.
Government presence on the island. This was a far cry
from Nixon’s earlier formulation that the United States
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simply would drawdown its forces on the island.9
At Beijing’s urging, Brzezinski also secured Carter’s
agreement to hold off on normalizing relations with
Vietnam and to announce the normalization before the
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) with the
Soviets, much to the consternation of Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance. Vietnam promptly signed a treaty with
the Soviets, and diplomatic normalization with the
United States would have to wait some 17 years.
This was a significant victory for Beijing, given that
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was planning on
striking Vietnam to “teach them a lesson” for Hanoi’s
expulsion of ethnic Chinese and Hanoi’s attack against
the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.
President Carter signaled that he would not disapprove
of such an attack by China. Brzezinski went a step
further—meeting nightly with Chinese Ambassador
Chai Zemin and turning over valuable intelligence
information.10
Beijing gained much from the process of
normalization: concessions on Taiwan, a de facto green
light to strike at historic rival Vietnam, and an upstaging of the Soviet Union before the arms limitations
talks. America also opened the floodgates on technology
transfers to the impoverished, technologically
backward Chinese military-industrial complex. Carter
offered Most Favored Nation trade status to China,
but not to the Soviets. This was a departure from the
Nixon-Kissinger idea that both Russia and China
would receive trade benefits, the former as part of a
broader détente policy. Moreover, though President
Carter made human rights a centerpiece of his foreign
policy, he pointedly neglected to include China in his
criticism of how despotic regimes treat their people.
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The Reagan Era: Haig and His Critics.
The Ronald Reagan administration continued
along the path set forth by its predecessors. Secretary
of State Alexander Haig, who had been a key Kissinger
deputy during the 1972 opening, particularly was
enthusiastic about advancing what he saw as a strategic
partnership between the two countries. He pushed for
direct military sales to China and an end to arms sales
with Taiwan, winning administration approval for the
former. The Reagan administration loosened hightechnology restrictions to allow U.S companies to treat
China the same for export purposes as friendly but not
allied countries in Africa, Europe, and Asia. By 1985,
“dual use” licensed exports to China were valued at $5
billion. High level military exchanges also picked up
as in 1985 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
John Vessey became the highest ranking military officer
to set foot in Mainland China since 1949.
President Reagan also authorized direct Foreign
Military Sales to China which eased the way for direct
commercial transactions. China bought S-70C helicopters, artillery locating radar, torpedoes and, most
notably entered into an agreement with the Americans
to upgrade its F-8 fighter jet, known as the Peace Pearl
program. The Reagan administration also negotiated a
civilian nuclear cooperation agreement and authorized
the sale and transfer of U.S.-designed satellites for
launch on Chinese rockets which indirectly bolstered
China’s missile and military nuclear propulsion
programs. In both the military and commercial arenas,
Beijing was like a starving kid finally at his first meal,
purchasing the most sophisticated technology that
it could get its hands on. A modulated diplomatic
relationship had morphed into a strategic and military
partnership.
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There were some dissenters concerning the
“strategic partnership” approach to China both in and
out of government. Strategists like Edward Luttwak,
China specialists such as Doak Barnett, and Defense
technocrats such as William Perry all sounded a note
of caution. Luttwak asked: “Is it our true purpose to
promote the rise of the People’s Republic to Superpower
status? Should we become the artificers of a great
power which our grandchildren may have to contend
with?”11
The Reagan adminstration had some powerful
dissenters as well in Secretary of State George Shultz
and his Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
Affairs Paul Wolfowitz. Shultz agreed with Wolfowitz’s
assessment that China’s importance had been
exaggerated to the detriment of U.S. strategy. China,
he wrote, thus far constantly had created obstacles—
Taiwan, technology transfer—which America had to
overcome just to maintain a good relationship.12 Shultz
rebalanced America’s Asia policy, emphasizing Japan
as the key to the U.S. position.
The Bush-Clinton Years: From Accommodation
to Accommodation.
While the Chinese may have contributed to the
downfall of the Soviet Union,13 once the common
enemy was gone, the relationship lost its raison d’etre.
Problems that had been plastered over emerged with
a vengeance. Americans were concerned by Chinese
transfer of missile and WMD technologies to Iran and
missiles to Saudi Arabia. Americans were outraged by
Chinese crackdown on several democracy movements
in the 1980s, culminating in the 1989 massacre of
students at Tiananmen square, and by the suppression
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of Tibetan moves for autonomy. And military and
intelligence officials began to notice that the PLA was
buying advanced weaponry from the former Soviet
Union.
The George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton
administrations tried to find new justifications for the
relationship. President Bush moved quickly to buck up
the reeling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was
isolated internationally after Tiananmen.14 President
Clinton settled on “comprehensive engagement”—
arguing that the policy inevitably would lead to a
democratic and less threatening China. The policy led
to looser restrictions on high-technology sales that
ended up in the hands of the PLA.
By the mid-1990s, despite alleged violations by
Hughes and Loral of laws prohibiting assistance to
the Chinese on satellite launch technology, President
Clinton approved sales of even more advanced satellites
than the Reagan administration had authorized. Once
the door to technology transfer had been opened,
powerful constituencies in the United States refused
to let it shut.15 As a consequence, the U.S. military
may have to one day face a Chinese military that,
in part, is armed with U.S. technology. The former
Martin Marietta Company, for example, provided
data that helped the Chinese improve upon its DF-21
intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM).16
Lessons Learned?
The history of America’s opening to and
normalization with China is instructive as America
embarks upon a similar process with India. Nixon
and Kissinger began with some concrete ideas about
why such a move was necessary. As administrations
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changed, those ideas morphed into a very different
position. The benefits to China were clear, it was
relieved of severe pressure from its clashes with the
Soviets, secured agreement to derecognize and begin to
isolate Taiwan, received a green light to attack Vietnam,
and perhaps most importantly, entered into a trading
relationship with America on favorable terms and got
its hands on critical high technology. Together with
Deng Xiaoping’s own reforms, the trade relationship
and high-technology transfers have helped turn China
into an economic powerhouse today. And, as William
Perry had predicted, “it had no particular reason to be
friendly to the United States.”17
Nixon had written an article in Foreign Affairs
journal before he became President that argued that
America had a broad interest in bringing China into
the “family of nations.” There is no doubt that, in part
because of America’s opening, the Chinese people are
better off. Economic integration with the West played
a pivotal role in China’s escape from being a Maoist
revolutionary society. However, China is today the
only country in the world that can compete militarily
with the United States.18 It is one thing to assist China
out of poverty and isolation, quite another to transfer
technologies and engage in military cooperation that
enabled China’s rise as a military power.
The fervor with which the opening was pursued
exaggerated China’s importance at the time, thereby
paving the way for an anti-Soviet military and
intelligence partnership, the downsides of which we
are facing today. In addition, expectations were raised
so high that whenever China did not “deliver,” the
relationship could go into a tailspin.
Perhaps of most significance, Kissinger and Nixon’s
willingness to accept the Chinese position on Taiwan
privately eliminated options that may have paved
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the way for a more enduring resolution between the
two countries. Ignoring that there existed a majority
Taiwanese population who did not believe they were
citizens of China has caused grave complications
today. Indeed, the deliberate ambiguity and chasm
between private and public assurances to the Chinese
have complicated the issue seriously. The insinuation
to Beijing that we would or could deliver on those
assurances always was false. Today the potential for
war over Taiwan is no less than it was in 1972.
As a counterfactual, what would have happened
if the United States had focused the relationship
on economic and political reform instead? What if
America had resisted Chinese attempts to define the
relationship as, in Shultz’s words, a series of obstacles
that the United States must remove in order to
maintain a good relationship for its own sake? What
if America had slowed the normalization process
down and pocketed a normalization with Vietnam
in the late 1970s? What if the United States had taken
heed of the growing Taiwanization of the island early
on, before China raised the stakes? What if, when the
CCP was reeling in 1989, President Bush had pressed
for real political reform? We well may have seen a
different China and a relationship characterized by
less suspicion and mistrust. The way the PRC and the
United States did business from the beginning seemed
to preclude Washington from exercising more creative
options when the opportunity arose.
WILL INDIA BE A BETTER PARTNER THAN
CHINA?
The foregoing is meant to provide a framework of
analysis as Washington and Delhi forge a “strategic
partnership.” India of 2006 is far from China of 1972.
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India is a successful multi-ethnic democracy, respectful
of the rights of citizens. Its economic growth since the
early 1990s has been impressive, and when it chooses
to, it plays a productive role on the international stage.
The potential for U.S.-Indian strategic competition is
limited.
But the relationship is being billed as a new
“strategic partnership,” and expectations on both sides
are running high. The United States paid a relatively
high cost up front for this partnership—changing
its nonproliferation policy to recognize India as a
nuclear weapons state despite its rejection of the Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Though some downplay
the importance of U.S. concessions, they are costly
nonetheless. The diplomacy entailed in getting China
and Russia to stop proliferating to their own special
friends—Pakistan and Iran—will be more complicated
with a new non-NPT nuclear weapons state. And, on
balance, India will emerge from the deal with more
nuclear material that can be weaponized than it would
have otherwise.19 The nuclear deal may be the best
solution to a vexing problem of squaring the IndoAmerican diplomatic circle, but Washington must
acknowledge the risks: India will have more nuclear
bomb making capacity to compete not only with China,
but with Pakistan as well; and the nonproliferation
regime has been damaged.
In order to evaluate whether the deal is worth
the price, a number of questions must be addressed:
What does the United States want out of the new
partnership? What has India committed to giving thus
far? What does India want? What has the United States
committed to giving?
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What the United States Wants.
The administration has articulated several rationales
for the opening to India. Robert Blackwill, President
Bush’s first ambassador to India and a key architect of
the new relationship, has laid out some hard headed
rationales:
Think first of the vital interests of the United States:
prosecuting the global war on terror and reducing the
staying power and effectiveness of the jihadi killers;
preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction,
including to terrorist groups; dealing with the rise of
Chinese power; ensuring the reliable supply of energy
from the Persian Gulf; and keeping the global economy
on track.20

India, he argues, shares those vital interests. Official
statements and speeches such as the Joint Statement
between President Bush and Prime Minister Singh are
less clear on what the two sides want to accomplish.
In the Joint Statement, the two leaders commit to
promote and strengthen democracy worldwide, and
combat terrorism relentlessly. The countries also
commit to a “Next Step in Strategic Partnership”
initiative which provides a framework for economic
cooperation; the joint promotion of democracy,
energy, and environmental cooperation; continued
defense cooperation; and high-technology and space
cooperation.21
In each of these areas, the United States commits to
providing support and assistance to India, including the
modernization of India’s infrastructure, agriculturaltechnical assistance, the provision of civilian nuclear
energy to India, and removing Indian companies from
the Department of Commerce’s Entity’s list in order to
advance space and high technology cooperation.
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In speeches by President Bush and Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, the theme of helping India become
a great power is consistent. In the administration’s
view, India, like America, is a multiracial, pluralistic
democracy with a growing economy, so its prominence
on the world stage would be a net- positive. Though
the President speaks of cooperation on global matters
such as HIV/AIDS, proliferation, and a commitment to
democracy, his administration’s rhetoric focuses most
intently on helping pull India up: India will be allowed
more cooperation in space activities, access to civilian
nuclear energy, high technology in agricultural and
other matters, purchase or coproduction of advanced
fighter jets, and it will be prodded to further liberalize
its economy.
In short, the relationship is not a balanced
diplomatic transaction as much as it is Washington’s
attempt to accommodate a rising and benign power.
State Department Counselor Philip Zelikow has gone
as far as to equate the opening with India to America’s
commitment to Western Europe and East Asia at the
Cold War’s onset. Washington would stake its claim
to the areas bracketing the Eurasian landmass, and
devote its strategic energy to securing and developing
those parts of the world. In Zelikow’s mind, America’s
new relationship with India reflects an American
recognition that Central and South Asia today and
in the future are as important as were Europe and
East Asia in the Cold War.22 This may be a rhetorical
overreach—besides Afghanistan, the administration
is not committing resources consistent with a new
approach to the Eurasian landmass.
There are risks entailed in the administration’s
oversell approach. Congress and the public will want
to see near-term results, but the policy, in fact, is
not a diplomatic transaction, rather it is a long-term
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investment. The truth is that long-term improvement
of relations with India is guided by a powerful
strategic logic. India’s economy has been growing at
impressive rates over the past decade, and Delhi is
trying to shed its legacy of nonalignment in order to
play an active and responsible role on the international
stage. India shares with the Unites States an intense
sense of threat from jihadi terrorists, and is wary of
a rising China’s strategic intentions. Indeed, Indians
argue that their own nuclear weapons programs was
a response to China’s support of Pakistan’s WMD
programs. Moreover, unlike China, India is pulling its
people out of poverty within a pluralistic democratic
system. As noted Indian analyst Raja Mohan has said,
if this experiment works, it will be of great benefit to
the entire democratic world.
The United States thus has a fundamental interest
in assisting India’s rise as a prosperous democracy
that contributes to international security. More
immediately, the United States would like to see India
play the role of counterweight on China’s western
flank (with Japan doing the same in the east), although
Washington complicates matters by not making this an
explicit goal. And the United States seeks partners in
its efforts to deny the Iranian regime nuclear weapons,
to stem the tide of WMD proliferation, to keep the sealanes astride South and Southeast Asia safe, and to
garner support for its democracy promotion agenda,
particularly in the Muslim world. Finally, the United
States wants Delhi’s understanding of its need to
maintain good relations with India’s rival Pakistan.
What India Wants.
Indian economic growth since its 1991 reforms, its
battle hardened and modernizing military, and its new
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pragmatic diplomatic stance have put it on the path to
becoming a great power. Fundamentally, it wishes to
be recognized as a great power today, at least on a par
with China. India’s nuclear testing in 1974 and 1998 and
its succeeding “nuclear recognition” diplomacy were
in service of achieving that goal. There in no question
that Delhi equates great power status with recognition
as a nuclear weapons state. The next diplomatic step,
Delhi believes, would be a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council.
Besides the grand objective of becoming a great
power, India’s immediate security concerns are jihadi
terrorism (much of it Pakistan-supported), settlement
of the Jammu and Kashmir issue on terms favorable
to Delhi, maintaining hegemony in its immediate
neighborhood, diversification of it energy supply and
improved energy security as its energy demands grow,
checking a China that Delhi believes is encroaching on
its sphere of influence, and maintaining good relations
with Iran both to ensure oil and gas supply and to stave
off potential troublemaking by Tehran. With these
strategic priorities in mind, from Delhi’s perspective
the deal is a major triumph and securing America’s
recognition as a nuclear weapons state is the crown
jewel:
The President told the Prime Minister that we will work
to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with
India . . . and the United States will work with friends and
allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil
nuclear cooperation and trade with India, including but
not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies
for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.23

It is difficult to overstate the signficance of this
undertaking from Delhi’s perspective. For years
India had taken a strong position against the global
309

nonproliferation regime, arguing that it was the strong
countries’ way of maintaining a monopoly on nuclear
power. Furthermore, Delhi felt that a double standard
had been applied to it vis-à-vis China on nuclear
matters. And, following its 1998 nuclear tests, it feared
that an American-Chinese-Pakistani axis would form
against it on the question of its nuclear weapons. The
joint-statement wiped away this legacy: Delhi was
part of the nuclear club, and America is going to help
it convince other members to confer the club’s full
benefits, notwithstanding the White House’s argument
that India would not be recognized as a nuclear
weapons state for purposes of the NPT.
As Ashton Carter has pointed out, given the significance of the American concession (even if this was the
most realistic option to the Indian nuclear question)
America will pay a price for a special nonproliferation
carve-out for India—and it is striking how little America
received in return.24 Besides nuclear technology, India
also will be the beneficiary of American advanced
defense and space technology. India, on the other hand,
committed itself to continue with policies it already
was pursuing—“combat terrorism relentlessly” and
continue high level dialogues on the economy, space,
defense, and energy.
Many see India’s two votes in the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that resulted in Iran’s
referral to the Security Council as a sign that India will
ally itself with the United States on this key strategic
question. Others point out that Indian officials
themselves state that they worked hard on behalf of
Tehran’s interests, lobbying the European Union (EU)
to water down the resolution.25 In any case, India will
not break its long-standing strategic ties to Iran anytime
soon.26
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If the relationship is thought of in terms of a “strategic
partnership,” then Dr. Carter is surely correct—the
diplomatic transaction was weighted heavily toward
the Indians. A strategic partnership conjures up images
of Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom (UK),
where, in the latter two cases, the worldview is so
similar that there is hardly a war fought by the United
States where the other two are not involved.
And, one could imagine a series of American requests
were the relationship truly thought of as a diplomatic
transaction—military access for China contingencies
would be helpful especially given the anti-access
challenge in East Asia. A clear statement committing
to the American position on Iranian denuclearization
would be another legitimate American request, and
more assistance with security and reconstruction in
Iraq a third.
The problem is that India is nowhere near the
point were it has either the will or ability to provide
such assistance. True, as Raja Mohan has pointed out,
America has not exactly invited India to “a containment
party.”27 But it is unlikely that even if Washington had,
Delhi would have accepted.
An examination of some important issues on the
Indian-American agenda reveals the different prisms
through which the two sides still view their respective
security problems.
India and China: Uneven Convergence.
For many American strategists, the driving force
behind the new partnership with Delhi is Washington’s
concerns about the long-term challenge of a stronger
China. Should Beijing become more assertive and the
relationship more confrontational, a solid U.S.-India
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relationship would position America well to maintain
the security order in Asia.
For its part, India is wary of China’s strategic
intentions, its support for Pakistan, its moves into South
Asia, and its increasing presence in the Indian ocean
and relations with countries that sit at critical junctures
along the Ocean. Indians are quick to remind Americans
that they have been concerned about a “China threat”
for decades, having fought a war against Beijing in
1962 and sharing a 4,000 km border, much of which is
in dispute. But India also derives great benefits from
having both an American and a Chinese card to play.
Delhi will welcome maritime security cooperation
with the United States as a counter to Beijing’s growing
presence along the Indian Ocean. China has been
busily constructing port facilities and surveillance
and reconnaissance capabilities around the Indian
Ocean as part of what some have termed a “string of
pearls strategy.” This, combined with investment in an
elaborate rail and road infrastructure through South
and Southeast Asia, are meant to provide China with
an alternative to American dominated sea routes in
delivering its oil and gas from the Persian Gulf back to
Chinese ports on the East Coast.28
Part of India’s logic of reaching out to the United
States is to help it out of its perceived encirclement by
China in the Indian Ocean and South Asia. Indeed, some
within the Indian military perceive Chinese expansion
of influence in Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal, Central Asia,
and the Persian Gulf as a strategy of “encirclement
of India.” On the one hand, India will continue to
compete with Beijing for influence in Southeast
Asia and has increased its political cooperation with
Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore. India’s desire to
counter Beijing’s dominance over Burma will result
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in continued engagement with the Rangoon regime,
much to the consternation of Washington.
Delhi no doubt will watch carefully China’s
measured commitment to a blue water navy as
manifested in its growing nuclear submarine force
and its development of some kind of aircraft carrier.29
The consensus among Indian strategists is that “China
should be kept out of the Indian Ocean.”
India’s May 2004 Maritime Doctrine sets an
ambitious course for India’s navy meant in part to
deal with “extra-regional powers” operating from the
Persian Gulf to the Malacca Strait. India has in mind
both sea denial and, over time, blue water capabilities.
It announced plans to purchase six French Scorpene
diesel electric submarines and build six more in
India, is negotiating with Russia for the transfer of
another aircraft carrier, and announced plans to equip
some of its surface destroyers with Brhamos antiship
cruise missiles as an answer to China’s equipping its
Soveremeny destroyers with Sunburns. The Navy’s
allocation of the defense budget rose from $7.5 billion
for the years 1997-2001, to $18.3 billion for 2002-07.
However, given the ambitions of the navy, budget
plans are underfunded.
On the other hand, India will continue to increase
its cooperation with China. While it will not cede
influence in Central, South, or even Southeast Asia
to Beijing, neither will it cede too much influence to
the United States. During the visit of Premier Wen
Jiabiao to India in April 2005, Prime Minister Singh
announced that “India and China can reshape the
world.”30 The two countries have begun a free trade
agreement (FTA) negotiation, and trade has been
increasing at a rapid pace, up to 20 billion in 2005.31
In addition, China formally abandoned its claim to
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the Himalayan province of Sikkim, set a strategic
framework for resolving differences over their 2,175
mile-long border, and signed a series of agreements on
technology sharing, civil aviation, and trade.
China agreed to support India’s bid for a UN Council
seat, and Foreign Minister Shyam Saran declared “we
look upon each other as partners.”32 Recently Indian
Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee announced that
India and China signed a military agreement that
will expand military cooperation in the areas of joint
military exercise and exchanges.33
India’s approach to China, not unlike America’s, is
to engage warily. The American and Chinese militaries
will compete for better ties with India, and India
will pressure the United States to relax technology
restriction, using its relationship with China as leverage.
The task for Washington is to build a relationship of
trust with the Indian military without falling into the
trap of “proving its love” by signing on to ever more
expansive technology transfer deals.
Defense Relations.
One major goal of America’s defense strategy is to
build what it calls “partnership capacity.” This reflects
a recognition that America will need new partners to
assist in its daunting strategic tasks, which in Asia include keeping the sea lanes safe for commerce, continuing to support operations in Afghanistan, balancing
China’s growing power, deterring North Korean and
Chinese aggression, and protecting growing energy
interests in Central Asia.
The military relationship began with a focus on
missile defense (India was one of the first countries
to embrace the Bush administration’s new approach
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to strategic defense34) and has blossomed into one
of America’s most active in Asia. The two countries
have conducted “dissimilar” combat exercises such
as flying exercises in which Indian pilots flying Sukhoi
Su 30s defeated F-15s 90 percent of the time; mountain
exercises in the Himalayas and Alaska; special forces
exercises in jungles and underwater; joint maritime
piracy and antisubmarine warfare exercises; and joint
aircraft carrier exercises in the Indian Ocean as part of
the annual Malabar exercises.35
In June 28, 2005, after a series of Under Secretarylevel Defense Policy Group meetings, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Minister of Defense
Pranab Mukherjee signed a “New Framework For
the U.S.-India Defense Relationship,” codifying the
already active relationship. The two sides agreed that
defeating terrorism; preventing the spread of WMD;
and protecting the free flow of commerce by air, land,
and sea were “shared security interests.”36 The two
countries further agreed to enhance their capabilities to
defeat terrorism and combat the proliferation of WMD
as well as expand their interaction with other regional
militaries. The document emphasizes the importance
of defense trade as a means to “reinforce the strategic
partnership” and “achieve greater interaction between
our two armed forces.”37
Through an intense program of exercises, the sale
of weapons systems, and high-level exchanges, the
Pentagon seeks to establish interoperability with India.
The U.S Air Force envisions a networked command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaisance (C4ISR) system with
all U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) partners, including
India, consisting of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
shared early warning radar, and satellite imagery that
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could “protect vital areas from the threats of terrorism,
piracy, smuggling, WMD proliferation, and potentially
even ballistic missiles.”38 Whether India will want to be
part of such a network is an open question, considering
that it does not plan on joining the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), and its Ministry of Defense has recently
talked of “spacing out” U.S.-Indian military contacts.39
For India, the sin qua non of the relationship is
technology and weapons transfer—both dual use and
lethal. The easing of restrictions on these items is both a
sign that India in no longer considered an outlaw by the
United States and an absolute necessity in Indian eyes
for modernizing its military. Indeed, for India to project
power, it needs high-end lift, refueling, and airborne
early warning and control capabilities, and believes
that the United States has state-of-the-art equipment.
India is conducting tough negotiations on defense
trade issues. For example, it has asked the United States
to release one of its most advanced radars—the active
electronically scanned array—as part of the United
states offer of F-16 and F-18 fighter jets to the Indian
Air Force. India is leveraging an intense competition to
fulfill its combat fighter requirement.40
The focus on defense trade is complicated by a
number of factors. On the one hand, a strong supply
and defense industrial relationship will create the
“connective tissue” of the defense relationship, and
America should have bargained for preferential
treatment as part of the grand deal. On the other hand,
India, like China before it, is getting in the habit of
creating litmus tests that require Washington to prove
its commitment to the relationship by asking: How
much state-of-the-art technology are you willing to
give? There is also the problem of India’s relationship
with Iran and the kind of incentives that will be in
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place to transfer technology to Tehran, not to mention
Moscow and Beijing. This is especially troublesome in
missile related areas such as Space Launch Vehicles.
Indian and American strategists seem to agree that
the most promising area of military cooperation will
continue to be maritime security in what the Indians
refer to as the “Indian Ocean Basin”—waters that
extend from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca.
Recent accelerations by Indian defense officials of its
interest in keeping the South East Asian sea lanes safe
from pirates and terrorists underscores this point.41
Moreover, the two countries already have cooperated
in sea lane protection in the Strait of Malacca at the
beginning of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and
the only joint structure in the Indian military is a Navyled one on the Nicobar islands.
India’s blue water aspirations, however, may be
too ambitious. Though the Indian Navy wants to build
a 3-carrier Navy by 2012, this will be difficult since it is
retiring its sole extant carrier once the Russian Admiral
Gorshkov arrives.42 Indian naval officials expect that
more ships will be decommissioned than commissioned
by 2012.
The Strategic Weapons Problem.
India has in service the Agni ballistic missile that
can carry nuclear warheads and can hit almost any
target in Pakistan. The arsenal cannot yet hit vital
Chinese targets—a strategic aspiration—but work
on the new longer-range Agni is intended to provide
India with that capability. In addition, the Navy
is interested in developing a nuclear second strike
submarine capability.43 Though India’s strategic
weapons program is in large measure a response to the
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growing Chinese strategic arsenal, the United States
should exercise caution in helping India along this
road. The nuclear equation in Asia is changing rapidly,
and is not an equation Americans should be confident
about managing. With an improved Chinese arsenal,
an improving Indian arsenal, and a nuclear Pakistan
and North Korea, it is probably a matter of time before
Japan decides it will need a nuclear arsenal as well.
Recent indications that India intends to add to its
arsenal are worrisome. The United States has made
it clear that no nuclear aid or fuel should be used to
help India’s strategic weapons program and that
India should not continue nuclear testing. But in a
recent speech to Parliament, Prime Minister Singh
rejected those conditions as infringements of Indian
sovereignty. He threatened that India must received
an “uninterrupted supply” of foreign nuclear fuel,
or it would suspend the IAEA inspection on civilian
nuclear facilities that were part of the nuclear deal.
Prime Minister Singh was equally emphatic about
India’s absolute right to process and enrich.44
While this speech may have been for purely
domestic consumption, it is troubling enough for the
United States to think carefully about transferring
technologies that may even indirectly assist the
strategic program. U.S.-Indian cooperation on space
launch vehicles should be avoided until America
gains greater confidence in India’s nuclear intentions.
The U.S. launching satellites off the Polar Launch
Space Vehicle could lead to the transfer of multiple
independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) rocket integration
technologies. This would be an unfortunate repeat of
the American experience with China.
There is a wiser two-fold course: Stop letting China
get a pass on its own nuclear posture improvements,
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and persist with missile defense activity. Missile defense
is entirely complementary of India’s “no first use” and
“force in being” posture intended to protect against
strategic coercion by Pakistan or China. A diplomatic
effort to curb Chinese strategic forces build-up would
help stem the steady march to a more dangerous Asia
characterized by even a low-intensity nuclear arms
races.
INDIA AND IRAN: CAUSE FOR CAUTION
India’s close relationship with Iran is also cause
for caution, especially when it comes to technology
transfer. During the visit of Iranian President
Mohammad Khatami, Tehran and Delhi signed the
New Delhi declaration in 2003 which commits them
to “explore opportunities for cooperation in defense
and agreed areas, including training and exchange of
visits.” Iran is seeking Indian help in operating missile
boats, refitting T-72 tanks and armored personnel
carriers, and upgrades for its MIG 29s which would
build upon Delhi’s past help in developing batteries for
Iranian submarines.45 The two have engaged in naval
exercises, the significance of which has been played
down by both the Americans and the Indians.46
India will continue to see Iran as an important source
of energy—the state-owned Gas Authority of India, Ltd.
reportedly has signed a $22 billion 25-year deal with
the Iranians. And the two countries seem committed to
building a pipeline, together with Pakistan, that would
run from Iran to India via Pakistan.
India is interested in cutting off any potential
Iranian troublemaking among India’s own substantial
Muslim population. And since the end of the Cold
War, the two countries have worked together against
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Sunni extremism in Central Asia and most significantly
against the Taliban during the 1990s when Washington
was not paying attention to events in Afghanistan.47
Iran was a useful Muslim ally for Delhi as it sought to
counter Pakistan’s attempts to play the Muslim Card in
the Kashmir dispute. Tehran even recognized Kashmir
as an integral part of India. Pakistanis fear that Indians
will develop bases in Iran for use in a potential Indo-Pak
war.48 In particular, Pakistanis are troubled by Delhi’s
agreement to expand the Iranian port of Chahbahar,
which Islamabad thinks may have an Indian naval
presence in the future. Delhi has expressed its own
apprehension about Chinese involvement in the
Pakistani port at Gwadar, a few hundred miles from
Chahbahar.
In addition, Indian individuals and companies have
been sanctioned to release nuclear related technology
to Iran, and there are reports of pending sanctions on
missile technology.49 Given Iran’s interest in improving
its ballistic missile capabilities, Indian-Iranian interest
in space launch cooperation is particularly troublesome.50 There have been reports of ongoing IndianIranian space cooperation, and India has been the target
of congressional legislation accusing it of assisting the
Iranian missile program.51
The United States should be exceedingly cautious in
proceeding with space launch cooperation with Delhi
unless such strategic cooperation with Iran is ceased.
Washington should recognize, however, that such
cooperation will not end in the near-term. Delhi has
cultivated ties with Iran to improve its position vis-àvis Pakistan and to gain influence in Central Asia, two
of its top foreign policy priorities. Ironically, the SinoAmerican rapprochement was premised upon the two
countries facing a common threat in the Soviet Union.
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Today, America views Iran as part of the greatest threat
it faces, that of jihadi terrorism, but it is unlikely to get
much by way of Delhi in facing this threat.
THE POWER GAP
The largest impediment to a strategic partnership
in the near term is the power gap between the United
States and India. U.S. GDP per capita is close to $40,000,
while India’s is closer to $3,000 (using purchasing power
parity). The United States is responsible for more than
a quarter of total global economic production, while
India’s contributes less than 2 percent. A quarter of
Indians still live in poverty. By most estimates, just to
pull its citizens out of poverty will require a decade of
7-8 percent of economic growth.
The U.S. military budget is double the total of
the EU combined, over $400 billion. As Eliot Cohen
has put it: “In virtually every sphere of warfare, the
United States dominates. Above the air and below
the sea” the U.S. military far surpasses any potential
adversary. “No other power has the ability to move
large and sophisticated forces around the globe; to
coordinate and direct its own forces and those of its
allies . . . and to support those troops with precision
firepower and unsurpassed amounts of information
and intelligence.”52
While India’s defense budget has been growing and
is now over 15 billion dollars, Delhi’s internal security
requirements, and the ongoing tension with Pakistan
over terrorism and Kashmir, means that Indian ability
to project power is a long-term aspiration. Thus, if the
goal is a diplomatic transaction of equal and mutual
gains, Washington will surely be disappointed. If the
goal is assisting India’s emergence, the relationship
ought to focus on minimizing the power gap.
321

In this context, the first order of business is economic
development and reform for India. So far, Indian
attempts to open its economy and take advantage of
international capital and resources (like the Chinese
have done) have been uneven. Nearly every expert
group looking at India’s economy calls for greater
liberalization of the trade and investment regimes,
investment in infrastructure, and rationalization of
the regulatory climate. The U.S.-India Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) Forum, convened by the two governments, stressed the need for a better foreign direct investment (FDI) climate in physical infrastructure, including power,roads, insurance, retail, and banking. 53
Restrictions on imports and investments, as well
as problematic infrastructure,54 have kept India’s
volume of trade relatively low. American business
sees a big potential market in India, and positive
demographic trends as well as an English speaking
population are looked upon favorably. But unless
Indian decisionmakers undertake massive economic
reform, India’s great power aspirations will not be
met. Morgan Stanley estimates that India will have to
spend $100 billion a year on infrastructure by 2010 to
achieve 8-9 percent annual economic growth.55 This
will be difficult for a government that is running fiscal
deficits.
If Washington wants to advance its goal of helping
India become a great power, it seriously should consider
a bilateral FTA. The primary objective would be to
provide a mechanism to force open the Indian economy
through market mechanisms. As economic analysts of
India have observed, such an agreement would serve as
“an effective mechanism for locking in reform policies,
mobilizing domestic political support for liberalization,
and spurring additional trade liberalization . . .”56 And
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Americans would develop vested commercial interests
in India that would provide a connective tissue that
is difficult to break. Skeptics will argue that an FTA
would divert trade, and that the Indian economy is
not ready for such an agreement. But Washington has
concluded, or is in the process of concluding, FTAs
with Morocco, Oman, and Singapore—according to
political as well as economic criteria set forth by then
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick. India meets
much of the criteria.57
Attempting to bridge the power gap will be difficult,
given India’s culture of autonomy and independence
and its reluctance to have interference with either.
For the project to succeed, humility will be needed on
both sides. Washington needs to be humble about how
much advise and influence India is ready to accept.
India needs to accept that its power right now is largely
incipient, and that America is ready and willing to
provide it with a boost.
CONCLUSION
Ashley Tellis, one of the artichects of the new
relationship with India, has said:
The question . . . ought not be “What will India do for
us” . . . rather the real question ought to be, “Is a strong
democratic (even perpetually independent) India in
American national interest? If the answer to the question
is “yes,” then the real discussion about the evolution of
the U.S.-Indian relationship ought to focus on how the
United States can assist the growth of Indian power . . .58

Dr Tellis adds that the administration strategy of
promoting India’s rise is “directed first and foremost,
towards constructing a geopolitical order in Asia that
is conducive to peace and prosperity.”
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George Perkovich has written, “If India can
democratically lift all of its citizens to a decent quality
of life without trampling on basic liberties and harming
its neighbors, the Indian people will have accomplished
perhaps the greatest success in human history.”59
Both the Tellis and Perkovich goals are well worth
pursuing. But Washington must enter this relationship
without illusions. Now that the nuclear deal is complete,
Washington needs to mitigate its risks so long as India
continues its partnerships with Iran and Beijing.
The Shultz approach rather than the Kissinger and
Brzezinski approach should guide the U.S.-Indian
relationship. The two countries should focus on what is
doable and most important. The first order of business
is promoting economic reform in India. Delhi will
not become a great power otherwise. Wise economic
statecraft in both capitals can have a significant impact
on India’s future. Working towards an FTA would
have the dual advantage of catalyzing liberalization
in India and tying the two countries closer together in
ways that advantage both. Military cooperation should
continue, especially in the maritime arena.
But the United States should heed the lessons of its
relations with China. Washington will live to regret it
if the relationship is defined as a series of obstacles that
it must clear to secure Indian cooperation. Technology
transfer should be done if it is in Washington’s
interests, not as proof of Washington’s commitment to
the overall relationship. The Pentagon in return should
work toward access agreements to protect its interests
on the Eurasian landmass and with respect to China.
On the other hand, Washington must realize that
India will not sever ties with Tehran anytime soon. India
sees its interests as convergent with Iran on the issue of
Sunni extremism in Central Asia, energy security, and
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Pakistan. With this is mind, Washington should avoid
cooperation in space launch vehicles until India weans
itself away from strategic cooperation with Iran.
Nor is there need to make too much of nuclear power
as an answer to India’s overwhelming need for energy.
Delhi will still rely heavily on oil and gas to fuel its
growth. Washington can help Delhi’s energy security
by adding it generously to existing development and
production consortia, realizing that Delhi has come
late to the game.
And Washington should not expect much in the
way of combined democracy promotion; India’s
protection of the Burmese junta from international
isolation is cause for skepticism.60 Washington will be
disappointed if it expects too much help from Delhi on
the “freedom agenda.”
India will be a better strategic partner than China,
but it will take Washington’s largesse to achieve
that goal. Washington is not interested in creating
a satellite or client state; it genuinely is interested in
having a prosperous, democratic, and powerful India
as a partner. The road will be a bumpy one, and in
overselling the partnership and giving too much on the
nuclear deal, Washington has not started off well. But,
with sustained and deft diplomacy and an economics
first approach, the payoff will be worth the price.
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TITLE I—UNITED STATES AND
INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Henry J. Hyde United
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of
2006’’.
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other
weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them,
and the means to deliver them are critical objectives for
United States foreign policy;
(2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and strengthening its implementation, particularly its
verification and compliance, is the keystone of United
States nonproliferation policy;
(3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing
the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and
maintaining a stable international security situation;
(4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT
and remain outside that treaty’s legal regime pose a
potential challenge to the achievement of the overall goals
of global nonproliferation, because those countries have
not undertaken the NPT obligation to prohibit the spread
of nuclear weapons capabilities;
(5) it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest
extent possible to ensure that those countries that are not
States Party to the NPT are responsible in the disposition
of any nuclear technology they develop;
(6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter into an
agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2153) with a country that has never been a State Party to
the NPT if—
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(A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior
with respect to the nonproliferation of technology
related to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver
them;
(B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted
democratic system of government, has a foreign policy
that is congruent to that of the United States, and is
working with the United States on key foreign policy
initiatives related to nonproliferation;
(C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate
and implement substantially improved protections
against the proliferation of technology related to nuclear
weapons and the means to deliver them, and to refrain
from actions that would further the development of its
nuclear weapons program; and
(D) such cooperation will induce the country to
give greater political and material support to the
achievement of United States global and regional
nonproliferation objectives, especially with respect to
dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, sanctioning and
containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist
groups that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability or other weapons of mass destruction
capability and the means to deliver such weapons;
(7) the United States should continue its policy of
engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and
between India and Pakistan;
(8) strong bilateral relations with India are in the national
interest of the United States;
(9) the United States and India share common democratic
values and the potential for increasing and sustained
economic engagement;
(10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the
United States and other countries has the potential to
benefit the people of all countries;
(11) such commerce also represents a significant change in
United States policy regarding commerce with countries
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that are not States Party to the NPT, which remains the
foundation of the international nonproliferation regime;
(12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by
the United States and other countries must be achieved in
a manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation
or regional arms races and maximizes India’s adherence
to international nonproliferation regimes, including, in
particular, the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG); and
(13) the United States should not seek to facilitate or
encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India
by any other party if such exports are terminated under
United States law.
SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The following shall be the policies of
the United States:
(1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce
nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state,
within or outside of the NPT.
(2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret
the right to ‘‘develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’’, as set forth in
Article IV of the NPT, as being a right that applies only
to the extent that it is consistent with the object and
purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities, including
by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any
State Party that the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) determines is not in full compliance
with its NPT obligations, including its safeguards
obligations.
(3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines
for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers
of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials,
Software and Related Technology developed by the
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NSG, and decisions related to the those guidelines, and
the rules and practices regarding NSG decisionmaking.
(4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions
concerning consultation by members regarding
violations of supplier and recipient understandings
by instituting the practice of a timely and coordi
nated response by NSG members to all such viola
tions, including termination of nuclear transfers to an
involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG
members from continuing cooperation with such
recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a
coordinated response has been achieved.
(5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and
technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production
of heavy water, work with members of the NSG,
individually and collectively, to further restrict the
transfers of such equipment and technologies, including
to India.
(6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear
equipment, materials, or technology from other
participating governments in the NSG or from any
other source if nuclear transfers to that country are
suspended or terminated pursuant to this title, the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or
any other United States law.
(b) WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH ASIA.—The following
shall be the policies of the United States with respect to
South Asia:
(1) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium
on the production of fissile material for nuclear
explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People’s
Republic of China.
(2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion
and implementation of a treaty banning the production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the
United States and India become parties.
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(3) Secure India’s—
(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative;
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of
Interdiction Principles of such Initiative;
(C) public announcement of its decision to conform
its export control laws, regulations, and policies
with the Australia Group and with the Guidelines,
Procedures, Criteria, and Control Lists of the
Wassenaar Arrangement;
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress
toward implementing the decision described in
subparagraph (C); and
(E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage,
done at Vienna on September 12, 1997.
(4) Secure India’s full and active participation in United
States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary,
sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire
weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear
weapons capability and the capability to enrich
uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel, and the means to
deliver weapons of mass destruction.
(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals
in South Asia and to promote their reduction and
eventual elimination.
(6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India’s civilian
nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United
States except pursuant to the Congressional review
procedures required under section 131 f. of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160 (f)).
(7) Pending implementation of the multilateral
moratorium described in paragraph (1) or the
treaty described in paragraph (2), encourage India
not to increase its production of fissile material at
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
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(8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional
Protocol to which India is a party with the IAEA can
reliably safeguard any export or reexport to India of
any nuclear materials and equipment.
(9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any
agreement for cooperation with India arranged
pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) meet the requirements set forth in
subsections a.(1) and a.(3) through a.(9) of such section.
(10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided
to the Government of India for use in safeguarded
civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with
reasonable reactor operating requirements.
SEC. 104. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.
(a) IN GENERAL.—If the President makes the deter
mination described in subsection (b), the President may—
(1) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation
with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) from the
requirement of subsection a.(2) of such section;
(2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to
exports to India; and
(3) waive with respect to India the application of—
(A) section 129 a.(1)(D) of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); and
(B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158) regarding
any actions that occurred before July 18, 2005.
(b) DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT.—The de
termination referred to in subsection (a) is a determination
by the President that the following actions have occurred:
(1) India has provided the United States and the IAEA
with a credible plan to separate civil and military
nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed
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a declaration regarding its civil facilities and materials
with the IAEA.
(2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal
steps required prior to signature by the parties of an
agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards
in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards,
principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of
Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India’s civil
nuclear facilities, materials, and programs as declared in
the plan described in paragraph (1), including materials
used in or produced through the use of India’s civil
nuclear facilities.
(3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress
toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent
with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that would
apply to India’s civil nuclear program.
(4) India is working actively with the United States
for the early conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the
cessation of the production of fissile materials for use in
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
(5) India is working with and supporting United States
and international efforts to prevent the spread of
enrichment and reprocessing technology to any state
that does not already possess full-scale, functioning
enrichment or reprocessing plants.
(6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear
and other sensitive materials and technology, including
through—
(A) the enactment and effective enforcement of
comprehensive export control legislation and
regulations;
(B) harmonization of its export control laws,
regulations, policies, and practices with the
guidelines and practices of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and the NSG; and
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(C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in
accordance with the procedures of those regimes for
unilateral adherence.
(7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply
to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of
the NSG.
(c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees the de
termination made pursuant to subsection (b), together
with a report detailing the basis for the determination.
(2) INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED.—To the
fullest extent available to the United States, the report
referred to in paragraph (1) shall include the following
information:
(A) A summary of the plan provided by India to
the United States and the IAEA to separate India’s
civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and
programs, and the declaration made by India to the
IAEA identifying India’s civil facilities to be placed
under IAEA safeguards, including an analysis of the
credibility of such plan and declaration, together
with copies of the plan and declaration.
(B) A summary of the agreement that has been
entered into between India and the IAEA requiring
the application of safeguards in accordance with
IAEA practices to India’s civil nuclear facilities as
declared in the plan described in subparagraph (A),
together with a copy of the agreement, and a
description of the progress toward its full
implementation.
(C) A summary of the progress made toward
conclusion and implementation of an Additional
Protocol between India and the IAEA, including a
description of the scope of such Additional Protocol.
(D) A description of the steps that India is taking
to work with the United States for the conclusion
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of a multilateral treaty banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons, including a
description of the steps that the United States has
taken and will take to encourage India to identify
and declare a date by which India would be willing
to stop production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral
moratorium or treaty.
(E) A description of the steps India is taking to
prevent the spread of nuclear-related technology,
including enrichment and reprocessing technology
or materials that can be used to acquire a nuclear
weapons capability, as well as the support that
India is providing to the United States to further
United States objectives to restrict the spread of such
technology.
(F) A description of the steps that India is taking
to secure materials and technology applicable for
the development, acquisition, or manufacture of
weapons of mass destruction and the means to
deliver such weapons through the application of
comprehensive export control legislation and
regulations, and through harmonization with and
adherence to MTCR, NSG, Australia Group, and
Wassenaar Arrangement guidelines, compliance
with United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540, and participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative.
(G) A description and assessment of the specific
measures that India has taken to fully and actively
participate in United States and international efforts
to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and
contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons
capability and the capability to enrich uranium or
reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver
weapons of mass destruction.
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(H) A description of the decision of the NSG relating
to nuclear cooperation with India, including whether
nuclear cooperation by the United States under an
agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2153) is consistent with the decision, practices,
and policies of the NSG.
(I) A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation
envisioned by the United States and India that will
be implemented under the agreement for nuclear
cooperation, including whether such cooperation
will include the provision of enrichment and
reprocessing technology.
(J) A description of the steps taken to ensure that
proposed United States civil nuclear cooperation
with India will not in any way assist India’s nuclear
weapons program.
(d) RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR TRANSFERS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Pursuant to the obligations of the
United States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this
title constitutes authority to carry out any civil nuclear
cooperation between the United States and a country
that is not a nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT
that would in any way assist, encourage, or induce that
country to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
(2) NSG TRANSFER GUIDELINES.—Notwithstanding
the entry into force of an agreement for cooperation
with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and
pursuant to this title, no item subject to such agreement
or subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG, or to
NSG decisions related thereto, may be transferred to
India if such transfer would be inconsistent with the
transfer guidelines of the NSG in effect on the date of
the transfer.
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(3) TERMINATION OF NUCLEAR TRANSFERS TO
INDIA.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the entry into
force of an agreement for cooperation with India
arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and pursuant to
this title, and except as provided under subparagraph
(B), exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material,
equipment, or technology to India shall be terminated
if there is any materially significant transfer by an
Indian person of—
(i) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment,
or technology that is not consistent with NSG
guidelines or decisions, or
(ii) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment
or technology that is not consistent with MTCR
guidelines, unless the President determines that
cessation of such exports would be seriously
prejudicial to the achievement of United
States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise
jeopardize the common defense and security.
(B) EXCEPTION.—The President may choose not
to terminate exports of nuclear and nuclear-related
material, equipment, and technology to India under
subparagraph (A) if—
(i) the transfer covered under such subparagraph
was made without the knowledge of the
Government of India;
(ii) at the time of the transfer, either the
Government of India did not own, control, or
direct the Indian person that made the transfer
or the Indian person that made the transfer is a
natural person who acted without the knowledge
of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C)
of section 110(5); and
(iii) the President certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that the Government of
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India has taken or is taking appropriate judicial or
other enforcement actions against the Indian per
son with respect to such transfer.
(4) EXPORTS, REEXPORTS, TRANSFERS,
AND RETRANSFERS TO INDIA RELATED TO
ENRICHMENT, REPROCESSING, AND HEAVY
WATER PRODUCTION.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—
(i) NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.—
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission may only
issue licenses for the export or reexport to India of
any equipment, components, or materials related
to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing
of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy
water if the requirements of subparagraph (B) are
met.
(ii) SECRETARY OF ENERGY.—The Secretary
of Energy may only issue authorizations for the
transfer or retransfer to India of any equipment,
materials, or technology related to the enrichment
of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear
fuel, or the production of heavy water (including
under the terms of a subsequent arrangement
under section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160)) if the requirements of
subparagraph (B) are met.
(B) REQUIREMENTS FOR APPROVALS.— Exports,
reexports, transfers, and retransfers referred to in
subparagraph (A) may only be approved if—
(i) the end user—
(I) is a multinational facility participating
in an IAEA-approved program to provide
alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities;
or
(II) is a facility participating in, and the export,
reexport, transfer, or retransfer is associated
with, a bilateral or multinational program to
develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle;
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(ii) appropriate measures are in place at any
facility referred to in clause (i) to ensure that no
sensitive nuclear technology, as defined in section
4(5) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978
(22 U.S.C. 3203(5)), will be diverted to any person,
site, facility, location, or program not under IAEA
safeguards; and
(iii) the President determines that the export,
reexport, transfer, or retransfer will not assist in
the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive
devices or the production of fissile material for
military purposes.
(5) NUCLEAR EXPORT ACCOUNTABILITY
PROGRAM.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall ensure
that all appropriate measures are taken to maintain
accountability with respect to nuclear materials,
equipment, and technology sold, leased, exported, or
reexported to India so as to ensure—
(i) full implementation of the protections required
under section 123 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153 (a)(1)); and
(ii) United States compliance with Article I of the
NPT.
(B) MEASURES.—The measures taken pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
(i) Obtaining and implementing assurances and
conditions pursuant to the export licensing
authorities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and the Department of Commerce and the authorizing authorities of the Department of Energy, in
cluding, as appropriate, conditions regarding enduse monitoring.
(ii) A detailed system of reporting and accounting
for technology transfers, including any retransfers
in India, authorized by the Department of Energy
pursuant to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act
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of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). Such system shall be
capable of providing assurances that—
(I) the identified recipients of the nuclear
technology are authorized to receive the
nuclear technology;
(II) the nuclear technology identified for
transfer will be used only for peaceful
safeguarded nuclear activities and will not
be used for any military or nuclear explosive
purpose; and
(III) the nuclear technology identified for
transfer will not be retransferred without the
prior consent of the United States, and facilities,
equipment, or materials derived through the use
of transferred technology will not be transferred
without the prior consent of the United States.
(iii) In the event the IAEA is unable to implement
safeguards as required by an agreement for
cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153),
appropriate assurance that arrangements will be
put in place expeditiously that are consistent with
the requirements of section 123 a.(1) of such Act
(42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding the maintenance
of safeguards as set forth in the agreement
regardless of whether the agreement is terminated
or suspended for any reason.
(C) IMPLEMENTATION.—The measures described
in subparagraph (B) shall be implemented to provide
reasonable assurances that the recipient is complying
with the relevant requirements, terms, and conditions
of any licenses issued by the United States regarding
such exports, including those relating to the use,
retransfer, safe handling, secure transit, and storage
of such exports.
(e) JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL REQUIREMENT.—
Section 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
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2153(d)) is amended in the second proviso by inserting
after ‘‘that subsection’’ the following: ‘‘, or an agreement
exempted pursuant to section 104(a)(1) of the Henry
J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy
Cooperation Act of 2006,’’.
(f) SUNSET.—The authority provided under subsection
(a)(1) to exempt an agreement shall terminate upon the
enactment of a joint resolution under section 123 d. of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) approving
such an agreement.
(g) REPORTING TO CONGRESS.—
(1) INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF
INDIA.—The President shall keep the appropriate
congressional committees fully and currently informed
of the facts and implications of any significant nuclear
activities of India, including—
(A) any material noncompliance on the part of the
Government of India with—
(i) the nonproliferation commitments undertaken
in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between
the President of the United States and the Prime
Minister of India;
(ii) the separation plan presented in the national
parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and in
greater detail on May 11, 2006;
(iii) a safeguards agreement between the
Government of India and the IAEA;
(iv) an Additional Protocol between the
Government of India and the IAEA;
(v) an agreement for cooperation between the
Government of India and the United States
Government arranged pursuant to section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or
any subsequent arrangement under section 131 of
such Act (42 U.S.C. 2160);
(vi) the terms and conditions of any approved
licenses regarding the export or reexport of
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nuclear material or dual-use material, equipment,
or technology; and
(vii) United States laws and regulations regarding
such licenses;
(B) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after
the date of the enactment of this title;
(C) significant changes in the production by India of
nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile
material produced; and
(D) changes in the purpose or operational status of
any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in
India.
(2) IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which
an agreement for cooperation with India arranged
pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) enters into force, and annually
thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report including—
(A) a description of any additional nuclear facilities
and nuclear materials that the Government of
India has placed or intends to place under IAEA
safeguards;
(B) a comprehensive listing of—
(i) all licenses that have been approved by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
Secretary of Energy for exports and reexports to
India under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, Code of
Federal Regulations;
(ii) any licenses approved by the Department of
Commerce for the export or reexport to India of
commodities, related technology, and software
which are controlled for nuclear nonproliferation
reasons on the Nuclear Referral List of the Com
merce Control List maintained under part 774
of title 15, Code of Federal Regulation, or any
successor regulation;
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(iii) any other United States authorizations for the
export or reexport to India of nuclear materials
and equipment; and
(iv) with respect to each such license or other
form of authorization described in clauses (i), (ii),
and (iii)—
(I) the number or other identifying information
of each license or authorization;
(II) the name or names of the authorized end
user or end users;
(III) the name of the site, facility, or location
in India to which the export or reexport was
made;
(IV) the terms and conditions included on such
licenses and authorizations;
(V) any post-shipment verification procedures
that will be applied to such exports or
reexports; and
(VI) the term of validity of each such license or
authorization;
(C) a description of any significant nuclear commerce
between India and other countries, including any
such trade that—
(i) is not consistent with applicable guidelines or
decisions of the NSG; or
(ii) would not meet the standards applied to
exports or reexports of such material, equipment,
or technology of United States origin;
(D) either—
(i) an assessment that India is in full compliance
with the commitments and obligations contained
in the agreements and other documents
referenced in clauses (i) through (vi) of paragraph
(1)(A); or
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(ii) an identification and analysis of all compliance
issues arising with regard to 27 the adherence
by India to its commitments and obligations,
including—
(I) the measures the United States Government
has taken to remedy or otherwise respond to
such compliance issues;
(II) the responses of the Government of India
to such measures;
(III) the measures the United States Government
plans to take to this end in the coming year;
and
(IV) an assessment of the implications of any
continued noncompliance, including whether
nuclear commerce with India remains in the na
tional security interest of the United States;
(E)(i) an assessment of whether India is fully and
actively participating in United States and international
efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction
and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons
of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons
capability (including the capability to enrich uranium
or reprocess nuclear fuel), and the means to deliver
weapons of mass destruction, including a description
of the specific measures that India has taken in this
regard; and
(ii) if India is not assessed to be fully and actively
participating in such efforts, a description of—
(I) the measures the United States Government
has taken to secure India’s full and active
participation in such efforts;
(II) the responses of the Government of India
to such measures; and
(III) the measures the United States
Government plans to take in the coming year
to secure India’s full and active participation;
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(F) an analysis of whether United States civil nuclear
cooperation with India is in any way assisting India’s
nuclear weapons program, including through—
(i) the use of any United States equipment,
technology, or nuclear material by India in
an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclearweapons related complex;
(ii) the replication and subsequent use of any
United States technology by India 31 in an
unsafeguarded nuclear facility or unsafeguarded
nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any
activity related to the research, development,
testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive
devices; and
(iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner
as to facilitate the increased production by India
of highly enriched uranium or plutonium in
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;
(G) a detailed description of—
(i) United States efforts to promote national
or regional progress by India and Pakistan in
disclosing, securing, limiting, and reducing their
fissile material stockpiles, including stockpiles for
military purposes, pending creation of a worldwide fissile material cut-off regime, including the
institution of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty;
(ii) the responses of India and Pakistan to such
efforts; and
(iii) assistance that the United States is providing,
or would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan
to promote the objectives in clause (i), consistent
with its obligations under international law and
existing agreements;
(H) an estimate of—
(i) the amount of uranium mined and milled in
India during the previous year;
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(ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely
been used or allocated for the production of
nuclear explosive devices; and
(iii) the rate of production in India of—
(I) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices;
and
(II) nuclear explosive devices;
(I) an estimate of the amount of electricity India’s
nuclear reactors produced for civil purposes during
the previous year and the proportion of such
production that can be attributed to India’s declared
civil reactors;
(J) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has
affected the rate of production in India of nuclear
explosive devices;
(K) a detailed description of efforts and progress
made toward the achievement of India’s—
(i) full participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative;
(ii) formal commitment to the Statement of
Interdiction Principles of such Initiative;
(iii) public announcement of its decision to
conform its export control laws, regulations, and
policies with the Australia Group and with the
Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Controls
List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
(iv) effective implementation of the decision
described in clause (iii); and
(L) the disposal during the previous year of spent
nuclear fuel from India’s civilian nuclear program,
and any plans or activities relating to future disposal
of such spent nuclear fuel.
(3) SUBMITTAL WITH OTHER ANNUAL REPORTS.—
(A) REPORT ON PROLIFERATION PREVENTION.—
Each annual report submitted under paragraph (2)
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after the initial report may be submitted together
with the annual report on proliferation prevention
required under section 601(a) of the Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281(a)).
(B) REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD REGIONAL
NONPROLIFERATION.—The information required
to be submitted under paragraph (2)(F) after the
initial report may be submitted together with
the annual report on progress toward regional
nonproliferation required under section 620F(c)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2376(c)).
(4) FORM.—Each report submitted under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 105. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
OBLIGATIONS.
Nothing in this title constitutes authority for any action in
violation of an obligation of the United States under the
NPT.
SEC. 106. INOPERABILITY OF DETERMINATION
AND WAIVERS.
A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall
cease to be effective if the President determines that India
has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of
the enactment of this title.
SEC. 107. MTCR ADHERENT STATUS.
Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the
purposes of section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2797b).
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SEC. 108. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.
Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation
Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg
Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
2000 and 2001 (as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of
Public Law 106–113 and contained in appendix G of that
Act; 113 Stat. 1501A– 486)) is amended—
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the
semicolon at the end;
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as sub-paragraph
(D); and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following
new subparagraph:
‘‘(C) so much of the reports required under section
104 of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful
Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 as relates to
verification or compliance matters; and’’.
SEC. 109. UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC
COOPERATIVE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
PROGRAM.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of Energy, acting
through the Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, is authorized to establish a
cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program to pursue
jointly with scientists from the United States and India
a program to further common nuclear nonproliferation
goals, including scientific research and development
efforts, with an emphasis on nuclear safeguards (in this
section referred to as ‘‘the program’’).
(b) CONSULTATION.—The program shall be carried
out in consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense.
(c) NATIONAL ACADEMIES RECOMMENDATIONS.—

352

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Energy shall enter
into an agreement with the National Academies to
develop recommendations for the implementation of
the program.
(2) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The agreement entered
into under paragraph (1) shall provide for the
preparation by qualified individuals with relevant ex
pertise and knowledge and the communication to the
Secretary of Energy each fiscal year of—
(A) recommendations for research and related
programs designed to overcome existing
technological barriers to nuclear nonproliferation;
and
(B) an assessment of whether activities and programs
funded under this section are achieving the goals of
the activities and programs.
(3) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The recommendations
and assessments prepared under this subsection shall
be made publicly available.
(d) CONSISTENCY WITH NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.—All United States activities related to the
program shall be consistent with United States obligations
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out this section for each of fiscal years
2007 through 2011.
SEC. 110. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) The term ‘‘Additional Protocol’’ means a protocol
additional to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as
negotiated between a country and the IAEA based on a
Model Additional Protocol as set forth in IAEA
information circular (INFCIRC) 540.
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(2) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’
means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
and the Committee on International Relations of the House
of Representatives.
(3) The term ‘‘dual-use material, equipment, or technology’’
means material, equipment, or technology that may be
used in nuclear or nonnuclear applications.
(4) The term ‘‘IAEA safeguards’’ has the meaning given
the term in section 830(3) of the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(3)).
(5) The term ‘‘Indian person’’ means—
(A) a natural person that is a citizen of India or is
subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of India;
(B) a corporation, business association, partnership,
society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity,
organization, or group, that is organized under the laws
of India or has its principal place of business in India;
and
(C) any Indian governmental entity, including any
governmental entity operating as a business enterprise.
(6) The terms ‘‘Missile Technology Control Regime’’,
‘‘MTCR’’, and ‘‘MTCR adherent’’ have the meanings given
the terms in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2797c).
(7) The term ‘‘nuclear materials and equipment’’ means
source material, special nuclear material, production and
utilization facilities and any components thereof, and any
other items or materials that are determined to have
significance for nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to
subsection 109 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2139(b)).
(8) The terms ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’’ and
‘‘NPT’’ mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and
Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970
(21 UST 483).
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(9) The terms ‘‘Nuclear Suppliers Group’’ and ‘‘NSG’’ refer
to a group, which met initially in 1975 and has met at least
annually since 1992, of Participating Governments that
have promulgated and agreed to adhere to Guidelines for
Nuclear Transfers (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/
Part 1) and Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related
Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related
Technology (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/ Rev.7/Part 2).
(10) The terms ‘‘nuclear weapon’’ and ‘‘nuclear explosive
device’’ mean any device designed to produce an
instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from
special nuclear material that is greater than the amount of
energy that would be released from the detonation of one
point of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
(11) The term ‘‘process’’ includes the term ‘‘reprocess’’.
(12) The terms ‘‘reprocessing’’ and ‘‘reprocess’’ refer to
the separation of irradiated nuclear materials and fission
products from spent nuclear fuel.
(13) The term ‘‘sensitive nuclear technology’’ means any
information, including information incorporated in a
production or utilization facility or important component
part thereof, that is not available to the public and which
is important to the design, construction, fabrication,
operation, or maintenance of a uranium enrichment
or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the
production of heavy water.
(14) The term ‘‘source material’’ has the meaning given the
term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2014(z)).
(15) The term ‘‘special nuclear material’’ has the meaning
given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).
(16) The term ‘‘unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity’’
means research on, or development, design, manufacture,
construction, operation, or maintenance of—
(A) any existing or future reactor, critical facility,
conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant,
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plant for the separation of isotopes of source or special
fissionable material, or separate storage installation
with respect to which there is no obligation to accept
IAEA safeguards at the relevant reactor, facility, plant,
or installation that contains source or special fissionable
material; or
(B) any existing or future heavy water production plant
with respect to which there is no obligation to accept
IAEA safeguards on any nuclear material produced by
or used in connection with any heavy water produced
therefrom.
TITLE II—UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
IMPLEMENTATION
SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ‘‘United States Additional
Protocol Implementation Act’’.
SEC. 202. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear
explosive devices poses a grave threat to the national
security of the United States and its vital national interests.
(2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven
critical to limiting such proliferation.
(3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be
effective, each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties
must conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement
with the IAEA, and such agreements must be honored and
enforced.
(4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of strengthening
the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the
safeguards system. This can best be accomplished by
providing IAEA inspectors with more information about,
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and broader access to, nuclear activities within the
territory of non-nuclear-weapon State Parties.
(5) The proposed scope of such expanded information
and access has been negotiated by the member states of
the IAEA in the form of a Model Additional Protocol to its
existing safeguards agreements, and universal acceptance
of Additional Protocols by non-nuclear weapons states
is essential to enhancing the effectiveness of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclearweapon State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that
is based on the Model Additional Protocol, but which
also contains measures, consistent with its existing
safeguards agreements with its members, that protect
the right of the United States to exclude the application
of IAEA safeguards to locations and activities with direct
national security significance or to locations or information
associated with such activities.
(7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the
United States in a manner consistent with United States
obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
may encourage other parties to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, especially non-nuclear-weapon
State Parties, to conclude Additional Protocols and
thereby strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
safeguards system and help reduce the threat of nuclear
proliferation, which is of direct and substantial benefit to
the United States.
(8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the
United States is not required and is completely voluntary
given its status as a nuclear-weapon State Party, but the
United States has acceded to the Additional Protocol
to demonstrate its commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime and to make United States civil
nuclear activities available to the same IAEA inspections
as are applied in the case of non-nuclear-weapon State
Parties.
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(9) In accordance with the national security exclusion
contained in Article 1.b of its Additional Protocol, the
United States will not allow any inspection activities, nor
make any declaration of any information with respect to,
locations, information, and activities of direct national
security significance to the United States.
(10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will
conform to the principles set forth in the letter of April 30,
2002, from the United States Permanent Representative to
the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Vienna
Office of the United Nations to the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL.—The term ‘‘Additional
Protocol’’, when used in the singular form, means the
Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United
States of America and the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United
States of America, with Annexes, signed at Vienna June 12,
1998 (T. Doc. 107–7).
(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—
The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on International Relations, the Committee
on Science, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(3) COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.—The term
‘‘complementary access’’ means the exercise of the IAEA’s
access rights as set forth in Articles 4 to 6 of the Additional
Protocol.
(4) EXECUTIVE AGENCY.—The term ‘‘executive agency’’
has the meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5,
United States Code.
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(5) FACILITY.—The term ‘‘facility’’ has the meaning set
forth in Article 18i. of the Additional Protocol.
(6) IAEA.—The term ‘‘IAEA’’ means the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
(7) JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘judge
of the United States’’ means a United States district judge,
or a United States magistrate judge appointed under the
authority of chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code.
(8) LOCATION.—The term ‘‘location’’ means any
geographic point or area declared or identified by the
United States or specified by the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
(9) NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.— The
term ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’’ means the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done
at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and
entered into force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
(10) NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY AND NONNUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY.—The terms
‘‘nuclear-weapon State Party’’ and ‘‘non-nuclear-weapon
State Party’’ have the meanings given such terms in the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(11) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’, except as otherwise
provided, means any individual, corporation, partnership,
firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution,
any State or any political subdivision thereof, or any
political entity within a State, any foreign government or
nation or any agency, instrumentality, or political
subdivision of any such government or nation, or other
entity located in the United States.
(12) SITE.—The term ‘‘site’’ has the meaning set forth in
Article 18b. of the Additional Protocol.
(13) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘United States’’, when
used as a geographic reference, means the several States
of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the
commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United
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States and includes all places under the jurisdiction or
control of the United States, including—
(A) the territorial sea and the overlying airspace;
(B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public
aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17)
and (41), respectively, of section 40102(a) of title 49,
United States Code; and
(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is
defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).
(14) WIDE-AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.—The
term ‘‘wide-area environmental sampling’’ has the
meaning set forth in Article 18g. of the Additional
Protocol.
SEC. 204. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this title, or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this title, or the application of such provision
to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it
is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.
Subtitle A—General Provisions
SEC. 211. AUTHORITY.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to
implement and carry out the provisions of this title and
the Additional Protocol and shall designate through Exec
utive order which executive agency or agencies of the
United States, which may include but are not limited to
the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, the
Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Com
mission, shall issue or amend and enforce regulations in
order to implement this title and the provisions of the Ad
ditional Protocol.
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(b) INCLUDED AUTHORITY.—For any executive agency
designated under subsection (a) that does not currently
possess the authority to conduct site vulnerability assess
ments and related activities, the authority provided in sub
section (a) includes such authority.
(c) EXCEPTION.—The authority described in subsection
(b) does not supersede or otherwise modify any existing
authority of any Federal department or agency already
having such authority.
Subtitle B—Complementary Access
SEC. 221. REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORITY
TO CONDUCT COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.
(a) PROHIBITION.—No complementary access to any
location in the United States shall take place pursuant to the
Additional Protocol without the authorization of the United
States Government in accordance with the requirements of
this title.
(b) AUTHORITY.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Complementary access to any
location in the United States subject to access under the
Additional Protocol is authorized in accordance with
this title.
(2) UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES.—
(A) RESTRICTIONS.—In the event of com
plementary access to a privately owned or oper
ated location, no employee of the Environmental
Protection Agency or of the Mine Safety and Health
Administration or the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration of the Department of Labor
may participate in the access.
(B) NUMBER.—The number of designated United
States representatives accompanying IAEA
inspectors shall be kept to the minimum necessary.
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SEC. 222. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLEMENTARY
ACCESS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Each instance of complementary
access to a location in the United States under the Addi
tional Protocol shall be conducted in accordance with this
subtitle.
(b) NOTICE.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Complementary access referred
to in subsection (a) may occur only upon the issuance
of an actual written notice by the United States
Government to the owner, operator, occupant, or agent
in charge of the location to be subject to complementary
access.
(2) TIME OF NOTIFICATION.—The notice under
paragraph (1) shall be submitted to such owner, op
erator, occupant, or agent as soon as possible after the
United States Government has received notification that
the IAEA seeks complementary access. Notices may be
posted prominently at the location if the United States
Government is unable to provide actual written notice
to such owner, operator, occupant, or agent.
(3) CONTENT OF NOTICE.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The notice required by
paragraph (1) shall specify—
(i) the purpose for the complementary access;
(ii) the basis for the selection of the facility, site,
or other location for the complementary access
sought;
(iii) the activities that will be carried out during
the complementary access;
(iv) the time and date that the complementary
access is expected to begin, and the anticipated
period covered by the complementary access; and
(v) the names and titles of the inspectors.
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(4) SEPARATE NOTICES REQUIRED.—A separate
notice shall be provided each time that complementary
access is sought by the IAEA.
(c) CREDENTIALS.—The complementary access team of
the IAEA and representatives or designees of the United
States Government shall display appropriate identifying
credentials to the owner, operator, occupant, or agent in
charge of the location before gaining entry in connection
with complementary access.
(d) SCOPE.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in a warrant
issued under section 223, and subject to the rights of
the United States Government under the Additional
Protocol to limit complementary access, complementary
access to a location pursuant to this title may extend to
all activities specifically permitted for such locations
under Article 6 of the Additional Protocol.
(2) EXCEPTION.—Unless required by the Additional
Protocol, no inspection under this title shall extend to—
(A) financial data (other than production data);
(B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment
data);
(C) pricing data;
(D) personnel data;
(E) patent data;
(F) data maintained for compliance with environmental or occupational health and safety regulations;
or
(G) research data.
(e) ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, SAFETY, AND SECURITY.—In carrying out their activities, members of the
IAEA complementary access team and representatives or
designees of the United States Government shall observe
applicable environmental, health, safety, and security reg
ulations established at the location subject to complemen
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tary access, including those for protection of controlled
environments within a facility and for personal safety.
SEC. 223. CONSENTS, WARRANTS, AND
COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—
(1) PROCEDURE.—
(A) CONSENT.—Except as provided in paragraph
(2), an appropriate official of the United States
Government shall seek or have the consent of the
owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge of a
location prior to entering that location in connection
with complementary access pursuant to sections 221
and 222. The owner, operator, occupant, or agent in
charge of the location may withhold consent for any
reason or no reason.
(B) ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH WARRANT.—
In the absence of consent, the United States
Government may seek an administrative search
warrant from a judge of the United States under
subsection (b). Proceedings regarding the issuance of
an administrative search warrant shall be conducted
ex parte, unless otherwise requested by the United
States Government.
(2) EXPEDITED ACCESS.—For purposes of obtaining
access to a location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii) of the
Additional Protocol in order to satisfy United States
obligations under the Additional Protocol when notice
of two hours or less is required, the United States
Government may gain entry to such location in
connection with complementary access, to the extent
such access is consistent with the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, without obtaining either
a warrant or consent.
(b) ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH WARRANTS FOR COM
PLEMENTARY ACCESS.—
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(1) OBTAINING ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH WARRANTS.—For complementary access conducted in
the United States pursuant to the Additional Protocol,
and for which the acquisition of a warrant is required,
the United States Government shall first obtain an
administrative search warrant from a judge of the
United States. The United States Government shall
provide to such judge all appropriate information
regarding the basis for the selection of the facility, site,
or other location to which complementary access is
sought.
(2) CONTENT OF AFFIDAVITS FOR ADMINISTRA
TIVE SEARCH WARRANTS.—A judge of the United
States shall promptly issue an administrative search
warrant authorizing the requested complementary
access upon an affidavit submitted by the United States
Government—
(A) stating that the Additional Protocol is in force;
(B) stating that the designated facility, site, or other
location is subject to complementary access under
the Additional Protocol;
(C) stating that the purpose of the complementary
access is consistent with Article 4 of the Additional
Protocol;
(D) stating that the requested complementary access
is in accordance with Article 4 of the Additional
Protocol;
(E) containing assurances that the scope of the
IAEA’s complementary access, as well as what it
may collect, shall be limited to the access provided
for in Article 6 of the Additional Protocol;
(F) listing the items, documents, and areas to be
searched and seized;
(G) stating the earliest commencement and the
anticipated duration of the complementary access
period, as well as the expected times of day during
which such complementary access will take place;
and
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(H) stating that the location to which entry in
connection with complementary access is sought was
selected either—
(i) because there is probable cause, on the basis
of specific evidence, to believe that information
required to be reported regarding a location
pursuant to regulations promulgated under
this title is incorrect or incomplete, and that
the location to be accessed contains evidence
regarding that violation; or
(ii) pursuant to a reasonable general
administrative plan based upon specific neutral
criteria.
(3) CONTENT OF WARRANTS.—A warrant issued
under paragraph (2) shall specify the same matters
required of an affidavit under that paragraph. In
addition, each warrant shall contain the identities of
the representatives of the IAEA on the complementary
access team and the identities of the representatives or
designees of the United States Government required to
display identifying credentials under section 222(c).
SEC. 224. PROHIBITED ACTS RELATING TO
COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.
It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or
refuse to permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise impede,
a complementary access authorized by this subtitle or an
entry in connection with such access.
Subtitle C—Confidentiality of Information
SEC. 231. PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF
INFORMATION.
Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the
United States Government under this title or under the
Additional Protocol shall be exempt from disclosure under
section 552 of title 5, United States Code.
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Subtitle D—Enforcement
SEC. 241. RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS.
It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or
refuse—
(1) to establish or maintain any record required by any
regulation prescribed under this title;
(2) to submit any report, notice, or other information to
the United States Government in accordance with any
regulation prescribed under this title; or
(3) to permit access to or copying of any record by the
United States Government in accordance with any
regulation prescribed under this title.
SEC. 242. PENALTIES.
(a) CIVIL.—
(1) PENALTY AMOUNTS.—Any person that is
determined, in accordance with paragraph (2), to have
violated section 224 or section 241 shall be required by
order to pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed
$25,000 for each violation. For the purposes of this
paragraph, each day during which a violation of section
224 continues shall constitute a separate violation of
that section.
(2) NOTICE AND HEARING.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Before imposing a penalty
against a person under paragraph (1), the head of
an executive agency designated under section 211(a)
shall provide the person with notice of the order.
If, within 15 days after receiving the notice, the
person requests a hearing, the head of the designated
executive agency shall initiate a hearing on the
violation.
(B) CONDUCT OF HEARING.—Any hearing
so requested shall be conducted before an ad
ministrative judge. The hearing shall be conducted
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in accordance with the requirements of section 554
of title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is so
requested, the order imposed by the head of the
designated agency shall constitute a final agency
action.
(C) ISSUANCE OF ORDERS.—If the administrative
judge determines, upon the preponderance of the
evidence received, that a person named in the
complaint has violated section 224 or section 241, the
administrative judge shall state the findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and issue and serve on such
person an order described in paragraph (1).
(D) FACTORS FOR DETERMINATION OF
PENALTY AMOUNTS.—In determining the
amount of any civil penalty, the administrative
judge or the head of the designated agency shall
take into account the nature, circumstances, extent,
and gravity of the violation or violations and, with
respect to the violator, the ability to pay, effect on
ability to continue to do business, any history of such
violations, the degree of culpability, the existence
of an internal compliance program, and such other
matters as justice may require.
(E) CONTENT OF NOTICE.—For the purposes of
this paragraph, notice shall be in writing and shall be
verifiably served upon the person or persons subject
to an order described in paragraph (1). In addition,
the notice shall—
(i) set forth the time, date, and specific nature of
the alleged violation or violations; and
(ii) specify the administrative and judicial
remedies available to the person or persons
subject to the order, including the availability of a
hearing and subsequent appeal.
(3) ADMINISTRATIVE APPELLATE REVIEW.— The
decision and order of an administrative judge shall
be the recommended decision and order and shall be
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referred to the head of the designated executive agency
for final decision and order. If, within 60 days, the head
of the designated executive agency does not modify or
vacate the decision and order, it shall become a final
agency action under this subsection.
(4) JUDICIAL REVIEW.—A person adversely affected
by a final order may, within 30 days after the date
the final order is issued, file a petition in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the
Court of Appeals for the district in which the violation
occurred.
(5) ENFORCEMENT OF FINAL ORDERS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—If a person fails to comply with
a final order issued against such person under this
subsection and—
(i) the person has not filed a petition for judicial
review of the order in accordance with paragraph
(4), or
(ii) a court in an action brought under paragraph
(4) has entered a final judgment in favor of the
designated executive agency, the head of the
designated executive agency shall commence a
civil action to seek compliance with the final order
in any appropriate district court of the United
States.
(B) NO REVIEW.—In any such civil action, the
validity and appropriateness of the final order shall
not be subject to review.
(C) INTEREST.—Payment of penalties assessed in a
final order under this section shall include interest
at currently prevailing rates calculated from the
date of expiration of the 60day period referred to in
paragraph (3) or the date of such final order, as the
case may be.
(b) CRIMINAL.—Any person who violates section 224
or section 241 may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil
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penalty which may be imposed under subsection (a) for
such violation, be fined under title 18, United States Code,
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
SEC. 243. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.
(a) JURISDICTION.—The district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the head
of an executive agency designated under section 211(a)—
(1) to restrain any conduct in violation of section 224 or
section 241; or
(2) to compel the taking of any action required by or
under this title or the Additional Protocol.
(b) CIVIL ACTIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—A civil action described in
subsection (a) may be brought—
(A) in the case of a civil action described in
paragraph (1) of such subsection, in the United States
district court for the judicial district in which any act,
omission, or transaction constituting a violation of
section 224 or section 241 occurred or in which the
defendant is found or transacts business; or
(B) in the case of a civil action described in
paragraph (2) of such subsection, in the United States
district court for the judicial district in which the
defendant is found or transacts business.
(2) SERVICE OF PROCESS.—In any such civil action,
process shall be served on a defendant wherever the
defendant may reside or may be found.
Subtitle E—Environmental Sampling
SEC. 251. NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF IAEA
BOARD APPROVAL OF WIDE-AREA
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.
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(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date
on which the Board of Governors of the IAEA approves
wide-area environmental sampling for use as a safeguards
verification tool, the President shall notify the appropriate
congressional committees.
(b) CONTENT.—The notification under subsection (a)
shall contain—
(1) a description of the specific methods and sampling
techniques approved by the Board of Governors that
are to be employed for purposes of wide-area sampling;
(2) a statement as to whether or not such sampling may
be conducted in the United States under the Additional
Protocol; and
(3) an assessment of the ability of the approved
methods and sampling techniques to detect, identify,
and determine the conduct, type, and nature of nuclear
activities.
SEC. 252. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
EXCLUSION TO WIDE-AREA ENVIRONMENTAL
SAMPLING.
In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Pro
tocol, the United States shall not permit any wide-area
environmental sampling proposed by the IAEA to be con
ducted at a specified location in the United States under
Article 9 of the Additional Protocol unless the President
has determined and reported to the appropriate congres
sional committees with respect to that proposed use of en
vironmental sampling that—
(1) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling
is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect
undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a nonnuclear-weapon State Party;
(2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling
will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, activities,
or information of direct national security significance; and
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(3) the United States—
(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for
consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested
complementary access involving wide-area environmental sampling; or
(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional
Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access
in the United States that involves the use of wide-area
environmental sampling.
SEC. 253. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL
SECURITY EXCLUSION TO LOCATION-SPECIFIC
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.
In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Pro
tocol, the United States shall not permit any location-specific environmental sampling in the United States under
Article 5 of the Additional Protocol unless the President
has determined and reported to the appropriate congres
sional committees with respect to that proposed use of en
vironmental sampling that—
(1) the proposed use of location-specific environmental
sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the
IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the
territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party;
(2) the proposed use of location-specific environmental
sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations,
activities, or information of direct national security
significance; and
(3) with respect to the proposed use of environmental
sampling, the United States—
(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for
consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested
complementary access involving location-specific
environmental sampling; or
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(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional
Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access
in the United States that involves the use of locationspecific environmental sampling.
SEC. 254. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
As used in this subtitle, the term ‘‘necessary to increase
the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear
activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State
Party’’ shall not be construed to encompass proposed uses
of environmental sampling that might assist the IAEA in
detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a
non-nuclear-weapon State Party by—
(1) setting a good example of cooperation in the conduct of
such sampling; or
(2) facilitating the formation of a political consensus or
political support for such sampling in the territory of a
non-nuclear-weapon State Party.
Subtitle F—Protection of National Security Information
and Activities
SEC. 261. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN
INFORMATION.
(a) LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES OF DIRECT NATIONAL
SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE.—No current or former
Department of Defense or Department of Energy location,
site, or facility of direct national security significance shall
be declared or be subject to IAEA inspection under the
Additional Protocol.
(b) INFORMATION OF DIRECT NATIONAL SECURITY
SIGNIFICANCE.—No information of direct national secu
rity significance regarding any location, site, or facility
associated with activities of the Department of Defense or
the Department of Energy shall be provided under the Ad
ditional Protocol.
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(c) RESTRICTED DATA.—Nothing in this title shall be
construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the
IAEA or IAEA employees of restricted data controlled by
the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2011 et seq.), including in particular ‘‘Restricted Data’’ as
defined under paragraph (1) of section 11 y. of such Act (42
U.S.C. 2014(y)).
(d) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—Nothing in this Act
shall be construed to permit the communication or disclo
sure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of national security
information and other classified information.
SEC. 262. IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VISITS.
(a) CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS PROHIBITED FROM OB
TAINING ACCESS.—No national of a country designated
by the Secretary of State under section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) as a government
supporting acts of international terrorism shall be permitted access to the United States to carry out an inspection
activity under the Additional Protocol or a related safeguards agreement.
(b) PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
PERSONNEL.—IAEA inspectors shall be accompanied at
all times by United States Government personnel when in
specting sites, locations, facilities, or activities in the United
States under the Additional Protocol.
(c) VULNERABILITY AND RELATED ASSESSMENTS.—
The President shall conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related assessments not less than every 5 years
to ensure that information of direct national security
significance remains protected at all sites, locations,
facilities, and activities in the United States that are subject
to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol.
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Subtitle G—Reports
SEC. 271. REPORT ON INITIAL UNITED STATES
DECLARATION.
Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial United
States declaration to the IAEA under the Additional
Protocol, the President shall submit to Congress a list of
the sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the United
States that the President intends to declare to the IAEA,
and a report thereon.
SEC. 272. REPORT ON REVISIONS TO INITIAL
UNITED STATES DECLARATION.
Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA any
revisions to the United States declaration submitted under
the Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to
Congress a list of any sites, locations, facilities, or activities
in the United States that the President intends to add to or
remove from the declaration, and a report thereon.
SEC. 273. CONTENT OF REPORTS ON UNITED
STATES DECLARATIONS.
The reports required under section 271 and section 272
shall present the reasons for each site, location, facility,
and activity being declared or being removed from the
declaration list and shall certify that—
(1) each site, location, facility, and activity included in the
list has been examined by each agency with national
security equities with respect to such site, location, facility,
or activity; and
(2) appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that
information of direct national security significance will
not be compromised at any such site, location, facility, or
activity in connection with an IAEA inspection.
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SEC. 274. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS.
Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the
Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on—
(1) measures that have been or should be taken to achieve
the adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards
agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties;
and
(2) assistance that has been or should be provided by the
United States to the IAEA in order to promote the effective
implementation of additional protocols to existing
safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon
State Parties and the verification of the compliance of such
parties with IAEA obligations, with a plan for providing
any needed additional funding.
SEC. 275. NOTICE OF IAEA NOTIFICATIONS.
The President shall notify Congress of any notifications
issued by the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of
the Additional Protocol.
Subtitle H—Authorization of Appropriations
SEC. 281. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may
be necessary to carry out this title.
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